χρύσεα χαλκείων, ἑκατόμβοι᾽ ἐννεαβοίων
(“gold for bronze, the price of a hundred oxen for the price of nine”?[397])
ἔφην ἀντηλλάχθαι; οὕτως ἀντὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ἑστίας τὴν Ἑλλάδα λαχὼν ἐγανύμην, οὐχ ἀγρόν, οὐ κῆπον, οὐ δωμάτιον ἐκεῖ κεκτημένος.
So great was my joy at obtaining the chance to live in Greece instead of in my own home, though I possessed there no land or garden or the humblest house.
Ἁλλὰ ἴσως ἔοικα ἐγὼ τὰς μὲν δυσπραγίας οὐκ ἀγεννῶς φέρειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰς παρὰ τῆς τύχης δωρεὰς ἀγεννής τις εἶναι καὶ μικρός, ὅ γε ἀγαπῶν τὰς Ἀθήνας μᾶλλον τοῦ νῦν περὶ ἡμᾶς ὄγκου, τὴν σχολὴν δήπουθεν ἐκείνην ἐπαινῶν, διὰ δὲ τὸ [C] πλῆθος τῶν πράξεων τοῦτον αἰτιώμενος τὸν βίον; ἀλλὰ μή ποτε χρὴ περὶ ἡμῶν ἄμεινον κρίνειν, οὐκ εἰς ἀπραξίαν καὶ πρᾶξιν βλέποντας, μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτὸν καὶ τὸ
(But perhaps you think that though I can bear adversity in the proper spirit, yet I show a poor and mean spirit towards the good gifts of Fortune, seeing that I prefer Athens to the pomp that now surrounds me; because, you will doubtless say, I approve the leisure of those days and disparage my present life because of the vast amount of work that the latter involves. But perhaps you ought to judge of me more accurately, and not consider the question whether I am idle or industrious, but rather the precept, “Know thyself,” and the saying,)
Ἔρδοι δ᾽ ἕκαστος ἥντιν᾽ εἰδείη τέχνην.
(“Let every man practise the craft which he knows.”[398])
Μεῖζον ἔμοιγε φαίνεται τὸ βασιλεύειν ἢ κατ᾽ ἄνθρωπον καὶ φύσεως δεῖσθαι δαιμονιωτέρας βασιλεύς, [D] ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγε· καὶ νῦν Ἀριστοτέλους εἰς ταῦτὸ συντείνοντα παραγράψω λόγον, οὐ γλαῦκα Ἀθηναίοις ἄγων, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι μὴ παντάπασιν ἀμελῶ τῶν ἐκείνου λόγων ἐπιδεικνύμενος. φησὶ δὲ ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς συγγράμμασιν· “Εἱ δὲ δή τις ἄριστον θείη τὸ βασιλεύεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσι, τῶς ἕξει τὰ περὶ τῶν τέκνων; πότερον καὶ τὸ γένος δεῖ βασιλεύειν; ἀλλὰ γιγνομένων ὁποῖοί τινες ἔτυχον, βλαβερόν. ἀλλὰ οὐ παραδώσει [261] κύριος ὢν τοῖς τέκνοις; ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔτι ῥᾴδιον τοῦτο πιστεῦσαι· χαλεπὸν γὰρ καὶ μείζονος ἀρετῆς ἢ κατ᾽ ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν.” ἑξῆς δὲ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ νόμον λεγομένου βασιλέως διεξελθών, ὡς[399] ἐστὶν ὑπηρέτης καὶ φύλαξ τῶν νόμων, καὶ τοῦτον οὐδὲ βασιλέα καλῶν, οὐδὲ τὸν τοιοῦτον εἶδος πολιτείας[400] οἰόμενος, προστίθησι· “[B] Περὶ δὲ τῆς παμβασιλείας καλουμένης, αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστὶ καθ᾽ ἣν ἄρχει πάντων κατὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν ὁ βασιλεύς, δοκεῖ τισιν οὐδὲ κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι τὸ κύριον ἕνα πάντων εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν· τοῖς γὰρ ὁμοίοις φύσει τὸ αὐτὸ δίκαιον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.” εἶτα μετ᾽ ὀλίγον φησίν· “Ὁ μὲν οὖν τὸν νοῦν κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύειν ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς νόμους· ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπον κελεύων [pg 222] προστίθησι καὶ θηρία· [C] ἥ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοιοῦτον καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ὃς[401] διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρασ· διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως ὁ νοῦς νόμος ἐστίν.” ὁρᾷς, ὁ φιλόσοφος ἔοικεν ἐνταῦθα σαφῶς ἀπιστοῦντι καὶ κατεγνωκότι τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως. φησὶ γὰρ οὕτω ῥήματι τοῦτο λέγων· οὐδεμίαν ἀξιόχρεων εἶναι φύσιν ἀνθρωπίνην πρὸς τοσαύτην τύχης ὑπεροχήν· [D] οὔτε γὰρ τῶν παίδων τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς πολίταις συμφέρον προτιμᾶν ἄνθρωπόν γε ὄντα ῥᾴδιον ὑπολαμβάνει, καὶ πολλῶν ὁμοίων ἄρχειν οὐ δίκαιον εἶναί φησι, καὶ τέλος ἐπιθεὶς τὸν κολοφῶνα τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λόγοις νόμον μὲν εἶναί φησι τὸν νοῦν χωρὶς ὀρέξεως, ᾧ μόνῳ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπιτρέπειν χρῆναι, ἀνδρῶν δὲ οὐδενί. ὁ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς νοῦς, κἂν ὦσιν ἀγαθοί, συμπέπλεκται θυμῷ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ, θηρίοις χαλεπωτάτοις. ταῦτα ἐμοὶ [262] δοκεῖ τοῖς τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἄκρως ὁμολογεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι κρείττονα χρὴ τῶν ἀρχομένων εἶναι τὸν ἄρχοντα, οὐκ ἐπιτηδεύσει μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει διαφέροντα· ὅπερ εὑρεῖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις οὐ ῥᾴδιον·[402] ... καὶ τρίτον ὅτι πάσῃ μηχανῇ κατὰ δύναμιν νόμοις προσεκτέον οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα κειμένοις οὐδὲ ὡς ἔοικε νῦν τεθεῖσιν ὑπ᾽ ἀνδρῶν οὐ πάντη κατὰ νοῦν βεβιωκότων, ἀλλ᾽ ὅστις μᾶλλον τὸν νοῦν καθαρθεὶς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ εἰς τὰ παρόντα [B] ἀφορῶν ἀδικήματα οὐδὲ εἰς [pg 224] τὰς παρεστώσας τύχας τίθησι τοὺς νόμους, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς πολιτείας φύσιν καταμαθὼν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οἷόν[403] ἐστι τῇ φύσει καὶ ποταπόν ἐστι τἀδίκημα τεθεαμένος τῇ φύσει, εἶθ᾽ ὅσα δυνατὸν ἐστιν ἐκεῖθεν ἐνταῦθα μεταφέρων καὶ τιθεὶς νόμους τοῖς πολίταις κοινούς, οὔτε εἰς φιλίαν οὔτε εἰς ἔχθραν ἀφορῶν [C] οὔτε εἰς γείτονα καὶ ξυγγενῆ· κρεῖσσον δέ, εἰ μηδὲ τοῖς καθ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὕστερον ἢ ξένοις γράψας ἀποπέμποι νόμους, ἔχων γε οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἐλπίζων πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἕξειν ἰδιωτικὸν συνάλλαγμα. