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June 15.—Here occurs the first gap in the correspondence, but his letters to the Directory between this date and the last letter to Josephine extant (April 24) are full of interest, including his conscientious disobedience at Cherasco, and the aura of his destiny to "ride the whirlwind and direct the storm" which first inspired him after Lodi. On April 28th was signed the armistice of Cherasco, by which his rear was secured by three strong fortresses.[44] He writes the Directory that Piedmont is at their mercy, and that in making the armistice into a definite peace he trusts they will not forget the little island of Saint-Pierre, which will be more useful in the future than Corsica and Sardinia combined. He looks upon northern Italy as practically conquered, and speaks of invading Bavaria through the Tyrol. "Prodigious" is practically the verdict of the Directory, and later of Jomini. "My columns are marching; Beaulieu flees. I hope to catch him. I shall impose a contribution of some millions on the Duke of Parma: he will sue for peace: don't be in a hurry, so that I may have time to make him also contribute to the cost of the campaign, by replenishing our stores and rehorsing our waggons at his expense." Bonaparte suggests that Genoa should pay fifteen millions indemnity for the frigates and vessels taken in the port. Certain risks had to be run in invading Lombardy, owing to want of horse artillery, but at Cherasco he secured artillery and horses. When writing to the Directory for a dozen companies, he tells them not to entrust the execution of this measure "to the men of the bureaus, for it takes them ten days to forward an order." Writing to Carnot on the same day he states he is marching against Beaulieu, who has 26,000 foot out of 38,000 at commencement of campaign. Napoleon's force is 28,000, but he has less cavalry. On May 1st, in a letter dated Acqui to Citizen Faipoult, he asks for particulars of the pictures, statues, &c., of Milan, Parma, Placentia, Modena, and Bologna. On the same day Massena writes that his men are needing shoes. On May 6th Bonaparte announces the capture of Tortona, "a very fine fortress, which cost the King of Sardinia over fifteen millions," while Cherasco has furnished him with twenty-eight guns. Meanwhile Massena has taken possession of Alessandria, with all its stores. On May 9th Napoleon writes to Carnot, "We have at last crossed the Po. The second campaign is begun; Beaulieu ... has fool-hardiness but no genius. One more victory, and Italy is ours." A clever commissary-general is all he needs, and his men are growing fat—with good meat and good wine. He sends to Paris twenty old masters, with fine examples of Correggio and Michael-Angelo. It is pleasant to find Napoleon's confidence in Carnot, in view of Barras' insinuations that the latter had cared only for Moreau—his type of Xenophon. In this very letter Napoleon writes Carnot, "I owe you my special thanks for the care that you have kindly given to my wife; I recommend her to you, she is a sincere patriot, and I love her to distraction." He is sending "a dozen millions" to France, and hopes that some of it will be useful to the army of the Rhine. Meanwhile, and two days before Napoleon's letter to Carnot just mentioned, the latter, on behalf of the Directory, suggests the division of his command with the old Alsatian General Kellermann. The Directory's idea of a gilded pill seems to be a prodigiously long letter. It is one of those heart-breaking effusions that, even to this day, emanate from board-rooms, to the dismay and disgust of their recipients. After plastering him with sickening sophistries as to his "sweetest recompense," it gives the utterly unnecessary monition, "March! no fatal repose, there are still laurels to gather"! Nevertheless, his plan of ending the war by an advance through the Tyrol strikes them as too risky. He is to conquer the Milanais, and then divide his army with Kellermann, who is to guard the conquered province, while he goes south to Naples and Rome. As an implied excuse for not sending adequate reinforcements, Carnot adds, "The exaggerated rumours that you have skilfully disseminated as to the numbers of the French troops in Italy, will augment the fear of our enemies and almost double your means of action." The Milanais is to be heavily mulcted, but he is to be prudent. If Rome makes advances, his first demand should be that the Pope may order immediate public prayers for the prosperity and success of the French Republic! The sending of old masters to France to adorn her National Galleries seems to have been entirely a conception of Napoleon's. He has given sufficiently good reasons, from a patriotic point of view; for money is soon spent, but a masterpiece may encourage Art among his countrymen a generation later. The plunderers of the Parthenon of 1800 could not henceforward throw stones at him in this respect. But his real object was to win the people of Paris by thus sending them Glory personified in unique works of genius.

