οὕτως ἡμεῖς ὑφ᾽ ἡγεμόσι τελούμενοι, φιλοσόφῳ μὲν τῷ τὰ τῆς προπαιδείας με τελέσαντι, φιλοσοφωτάτῳ δὲ τῷ τὰ πρόθυρα τῆς φιλοσοφίας δείξαντι, σμικρὰ μὲν διὰ τὰς ἔξωθεν ἡμῖν προσπεσούσας ἀσχολίας, [D] ὅμως δ᾽ οὖν ἀπελαύσαμεν τῆς ὀρθῆς ἀγωγῆς, οὐ τὴν σύντομον, ἣν σὺ φής, ἀλλὰ τὴν κύκλῳ πορευθέντες· καίτοι νὴ τοὺς θεοὺς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν οἶμαι ὅτι σου συντομωτέραν ἐτραπόμην. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῆς, [pg 152] εἰ μὴ φορτικὸν εἰπεῖν, ἐπὶ τοῖς προθύροις ἕστηκα, σὺ δὲ καὶ τῶν προθύρων εἶ πόρρω. σοὶ δὲ ἀρετῆς ἢ τοῖς σοῖς ἀδελφοῖς—, ἀφελὼν δὲ τὸ δύσφημον τὸ λειπόμενον αὐτὸς ἀναπλήρωσον· εἰ βούλει δέ, καὶ παρ᾽ ἡμῶν αὐτὸ ἀνάσχου πρᾴως λεγόμενον,—τίς μετουσία; [236] πᾶσιν ἐπιτιμᾷς αὐτὸς οὐδὲν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου πράττων, ἐπαινεῖς φορτικῶς ὡς οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀμαθεστάτων ῥητόρων, οἷς διὰ τὴν τῶν λόγων ἀπορίαν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν εὑρεῖν ἐκ τῶν παρόντων ὅ, τι φῶσιν, ἡ Δῆλος ἐπέρχεται καὶ ἡ Λητὼ μετὰ τῶν παίδων, εἶτα κύκνοι λιγυρὸν ᾄδοντες καὶ ἐπηχοῦντα αὐτοῖς τὰ δένδρα, λειμῶνές τε ἔνδροσοι μαλακῆς πόας καὶ βαθείας πλήρεις, ἥ τε ἐκ τῶν ἀνθέων ὀδμὴ καὶ τὸ ἔαρ αὐτὸ καί τινες εἰκόνες τοιαῦται. [B] ποῦ τοῦτο Ἰσοκράτης ἐν τοῖς ἐγκωμιαστικοῖς ἐποίησε λόγοις; ποῦ δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν τις ἀνδρῶν, οἳ ταῖς Μούσαις ἐτελοῦντο γνησίως, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὥσπερ οἱ νῦν; ἀφίημι δὲ τὰ ἑξῆς, ἵνα μὴ καὶ πρὸς τούτους ἀπεχθανόμενος ἅμα τοῖς τε φαυλοτάτοις τῶν Κυνικῶν καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων προσκρούσαιμι· ὡς ἔμοιγε πρός τε τοὺς κρατίστους τῶν Κυνικῶν, [pg 154] εἴ τις ἄρα ἔστι νῦν τοιοῦτος, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γενναίους ῥήτοράς [C] ἐστι φίλα[268] πάντα. τῶν μὲν δὴ τοιούτων λόγων, εἰ καὶ πολὺ πλῆθος ἐπιρρεῖ· καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅσον οὐχὶ λέγειν ἐθέλων τις ἐκ πάνυ δαψιλοῦς ἀντλήσειεν ἂν πίθου· τῆς προκειμένης ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας ἕνεκεν ἀφέξομαι. μικρὰ δὲ ἔτι τῷ λόγῳ προσθεὶς ὥσπερ ὀφλήματι τὸ ἐνδέον ἐπ᾽ [D] ἄλλο τι τρέψομαι, ταυτηνὶ τὴν ξυγγραφὴν αὐτοῦ που πληρώσας.
