The Judge.—“Not the least in the world.”
M. Zola.—“Then there are differences in the thing judged?”
The Judge.—“The question will not be put. It is useless to debate it.”
M. Labori.—“No, it is not useless. Useless, perhaps, so far as obtaining a decision in our favor is concerned; but not useless from the standpoint of our cause, for everybody judges us, and the jurors follow these discussions with interest. But, as you say that discussion is useless, I shall have the honor to offer a motion, and await a decree of the court. I do not wish to detain M. Casimir-Perier longer, so I shall ask you, Monsieur le Président, on the ground of morality and good faith,—and I hope that no decree of the court will be needed to give us satisfaction on this point,—to ask M. Casimir-Perier the following question: If a secret document had been produced in any trial whatever, before any jurisdiction whatever, and if in this way an adverse verdict had been obtained, what would M. Casimir-Perier,—who will not, I am sure, in order to answer me, take refuge behind any sort of professional secrecy, since the question here is one of right and public morality, on which such men as Daguesseau have given an opinion before him,—what would M. Casimir-Perier think of it?”
The Judge.—“Allow me to tell you that it is useless to try to arrive by indirect questions at the same result. I will not put the question.”
M. Clemenceau.—“I think the court does not clearly understand my confrère’s question, which is this: If M. Casimir-Perier were to learn tomorrow that a person had been condemned on a document that had not been shown to him, what would be his opinion? It is a question of good faith. The high position that M. Casimir-Perier has occupied justifies us in asking his opinion.”
The Judge.—“It is not a fact; it is an opinion.”
M. Clemenceau.—“Then the court refuses to ask this question?”
The Judge.—“It is not a proper question to ask.”
M. Labori.—“Well, on this question, as on the others, we shall offer a motion.”