(In our own day, however, the imitators of Diogenes have chosen only what is easiest and least burdensome and have failed to see his nobler side. And as for you, in your desire to be more dignified than those early Cynics you have strayed so far from Diogenes' plan of life that you thought him an object of pity. But if you did not believe all this that I say about a man whom all the Greeks in the generation of Plato and Aristotle admired next to Socrates and Pythagoras, a man whose pupil was the teacher of the most modest and most wise Zeno,—and it is not likely that they were all deceived about a man as contemptible as you make him out to be in your travesty,—well, in that case, my dear sir, perhaps you might have studied his character more carefully and you would have progressed further in your knowledge of the man. Was there, I ask, a single Greek who was not amazed by the endurance of Diogenes and by his perseverance, which had in it a truly royal greatness of soul? The man used to sleep in his jar on a bed of leaves more soundly than the Great King on his soft couch under a gilded roof; he used to eat his crust[107] with a better appetite than you now eat your Sicilian courses[108]; he used to bathe his body in cold water and dry himself in the open air instead of with the linen towels with which you rub yourself down, my most philosophic friend! It becomes you well to ridicule him because, I suppose, like Themistocles you conquered Xerxes, or Darius like Alexander of Macedon. But if you had the least habit of reading books as I do, though I am a statesman and engrossed in public affairs, you would know how much Alexander is said to have admired Diogenes' greatness of soul. But you care little, I suppose, for any of these things. How should you care? Far from it![109] You admire and emulate the life of wretched women.)
Εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ λόγος τι πλέον ἐποίησεν, οὐκ ἐμὸν μᾶλλον ἢ σόν ἐστι κέρδος· εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν περαίνομεν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀπνευστὶ τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον συνείραντες· ἔστι γὰρ πάρεργον ἡμέραιν δυοῖν, ὡς ἴσασιν αἱ Μοῦσαι, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ σὺ[110] αὐτός· παραμενέτω μέν σοι ὁπόσα πρόσθεν ἐγνώκεις, ἡμῖν δὲ οὐ μεταμελήσει τῆς εἰς τὸν ἄνδρα εὐφημίας.
(However, if my discourse has improved you at all you will have gained more than I. But even if I accomplish nothing at the moment by writing on such a great subject thus hastily, and, as the saying is, without taking breath[111]—for I gave to it only the leisure of two days, as the Muses or rather you yourself will bear me witness—then do you abide by your former opinions, but I at any rate shall never regret having spoken of that great man with due reverence.)
Oration VII
Introduction to Oration VII
The Seventh Oration is directed against the Cynic Heracleios, who had ventured to recite before an audience when Julian was present a myth or allegory in which the gods were irreverently handled. Julian raises the question whether fables and myths are suitable for a Cynic discourse. He names the regular divisions of philosophy and decides that the use of myths may properly be allowed only to ethical philosophers and writers on theology: that myth is intended always as a means of religious teaching and should be addressed to children and those whose intellect does not allow them to envisage the truth without some such assistance. In Sallust's treatise On the Gods and the World he gives much the same account of the proper function of myths and divides them into five species, giving examples of each. “To wish to teach the whole truth about the gods to all produces contempt in the foolish, because they cannot understand, and lack of zeal in the good; whereas to conceal the truth by myths prevents the contempt of the foolish and compels the good to practise philosophy.”[112] This is precisely the opinion of Julian as expressed [pg 070] in the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Orations. Though both Julian and Sallust explain the myths away they are never rationalistic, and never offer the least excuse for scepticism. Julian's explanation of the Semele myth,[113] which makes Semele an inspired prophetess and not the mother of Dionysus, tends to the greater glory of the god. The conclusion is that Heracleios should not have used myth at all, but in any case he used the wrong sort and wrote in the wrong spirit. He should have used such a myth as that composed by Prodicus the sophist on the Choice of Heracles at the Crossroads, an allegory which is more than once cited by Julian and was a favourite illustration in later Greek literature.[114]