(Thus then I was initiated by those guides, in the first place by a philosopher who trained me in the preparatory discipline, and next by that most perfect philosopher who revealed to me the entrance to philosophy; and though I achieved but little on account of the engrossing affairs that overwhelmed me from without, still for all that I have had the benefit of right training, and have not travelled by the short road as you say you have, but have gone all the way round. Though indeed I call the gods to witness, I believe that the road I took was really a shorter road to virtue than yours. For I, at any rate, if I may say so without bad taste, am standing at the entrance, whereas you are a long way even from the entrance. “But as for virtue, you and your brethren—,”[269] omit the ill-sounding phrase and fill in the blank yourself! Or rather if you please, bear with me when I “put it mildly”[270]—“what part or lot have you in it?” You criticise everybody, though you yourself do nothing to deserve praise; your praises are in worse taste than those of the most ignorant rhetoricians. They, because they have nothing to say and cannot invent anything from the matter in hand, are always dragging in Delos and Leto with her children, and then “swans singing their shrill song and the trees that echo them,” and “dewy meadows full of soft, deep grass,” and the “scent of flowers,” and “the season of spring,” and other figures of the same sort.[271] When did Isocrates ever do this in his panegyrics? Or when did anyone of those ancient writers who were genuine votaries of the Muses, and not like the writers of to-day? However, I omit what I might add, lest I should make them also my enemies, and offend at once the most worthless Cynics and the most worthless rhetoricians. Though indeed I have nothing but friendly feelings for the really virtuous Cynics, if indeed there be any such nowadays, and also for all honest rhetoricians. But though a vast number of illustrations of this sort flow into my mind—for anyone who desired to use them could certainly draw from an ample jar[272]—I shall refrain because of the present pressure of business. However I have still somewhat to add to my discourse, like the balance of a debt, and before I turn to other matters let me complete this treatise.)
Τίς οὖν ἡ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν εὐλάβεια περὶ τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα, τίς δὲ ἡ Πλάτωνος; ποταπὸς δὲ ἦν ἐν τούτοις Ἀριστοτέλης; ἆρ᾽ οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτὸ ἰδεῖν; ἢ τὸν μὲν Σάμιον οὐδεὶς ἀντερεῖ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι; καὶ γὰρ οὔτε τὸ ὀνόματα θεῶν ἐν τῆς σφραγῖδι φορεῖν ἐπέτρεπεν οὔτε τὸ ὅρκῳ χρῆσθαι προπετῶς τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν. εἰ δὲ νῦν λέγοιμι, [237] ὅτι καὶ εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐπορεύθη καὶ Πέρσας εἶδε καὶ πανταχοῦ πάντα ἐπειράθη τὰ μυστήρια τῶν θεῶν ἐποπτεῦσαι καὶ τελεσθῆναι παντοίας πανταχοῦ τελετάς, ἐρῶ μὲν ἴσως ἄγνωστά σοι, γνώριμα μέντοι καὶ σαφῆ τοῖς πολλοῖς. ἀλλὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἄκουε· τὸ δ᾽ ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου. καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπῃ ἐκείνῃ φίλον, ταύτῃ προσαγορεύω· [B] τὴν δ᾽ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον· ταῦτα ἐν Φιλήβῳ λέγεται, καὶ τοιαῦτα ἕτερα πάλιν ἐν Τιμαίῳ· πιστεύειν γὰρ [pg 156] ἁπλῶς ἀξιοῖ καὶ χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως λεγομένοις, ὅσα ὑπὲρ τῶν θεῶν φασιν οἱ ποιηταί. ταῦτα δὲ παρέθηκα, μή