(Now the end and aim of the Cynic philosophy, as indeed of every philosophy, is happiness, but happiness that consists in living according to nature and not according to the opinions of the multitude. For plants too are considered to do well, and indeed all animals also, when without hindrance each attains the end designed for it by nature. Nay, even among the gods this is the definition of happiness, that their state should be according to their nature, and that they should be independent. And so too in the case of human beings we must not be busy about happiness as if it were hidden away outside ourselves. Neither the eagle nor the plane tree nor anything else that has life, whether plant or animal, vainly troubles itself about wings or leaves of gold or that its shoots may be of silver or its stings and spurs of iron, or rather of adamant; but where nature in the beginning has adorned them with such things, they consider that, if only they are strong and serviceable for speed or defence, they themselves are fortunate and well provided. Then is it not absurd when a human being tries to find happiness somewhere outside himself, and thinks that wealth and birth and the influence of friends, and generally speaking everything of that sort is of the utmost importance? If however nature had bestowed on us only what she has bestowed on other animals, I mean the possession of bodies and souls like theirs, so that we need concern ourselves with nothing beyond, then it would suffice for us, as for all other animals, to content ourselves with physical advantages, and to pursue happiness within this field. But in us has been implanted a soul that in no way resembles other animals; and whether it be different in essence, or not different in essence but superior in its activity only, just as, I suppose, pure gold is superior to gold alloyed with sand,—for some people hold this theory to be true of the soul,—at any rate we surely know that we are more intelligent than other animals. For according to the myth in the Protagoras,[74] nature dealt with them very generously and bountifully, like a mother, but to compensate for all this, mind was bestowed on us by Zeus. Therefore in our minds, in the best and noblest part of us, we must say that happiness resides.)
Σκόπει δή, ταύτης εἰ μὴ μάλιστα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἦν Διογένης, ὃς τὸ μὲν σῶμα τοῖς πόνοις ἀνέδην παρεῖχεν, ἵνα αὐτὸ τῆς φύσεως ῥωμαλεώτερον καταστήσῃ πράττειν [195] δὲ ἠξίου μόνον ὁπόσα ἂν φανῇ τῷ λόγῳ πρακτέα, τοὺς δὲ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐμπίπτοντας τῇ ψυχῇ θορύβους, οἷα πολλάκις ἡμᾶς ἀναγκάζει τουτὶ τὸ περικείμενον αὐτοῦ χάριν πολυπραγμονεῖν, οὐδὲ ἐν μέρει προσίετο. ὑπὸ δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀσκήσεως ὁ ἀνὴρ οὕτω μὲν ἔσχεν ἀνδρεῖον τὸ σῶμα ὡς οὐδεὶς οἶμαι τῶν τοὺς [B] στεφανίτας ἀγωνισαμένων, οὕτω δὲ διετέθη τὴν ψυχήν, ὥστε εὐδαιμονεῖν, ὥστε βασιλεύειν οὐδὲν ἔλαττον, εἰ μὴ καὶ πλέον, ὡς οἱ τότε εἰώθεσαν λέγειν Ἕλληνες, τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως, τὸν Πέρσην λέγοντες. ἆρά σοι μικρὰ φαίνεται ἀνὴρ
(Now consider whether Diogenes did not above all other men profess this belief, since he freely exposed his body to hardships so that he might make it stronger than it was by nature. He allowed himself to act only as the light of reason shows us that we ought to act; and the perturbations that attack the soul and are derived from the body, to which this envelope of ours often constrains us for its sake to pay too much attention, he did not take into account at all. Thus by means of this discipline the man made his body more vigorous, I believe, than that of any who have contended for the prize of a crown in the games: and his soul was so disposed that he was happy and a king no less if not even more than the Great King, as the Greeks used to call him in those days, by which they meant the king of Persia. Then does he seem to you of no importance, this man who was)
Ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος,
οὐκ ὀβολόν, οὐ δραχμήν, ἔχων[75] οὐδ᾽ οἰκέτην,
(“cityless, homeless, a man without a country, owning not an obol, not a drachma, not a single slave,”[76])
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μᾶζαν, ἧς Ἐπίκουρος εὐπορῶν οὐδὲ τῶν θεῶν φησιν εἰς εὐδαιμονίας λόγον ἐλαττοῦσθαι, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἐρίζων, [C] τοῦ δοκοῦντος δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐδαιμονεστάτου εὐδαιμονέστερον ζῶν καὶ ἔλεγε ζῆν εὐδαιμονέστερον. εἰ δὲ ἀπιστεῖς, [pg 044] ἔργῳ πειραθεὶς ἐκείνου τοῦ βίου καὶ οὐ τῷ λόγῳ αἰσθήσῃ.