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸν Σόλωνα τὸν σοφὸν ἀκούω μετὰ τῶν φίλων συμβουλευσάμενον ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν χρεῶν ἀναιρέσεως τοῖς μὲν εὐπορίας ἀφορμήν, αὑτῷ δὲ αἰσχύνης αἰτίαν παρασχεῖν, καὶ ταῦτα τῷ πολιτεύματι τὸν δῆμον ἐλευθερώσαντα. οὕτως [D] οὐ ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι τὰς τοιαύτας ἐκφυγεῖν κῆρας, κἂν τὸν αὑτοῦ νοῦν παράσχῃ τις ἀπαθῆ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν.
(To me, at any rate, it seems that the task of reigning is beyond human powers, and that a king needs a more divine character, as indeed Plato too used to say. And now I will write out a passage from Aristotle to the same effect, not “bringing owls to the Athenians,”[404] but in order to show you that I do not entirely neglect his writings. In his political treatises he says: “Now even if one maintain the principle that it is best for cities to be governed by a king, how will it be about his children? Ought his children to succeed him? And yet if they prove to be no better than anybody else, that would be a bad thing for the city. But you may say, though he has the power he will not leave the succession to his children? It is difficult indeed to believe that he will not; for that would be too hard for him, and demands a virtue greater than belongs to human nature.”[405] And later on, when he is describing a so-called king who rules according to law, and says that he is both the servant and guardian of the laws, he does not call him a king at all, nor does he consider such a king as a distinct form of government; and he goes on to say: “Now as for what is called absolute monarchy, that is to say, when a king governs all other men according to his own will, some people think that it is not in accordance with the nature of things for one man to have absolute authority over all the citizens; since those who are by nature equal must necessarily have the same rights.”[406] Again, a little later he says: “It seems, therefore, that he who bids Reason rule is really preferring the rule of God and the laws, but he who bids man rule, adds an element of the beast. For desire is a wild beast, and passion which warps even the best men. It follows, therefore, that law is Reason exempt from desire.” You see the philosopher seems here clearly to distrust and condemn human nature. For he says so in so many words when he asserts that human nature is in no case worthy of such an excess of fortune. For he thinks that it is too hard for one who is merely human to prefer the general weal of the citizens to his own children; he says that it is not just that one man should rule over many who are his equals; and, finally, he puts the finishing stroke[407] to what he has just said when he asserts that “law is Reason exempt from desire,” and that political affairs ought to be entrusted to Reason alone, and not to any individual man whatever. For the reason that is in men, however good they may be, is entangled with passion and desire, those most ferocious monsters. These opinions, it seems to me, harmonise perfectly with Plato's; first, that he who governs ought to be superior to his subjects and surpass them not only in his acquired habits but also in natural endowment; a thing which is not easy to find among men;... thirdly, that he ought by every means in his power to observe the laws, not those that were framed to meet some sudden emergency, or established, as now appears, by men whose lives were not wholly guided by reason; but he must observe them only in case the lawgiver, having purified his mind and soul, in enacting those laws keeps in view not merely the crimes of the moment or immediate contingencies; but rather recognises the nature of government and the essential nature of justice, and has carefully observed also the essential nature of guilt, and then applies to his task all the knowledge thus derived, and frames laws which have a general application to all the citizens without regard to friend or foe, neighbour or kinsman. And it is better that such a lawgiver should frame and promulgate his laws not for his contemporaries only but for posterity also, or for strangers with whom he neither has nor expects to have any private dealings. For instance, I hear that the wise Solon, having consulted his friends about the cancelling of debts, furnished them with an opportunity to make money, but brought on himself a disgraceful accusation.[408] So hard is it to avoid such fatalities, even when a man brings a passionless mind to the task of governing.)