ΘΕΜΙΣΤΙΩΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΩΙ
(To Themistius the Philosopher)
Ἐγώ σοι βεβαιῶσαι μέν, ὥσπερ οὖν γράφεις, τὰς ἐλπίδας καὶ σφόδρα εὔχομαι, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ διαμάρτω, μείζονος οὔσης τῆς ὑποσχέσεως, ἣν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ πρός τε τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας καὶ ἔτι μᾶλλον πρὸς σεαυτὸν ποιῇ· καί μοι πάλαι μὲν οἰομένῳ πρός τε τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ τὸν Μάρκον, καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος γέγονεν ἀρετῇ διαφέρων, [B] εἶναι τὴν ἅμιλλαν φρίκη τις προσῄει καὶ δέος θαυμαστόν, μὴ τοῦ μὲν ἀπολείπεσθαι παντελῶς τῆς ἀνδρείας δόξω, τοῦ δὲ τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς οὐδὲ ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον ἐφίκωμαι. εἰς ταῦτα ἀφορῶν ἀνεπειθόμην τὴν σχολὴν ἐπαινεῖν, καὶ τῶν Ἀττικῶν διαιτημάτων[370] αὐτός τε ἡδέως ἐμεμνήμην καὶ τοῖς φίλοις ὑμῖν προσᾴδειν ἠξίουν, ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ βαρέα φορτία φέροντες ἐν ταῖς ᾠδαῖς ἐπικουφίζουσιν αὑτοῖς τὴν ταλαιπωρίαν. [C] σὺ δέ μοι νῦν μεῖζον ἐποίησας διὰ τῆς ἔναγχος ἐπιστολῆς τὸ δέος καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα τῷ παντὶ χαλεπώτερον ἔδειξας, ἐν ταύτῃ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τετάχθαι με τῇ μερίδι λέγων, ἐν ᾗ πρότερον Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Διόνυσος ἐγενέσθην φιλοσοφοῦντες ὁμοῦ καὶ βασιλεύοντες καὶ πᾶσαν [pg 204] σχεδὸν [254] τῆς ἐπιπολαζούσης κακίας ἀνακαθαιρόμενοι γῆν τε καὶ θάλατταν. κελεύεις δὲ πᾶσαν ἀποσεισάμενον σχολῆς ἔννοιαν καὶ ῥᾳστώνης σκοπεῖν, ὅπως τῆς ὑποθέσεως ἀξίως ἀγωνιούμεθα· εἶτα ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τῶν νομοθετῶν μέμνησαι, Σόλωνος, Πιττακοῦ, Λυκούργου, καὶ τούτων ἁπάντων μείζονα χρῆναι παρ᾽ ἡμῶν λέγεις τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν δίκῃ νῦν περιμένειν. τούτοις ἐγὼ τοῖς λόγοις ἐντυχὼν ἐξεπλάγην μικροῦ· [B] σοὶ μὲν γὰρ ὑπελάμβανον οὐδαμῶς θεμιτὸν κολακεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι, ἐμαυτῷ δὲ συνειδὼς φύσεως μὲν ἕνεκα διαφέρον οὐδὲν οὔτε ἐξ ἀρχῆς οὔτε νῦν ὑπάρξαν, φιλοσοφίας δὲ ἐρασθέντι μόνον· τὰς γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ σιγῶ τύχας, αἵ μοι τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον ἀτελῆ τέως ἐφύλαξαν· οὐκ εἴχον οὖν ὅ, τι χρὴ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων συμβαλεῖν, ἕως ἐπὶ νοῦν ἤγαγεν ὁ θεός, [C] μή ποτε ἄρα προτρέπειν ἐθέλεις διὰ τῶν ἐπαίνων καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων δεῖξαι τὸ μέγεθος, οἷς ἀνάγκη πᾶσα τὸν ἐν πολιτείᾳ ζῶντα παραβεβλῆσθαι τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον.