(nay, not even a loaf of bread—and Epicurus says that if he have bread enough and to spare he is not inferior to the gods on the score of happiness. Not that Diogenes tried to rival the gods, but he lived more happily than one who is counted the happiest of men, and he used actually to assert that he lived more happily than such a man. And if you do not believe me, try his mode of life in deed and not in word, and you will perceive the truth.)
Φέρε δὴ πρῶτον αὐτὸν διὰ τῶν λόγων ἐλέγξωμεν. ἆρά σοι δοκεῖ τῶν πάντων ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώποις ἡγεῖσθαι, τούτων δὴ τῶν πολυθρυλήτων, ἐλευθερίαν· [D] πῶς γὰρ οὐ φήσεις· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ χρήματα καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ γένος καὶ σώματος ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος καὶ πάντα ἁπλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα δίχα τῆς ἐλευθερίας οὐ τοῦ δοκοῦντος ηὐτυχηκέναι, τοῦ κτησαμένου δὲ αὐτόν ἐστιν ἀγαθά; τίνα οὖν ὑπολαμβάνομεν τὸν δοῦλον; ἇρα μή ποτε ἐκεῖνον, ὃν ἂν πριώμεθα δραχμῶν ἀργυρίου τόσων ἢ μναῖν δυοῖν ἢ χρυσίου στατήρων δέκα; ἐρεῖς δήπουθεν τοῦτον εἶναι ἀληθῶς δοῦλον. ἆρα δι᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, ὅτι τὸ ἀργύριον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τῷ πωλοῦντι καταβεβλήκαμεν; οὕτω μεντἂν [196] εἶεν οἰκέται καὶ ὁπέσους τῶν αἰχμαλώτων λυτρούμεθα. καίτοι καὶ οἱ νόμοι τούτοις ἀποδεδώκασι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν σωθεῖσιν οἴκαδε, καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοὺς ἀπολυτρούμεθα, οὐχ ἵνα δουλεύσωσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἵνα ὦσιν ἐλεύθεροι. ὁρᾷς ὡς οὐχ ἱκανόν ἐστιν ἀργύριον καταβαλεῖν ἐς τὸ ἀποφῆναι τὸν λυτρωθέντα δοῦλον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς δοῦλος, οὗ κύριός ἐστιν ἕτερος προσαναγκάσαι πράττειν ὅ,τι ἂν κελεύῃ, καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον κόλασαι καί, τὸ λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ,
(Come, let us first test it by reasoning. You think, do you not, that for mankind freedom is the beginning of all good things,[77] I mean of course what people are always calling good? How can you deny it? For property, money, birth, physical strength, beauty and in a word everything of the sort when divorced from freedom are surely blessings that belong, not to him who merely seems to enjoy them, but to him who is that man's master? Whom then are we to regard as a slave? Shall it be him whom we buy for so many silver drachmas, for two minae or for ten staters[78] of gold? Probably you will say that such a man is truly a slave. And why? Is it because we have paid down money for him to the seller? But in that case the prisoners of war whom we ransom would be slaves. And yet the law on the one hand grants these their freedom when they have come safe home, and we on the other hand ransom them not that they may become slaves, but that they may be free. Do you see then that in order to make a ransomed man a slave it is not enough to pay down a sum of money, but that man is truly a slave over whom another man has power to compel him to do whatever he orders, and if he refuse, to punish him and in the words of the poet)