ποτέ σοι παράσχῃ πρόφασιν, ὥσπερ οἶμαι τῶν Πλατωνικῶν πολλοῖς, ὁ Σωκράτης εἴρων ὢν φύσει τὴν Πλατωνικὴν ἀτιμάσαι δόξαν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐχ [C] ὁ Σωκράτης, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ Τίμαιος ταῦτα λέγει ἥκιστα ὢν εἴρων. καίτοι τοῦτό γέ ἐστιν οὐχ ὑγιὲς μὴ τὰ λεγόμενα ἐξετάζειν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς λέγοντας, καὶ τὸ πρὸς τίνας οἱ λόγοι γίγνονται. βούλει δῆτα[273] τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν πάνσοφον ὑπαγορεύσω σειρῆνα, τὸν τοῦ λογίου τύπον Ἑρμοῦ, τὸν τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι καὶ ταῖς Μούσαις φίλον; ἐκεῖνος ἀξιοῖ τοὺς ἐπερωτῶντας ἢ ζητεῖν ὅλως ἐπιχειροῦντας, εἰ θεοί εἰσιν, οὐχ ὡς ἀνθρώπους ἀποκρίσεως τυγχάνειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς [D] τὰ θηρία κολάσεως. εἰ δὲ ἀνεγνώκεις τὸν συστατικὸν[274] αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὃς ὥσπερ τῆς Πλάτωνος, οὕτω δὴ[275] καὶ τῆς ἐκείνου διατριβῆς προυγέγραπτο, ἔγνως ἂν πρὸ πάντων, ὅτι τὰ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εὐσεβεῖς εἶναι καὶ μεμυῆσθαι πάντα τὰ μυστήρια καὶ τετελέσθαι τὰς ἁγιωτάτας τελετὰς καὶ διὰ πάντων τῶν μαθημάτων ἦχθαι τοῖς εἴσω τοῦ περιπάτου βαδίζουσι προηγόρευτο.[276]
(I ask you then what reverence for the names of the gods was shown by the Pythagoreans and by Plato? What was Aristotle's attitude in these matters? Is it not worth while to pay attention to this? Or surely no one will deny that he of Samos[277] was reverent? For he did not even allow the names of the gods to be used on a seal, nor oaths to be rashly uttered in the names of the gods. And if I should go on to say that he also travelled to Egypt and visited Persia, and everywhere endeavoured to be admitted to the inner mysteries of the gods and everywhere to be initiated into every kind of rite, I shall be saying what is familiar and obvious to most people, though you may not have heard of it. However, listen to what Plato says: “But for my part, Protarchus, I feel a more than human awe, indeed a fear beyond expression, of the names of the gods. Now therefore I will address Aphrodite by whatever name pleases her best; though as for pleasure, I know that it has many forms.” This is what he says in the Philebus[278] and he says the same sort of thing again in the Timaeus.[279] For he says that we ought to believe directly and without proof what we are told, I mean what the poets say about the gods. And I have brought forward this passage for fear that Socrates may furnish you with an excuse,—as I believe he does to many Platonists because of his natural tendency to irony,—to slight the doctrine of Plato. For it is not Socrates who is speaking here, but Timaeus, who had not the least tendency to irony. Though for that matter it is not a sound principle to enquire who says a thing and to whom, rather than the actual words. But now will you allow me to cite next that all-wise Siren, the living image of Hermes the god of eloquence, the man dear to Apollo and the Muses?[280] Well, he declares that all who raise the question or seek to enquire at all whether gods exist ought not to be answered as though they were men but to be chastised as wild beasts. And if you had read that introductory sentence which was inscribed over the entrance to his school, like Plato's, you would most surely know that those who entered the Lyceum were warned to be reverent to the gods, to be initiated into all the mysteries, to take part in the most sacred ceremonies, and to be instructed in knowledge of every kind.)