(I earnestly desire to fulfil your hopes of me even as you express them in your letter, but I am afraid I shall fall short of them, since the expectations you have raised both in the minds of others, and still more in your own, are beyond my powers. There was a time when I believed that I ought to try to rival men who have been most distinguished for excellence, Alexander, for instance, or Marcus;[371] but I shivered at the thought and was seized with terror lest I should fail entirely to come up to the courage of the former, and should not make even the least approach to the latter's perfect virtue. With this in mind I convinced myself that I preferred a life of leisure, and I both gladly recalled the Attic manner of living, and thought myself to be in sweet accord with you who are my friends, just as those who carry heavy burdens lighten their labour by singing.[372] But by your recent letter you have increased my fears, and you point to an enterprise in every way more difficult. You say that God has placed me in the same position as Heracles and Dionysus of old who, being at once philosophers and kings, purged almost the whole earth and sea of the evils that infested them. You bid me shake off all thought of leisure and inactivity that I may prove to be a good soldier worthy of so high a destiny. And besides those examples you go on to remind me of law-givers such as Solon, Pittacus, and Lycurgus, and you say that men have the right to expect from me now greater things than from any of these. When I read these words I was almost dumbfounded; for on the one hand I was sure that it was unlawful for you as a philosopher to flatter or deceive; on the other hand I am fully conscious that by nature there is nothing remarkable about me—there never was from the first nor has there come to be now,—but as regards philosophy I have only fallen in love with it (I say nothing of the fates that have intervened[373] to make that love so far ineffectual). I could not tell therefore how I ought to interpret such expressions, until God brought it into my mind that perhaps by your very praises you wished to exhort me, and to point out how great are those trials to which a statesman must inevitably be exposed every day of his life.)
Τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτρέποντός ἐστι πλέον ἢ πρὸς τὸν βίον παρορμῶντος. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις τὸν πορθμὸν τὸν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν πλέων καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτον ῥᾳδίως οὐδὲ εὐκόλως ὑφιστάμενος ἀκούοι παρά του μαντικὴν ἐπαγγελλομένου τέχνην, [D] ὡς χρεὼν αὐτὸν τὸν Αἰγαῖον ἀναμετρῆσαι καὶ τὸν Ἰόνιον καὶ τῆς ἔξω θαλάσσης ἅψασθαι, καὶ “Νῦν μὲν” ὁρᾷς ὁ προφήτης λέγοι “τείχη καὶ λιμένας, ἐκεῖ δὲ γενόμενος [pg 206] οὐδὲ σκοπιὰν οὐδὲ πέτραν ὄψει, ἀλλ᾽ ἀγαπήσεις καὶ ναῦν πόρρωθεν κατιδὼν προσειπεῖν τοὺς ἐμπλέοντας, καὶ τῆς γῆς ὀψέ ποτε ἁψάμενος, τῷ θεῷ πολλάκις προσεύξῃ, πρὸς αὐτῷ γοῦν τῷ τέλει τοῦ βίου τυχεῖν [255] ὅρμου καὶ τήν τε ναῦν σώαν παραδοῦναι καὶ τοὺς ἐμπλέοντας ἀπαθεῖς τοῖς οἰκείοις κακῶν παραστῆσαι καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ μητρὶ γῇ δοῦναι, τοῦτο δὲ ἐσόμενον ἴσως ἄδηλον ἔσται σοι μέχρι τῆς τελευταίας ἐκείνης ἡμέρας·” ἆρ᾽ οἴει τούτων ἀκούσαντα τῶν λόγων ἐκεῖνον πόλιν γ᾽ ἂν[374] οἰκεῖν ἑλέσθαι πλησίον θαλάσσης, οὐχὶ δὲ χαίρειν εἰπόντα πλούτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐξ ἐμπορίας ἀγαθοῖς περιγιγνομένοις, γνωρέμων πολλῶν, ξενικῆς φιλίας, [B] ἱστορίας ἐθνῶν καὶ πόλεων ὑπεριδόντα σοφὸν ἀποφαίνειν τὸν τοῦ Νεοκλέους, ὃς κελεύει λαθεῖν βιώσαντα; καὶ σὺ δὲ ἕοικας τοῦτο καταμαθὼν προκαταλαμβάνειν ἡμᾶς ταῖς εἰς τὸν Ἐπίκουρον λοιδορίαις καὶ προεξαιρεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην γνώμην. φὴς γάρ που σχολὴν ἐπαινεῖν ἀπράγμονα καὶ διαλέξεις ἐν περιπάτοις προσήκειν ἐκείνῳ· [C] ἐγὲ δὲ ὅτι μὲν οὐ καλῶς Ἐπικούρῳ ταῦτα ἐδόκει, πάλαι καὶ σφόδρα πείθομαι· εἰ δὲ πάνθ᾽ ὁντινοῦν ἐπὶ πολιτείαν προτρέπειν ἄξιον, καὶ τὸν ἧττον πεφυκότα καὶ τὸν οὔπω τελέως δυνάμενον, ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἴσως διαπορῆσαι χρή. λέγουσι γάρ τοι καὶ τὸν Σωκράτη πολλοὺς μὲν οὐ σφόδρα εὐφυῶς[375] ἔχοντας ἀπαγαγεῖν τοῦ βήματος, [pg 208] καὶ Γλαύκωνα ἐκεῖνον, Ξενοφῶν λέγει· τὸν δὲ[376] τοῦ Κλεινίου παῖδα πειραθῆναι μὲν ἐπισχεῖν, [D] οὐ δυνηθῆναι δὲ περιγενέσθαι τοῦ νεανίσκου τῆς ὁρμῆς. ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἄκοντας καὶ ξυνιέντας αὑτῶν προσαναγκάσομεν, θαρρεῖν ὑπὲρ τηλικούτων ἔργων κελεύοντες, ὧν οὐκ ἀρετὴ μόνον ἐστὶν οὐδὲ προαίρεσις ὀρθὴ κυρία, πολὺ δὲ πλέον ἡ τύχη κρατοῦσα πανταχοῦ καὶ βιαζομένη ῥέπειν ᾗπερ ἂν ἐθέλῃ τὰ πράγματα; Χρύσιππος δὲ δοκεῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα σοφὸς εἶναι καὶ νομισθῆναι δικαίως, ἀγνοήσας δὲ τὴν τύχην καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον καί τινας ἄλλας αἰτίας [256] τοιαύτας ἔξωθεν τοῖς πρακτικοῖς παρεμπιπτούσας οὐ σφόδρα ὁμολογούμενα λέγειν οἷς ὁ χρόνος ἡμᾶς διὰ μυρίων ἐναργῶς διδάσκει παραδειγμάτων. ποῦ γὰρ εὐτυχῆ καὶ μακάριον Κάτωνα φήσομεν; ποῦ δὲ Δίωνα τὸν Σικελιώτην εὐδαίμονα; οἷς τοῦ μὲν ἀποθανεῖν ἔμελεν ἴσως οὐδέν, τοῦ δὲ μὴ λείπειν ἀτελεῖς τὰς πράξεις, ἐφ᾽ ἃς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὥρμησαν, [B] καὶ σφόδρα ἔμελε, καὶ πάντα ἂν εἵλοντο παθεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου. σφαλέντες δὲ ἐν ἐκείνοις εἰ μὲν εὐσχημόνως ἔφερον, ὥσπερ οὖν λέγεται, τὴν τύχην παραμυθίαν ἔσχον ἐκ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὐ μικράν, εὐδαίμονες δὲ οὐκ ἂν λέγοιντο τῶν καλλίστων πράξεων διημαρτηκότες, πλὴν ἴσως διὰ τὴν Στωικὴν ἔνστασιν· πρὸς ἣν ῥητέον, ὡς οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἐπαινεῖσθα καὶ μακαρίζεσθαι, καὶ εἰ φύσει τὸ ζῷον εὐδαιμονίας ὀρέγεται, [C] κρεῖττον εἶναι τὸ κατ᾽ [pg 210] ἐκείνην μακαριστὸν τέλος τοῦ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐπαινετοῦ. ἥκιστα δὲ φιλεῖ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἡ βεβαιότης τῇ τύχῃ πιστεύειν. καὶ τοὺς ἐν πολιτείᾳ ζῶντας οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἔνευ ταύτης ἀναπνεῖν τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον ...[377] ἀληθῶς θεωροῦντες εἴτε καὶ πεποιήκασι καὶ στρατηγὸν λόγῳ[378], καθάπερ οἱ τὰς ἰδέας εἴτε καὶ ψευδῶς ξυντιθέντες, ἐν τοῖς ἀσωμάτοις καὶ νοητοῖς ἱδρῦσθαί που τῶν τυχαίων ὑπεράνω πάντων, ἢ τὸν Διογένους ἐκεῖνον
(But your method is more likely to discourage than to make one eager for such an existence. Suppose that a man were navigating your strait,[379] and were finding even that none too easy or safe, and then suppose some professional soothsayer should tell him that he would have to traverse the Aegaean and then the Ionian Sea, and finally embark on the outer sea. “Here,” that prophet would say, “you see towns and harbours, but when you arrive there you will see not so much as a watch-tower or a rock, but you will be thankful to descry even a ship in the distance and to hail her crew. You will often pray to God that you may, however late, touch land and reach a harbour, though that were to be the last day of your life. You will pray to be allowed to bring home your ship safe and sound and restore your crew unscathed to their friends, and then to commit your body to mother earth. And this indeed may happen, but you will not be sure of it until that final day.” Do you think that such a man after being told all this would choose even to live in a sea-port town? Would he not bid adieu to