[238] Σὺ δὲ ὅπως ἡμῖν μὴ τὸν Διογένη προβαλὼν ὥσπερ τι μορμολυκεῖον ἐκφοβήσεις.[281] οὐ γὰρ ἐμυήθη, φασίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν προτρεπόμενον μυηθῆναι, Γελοῖον, εἶπεν, ὦ νεανίσκε, εἰ τοὺς μὲν τελώνας οἴει ταύτης ἕνεκα τῆς τελετῆς κοινωνήσειν τοῖς ὁσίοις τῶν ἐν ᾅδου καλῶν, Ἀγησίλαον [pg 158] δὲ καὶ Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ἐν τῷ βορβόρῳ κείσεσθαι. τοῦτο, ὦ νεανίσκε, βαθὺ λίαν ἐστὶ καὶ δεόμενον ἐξηγήσεως, [B] ὡς ἐμαυτὸν πείθω, μείζονος, ὁποίας[282] ἡμῖν αὐταὶ δοῖεν αἱ θεαὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν; νομίζω δὲ αὐτὴν ἤδη καὶ δεδόσθαι. φαίνεται γὰρ ὁ Διογένης οὐχ, ὥσπερ ὑμεῖς ἀξιοῦτε, δυσσεβής, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνοις, ὧν μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἐπεμνήσθην, προσόμοιος. ἀπιδὼν γὰρ εἰς τὴν περίστασιν τὴν καταλαβοῦσαν αὐτόν, εἶτα εἰς τὰς ἐντολὰς βλέπων τοῦ Πυθίου καὶ συνιεὶς[283] ὅτι τὸν μυούμενον ἐχρῆν πολιτογραφηθῆναι πρότερον καὶ Ἀθηναῖον, [C] εἰ καὶ μὴ φύσει, τῷ νόμῳ γε γενέσθαι, τοῦτο ἔφυγεν, οὐ τὸ μυηθῆναι, νομίζων αὑτὸν εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου πολίτην, καὶ ταῖς ὅλαις τῶν θεῶν οὐσίαις, αἳ τὸν ὅλον κοινῇ κόσμον ἐπιτροπεύουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταῖς τὰ μέρη κατανειμαμέναις αὐτοῦ, διὰ μεγαλοφροσύνην ἀξιῶν συμπολιτεύεσθαι· τό τε νόμιμον οὐ παρέβη αἰδοῖ τῶν θεῶν, καίτοι τἆλλα πατῶν καὶ παραχαράττων· αὑτόν [D] τε οὐκ ἐπανήγαγεν, ὄθεν ἄσμενος ἠλευθέρωτο. τί δ᾽ ἦν τοῦτο; τὸ πόλεως μιᾶς δουλεῦσαι νόμοις ἑαυτόν τε ὑποθεῖναι τούτῳ, ὅπερ ἦν ἀνάγκη παθεῖν Ἀθηναίῳ γενομένῳ. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἔμελλεν ὁ τῶν θεῶν ἕνεκεν εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν βαδίζων, ὁ τῷ Πυθίῳ πεισθεὶς καὶ φιλοσοφήσας ὥσπερ Σωκράτης· φησὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι Πύθιον οἴκοι παρ᾽ ἑαυτῷ, ὅθεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἡ ὁρμὴ [pg 160] πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν ἐγένετο· [239] παριέναι τῶν ἀνακτόρων εἴσω καὶ μάλα ἀσμένως, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο ἐξέκλινε τὸ ὑποθεῖναι νόμοις ἑαυτὸν καὶ δοῦλον ἀποφῆναι πολιτείας; ἀλλὰ διὰ τί μὴ ταύτην αὐτὴν εἶπε τὴν αἰτίαν, ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ τὴν παραιρουμένην οὐ σμικρὰ τῆς τῶν μυστηρίων σεμνότητος; ἴσως μὲν ἄν τις τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ Πυθαγόρᾳ μάλιστα ἐπισκήψειεν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς λογιζόμενος. οὔτε γὰρ ῥητέον πάντα ἐστίν, αὐτῶν τε οἶμαι τούτων, ὧν θέμις φάναι, ἔνια πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς σιωπητέον εἶναί μοι φαίνεται. [B] φανερὰ δὲ ὅμως ἐστὶ καὶ τούτων ἡ αἰτία. κατανοήσας γὰρ ἀμελοῦντα μὲν τῆς περὶ τὸν βίον ὀρθότητος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ μεμυῆσθαι μέγα φρονοῦντα[284] τὸν παραινοῦντα αὐτῷ τοιαῦτα, σωφρονίζων ἅμα καὶ διδάσκων αὐτόν, ὅτι τοῖς[285] μέν, οἷς ἀξίως τοῦ μυηθῆναι βεβίωται, καὶ μὴ μυηθεῖσιν οἱ θεοὶ [C] τὰς ἀμοιβὰς ἀκεραίους φυλάττουσι, τοῖς δὲ μοχθηροῖς οὐδέν ἐστι πλέον, κἂν εἴσω τῶν ἱερῶν εἰσφρήσωσι περιβόλων. ἢ γὰρ οὐ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ ἱεροφάντης προαγορεύει, ὅστις χεῖρα μὴ καθαρὸς καὶ ὅντινα μὴ χρή, τούτοις ἀπαγορεύων μὴ μυεῖσθαι;