money-making and all the advantages of commerce, and caring little for troops of friends and acquaintances abroad, and all that he might learn about nations and cities, would he not approve the wisdom of the son of Neocles[380] who bids us “Live in obscurity”? Indeed, you apparently perceived this, and by your abuse of Epicurus you tried to forestall me and to eradicate beforehand any such purpose. For you go on to say that it was to be expected that so idle a man as he should commend leisure and conversations during walks. Now for my part I have long been firmly convinced that Epicurus was mistaken in that view of his, but whether it be proper to urge into public life any and every man, both him who lacks natural abilities and him who is not yet completely equipped, is a point that deserves the most careful consideration. We are told that Socrates dissuaded from the statesman's profession[381] many who had no great natural talent, and Glaucon too, Xenophon[382] tells us; and that he tried to restrain the son of Cleinias[383] also, but could not curb the youth's impetuous ambition. Then shall we try to force into that career men who are reluctant and conscious of their deficiencies, and urge them to be self-confident about such great tasks? For in such matters not virtue alone or a wise policy is paramount, but to a far greater degree Fortune holds sway throughout and compels events to incline as she wills. Chrysippus[384] indeed, though in other respects he seems a wise man and to have been rightly so esteemed, yet in ignoring fortune and chance and all other such external causes that fall in to block the path of men of affairs, he uttered paradoxes wholly at variance with facts about which the past teaches us clearly by countless examples. For instance, shall we call Cato a fortunate and happy man? Or shall we say that Dio of Sicily had a happy lot? It is true that for death they probably cared nothing, but they did care greatly about not leaving unfinished the undertakings which they had originally set on foot, and to secure that end there is nothing that they would not have endured. In that they were disappointed, and I admit that they bore their lot with great dignity, as we learn, and derived no small consolation from their virtue; but happy one could not call them, seeing that they had failed in all those noble enterprises, unless perhaps according to the Stoic conception of happiness. And with regard to that same Stoic conception we must admit that to be applauded and to be counted happy are two very different things, and that if every living thing naturally desires happiness,[385] it is better to make it our aim to be congratulated on the score of happiness rather than to be applauded on the score of virtue. But happiness that depends on the chances of Fortune is very rarely secure. And yet men who are engaged in public life cannot, as the saying is, so much as breathe unless she is on their side ... and they have created a merely verbal idea of a leader who is established somewhere above all the chances of Fortune in the sphere of things incorporeal and intelligible, just as men define the ideas, whether envisaging them truly or falsely imagining them. Or again they give us the ideal man, according to Diogenes)
Ἄπολιν, [D] ἄοικον, πατρίδος ἐστερημένον,
(“The man without a city, without a home, bereft of a fatherland,”[386])
οὐκ ἔχοντα μὲν εἰς ὅ,τι παρ᾽ αὐτῆς εὖ πάθῃ καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐν τίνι σφαλῇ· τοῦτον δὲ ὃν ἡ συνήθεια καλεῖν εἴωθε καὶ Ὅμηρος πρῶτος,
(that is to say, a man who can gain nothing from Fortune, and on the other hand has nothing to lose. But one whom we are in the habit of calling, as Homer did first,)