(And do not try to frighten me by bringing forward Diogenes as a sort of bogey. He was never initiated, they tell us, and replied to some one who once advised him to be initiated: “It is absurd of you, my young friend, to think that any tax-gatherer, if only he be initiated, can share in the rewards of the just in the next world, while Agesilaus and Epameinondas are doomed to lie in the mire.”[286] Now this, my young friend, is a very hard saying and, I am persuaded, calls for more profound discussion. May the goddesses themselves grant us understanding thereof! Though indeed I think that has already been bestowed by them. For it is evident that Diogenes was not impious, as you aver, but resembled those philosophers whom I mentioned a moment ago. For having regard to the circumstances in which his lot was cast, and next paying heed to the commands of the Pythian god, and knowing that the candidate for initiation must first be registered as an Athenian citizen, and if he be not an Athenian by birth must first become one by law, it was this he avoided, not initiation, because he considered that he was a citizen of the world; and moreover such was the greatness of his soul that he thought he ought to associate himself with the divine nature of all the gods who in common govern the whole universe, and not only with those whose functions are limited to certain portions of it. And out of reverence for the gods he did not transgress their laws, though he trampled on all other opinions and tried to give a new stamp to the common currency. And he did not return to that servitude from which he had joyfully been released. What servitude do I mean? I mean that he would not enslave himself to the laws of a single city and submit himself to all that must needs befall one who had become an Athenian citizen. For is it likely that a man who in order to honour the gods journeyed to Olympia, and like Socrates embraced philosophy in obedience to the Pythian oracle,—for he says himself that at home and in private he received the commands of that oracle and hence came his impulse to philosophy[287]—is it likely I say that such a man would not very gladly have entered the temples of the gods but for the fact that he was trying to avoid submitting himself to any set of laws and making himself the slave of any one constitution? But why, you will say, did he not assign this reason, but on the contrary a reason that detracted not a little from the dignity of the Mysteries? Perhaps one might bring this same reproach against Pythagoras as well, but the reasoning would be incorrect. For everything ought not to be told, nay more, even of those things that we are permitted to declare, some, it seems to me, we ought to refrain from uttering to the vulgar crowd.[288] However the explanation in this case is obvious. For since he perceived that the man who exhorted him to be initiated neglected to regulate his own life aright, though he prided himself on having been initiated, Diogenes wished at the same time to reform his morals and to teach him that the gods reserve their rewards without stint for those whose lives have earned them the right to be initiated, even though they have not gone through the ceremony, whereas the wicked gain nothing by penetrating within the sacred precincts. For this is what the hierophant proclaims, when he refuses the rite of initiation to him “whose hands are not pure or who for any reason ought not![289]”)
Τί πέρας ἡμῖν ἔσται τῶν λόγων, εἰ ταῦτα μήπω σε πείθει;
(But where would this discourse end if you are still unconvinced by what I have said?)