The Directory, already jealous of his fame, endeavour to neutralise the effect of his initiative by hearty concurrence, and write, "Italy has been illumined and enriched by their possession, but the time is now come when their reign should pass to France to stablish and beautify that of Liberty." The despatch adds somewhat naïvely that the effects of the vandalism committed during their own Republican orgies would be obliterated by this glorious campaign, which should "join to the splendour of military trophies the charm of beneficent and restful arts." The Directory ends by inviting him to choose one or two artists to select the most valuable pictures and other masterpieces.

Meanwhile, the Directory's supineness in pushing on the war on the Rhine is enabling the Austrians to send large reinforcements against Napoleon. Bonaparte, who has recently suffered (Jomini, vol. viii. 113) from Kellermann's tardiness in sending reinforcements at an important moment, replies to the letters of May 7th a week later, and writes direct to Citizen Carnot from Lodi, as well as to the Executive Directory. "On the receipt of the Directory's letter of the 7th your wishes were fulfilled, and the Milanais is ours. I shall shortly march, to carry out your intentions, on Leghorn and Rome; all that will soon be done. I am writing the Directory relatively to their idea of dividing the army. I swear that I have no thought beyond the interest of my country. Moreover, you will always find me straight (dans la ligne droite).... As it might happen that this letter to the Directory may be badly construed, and since you have assured me of your friendship, I take this opportunity of addressing you, begging you to make what use of it your prudence and attachment for me may suggest.... Kellermann will command the army as well as I, for no one is more convinced than I am that the victories are due to the courage and pluck of the army; but I think joining Kellermann and myself in Italy is to lose everything. I cannot serve willingly with a man who considers himself the first general in Europe; and, besides, I believe one bad general is better than two good ones. War is like government: it is an affair of tact. To be of any use, I must enjoy the same confidence that you testified to me in Paris. Where I make war, here or there, is a matter of indifference. To serve my country, to deserve from posterity a page in our history, to give the Government proofs of my attachment and devotion—that is the sum of my ambition. But I am very anxious not to lose in a week the fatigues, anxieties, and dangers of two months, and to find myself fettered. I began with a certain amount of fame; I wish to continue worthy of you." To the Directory he writes that the expeditions to Leghorn, Rome, and Naples are small affairs, but to be safely conducted must have one general in command. "I have made the campaign without consulting a soul; I should have done no good if I had had to share my views with another. I have gained some advantages over superior forces, and in utter want of everything, because, certain of your confidence, my marches have been as quick as my thoughts." He foretells disaster if he is shackled with another general. "Every one has his own method of making war. General Kellermann has more experience, and will do it better than I; but both together will do it very badly." With Barras he knew eloquence was useless, and therefore bribed him with a million francs. On May 10th was gained the terrible battle of the Bridge of Lodi, where he won promotion from his soldiers, and became their "little corporal," and where he told Las Cases that he "was struck with the possibility of becoming famous. It was then that the first spark of my ambition was kindled." On entering Milan he told Marmont, "Fortune has smiled on me to-day, only because I despise her favours; she is a woman, and the more she does for me, the more I shall exact from her. In our day no one has originated anything great; it is for me to give the example."

On May 15th, thirty-five days after the commencement of the campaign, he entered Milan, under a triumphal arch and amid the acclamations of the populace. On the previous evening he was guilty of what Dr. Johnson would have considered a fitting herald of his spoliation of picture-galleries—the perpetration of a pun. At a dinner-table the hostess observed that his youth was remarkable in so great a conqueror, whereat he replied, "Truly, madam, I am not very old at present—barely twenty-seven—but in less than twenty-four hours I shall count many more, for I shall have attained Milan" (mille ans).

On May 22nd he returned to Lodi, but heard immediately that Lombardy in general, and Pavia in particular, was in open revolt. He makes a terrible example of Pavia, shooting its chief citizens, and, for the only time, giving up a town to three hours' pillage. The Directory congratulates him on these severe measures: "The laws of war and the safety of the army render them legitimate in such circumstances." He writes them that had the blood of a single Frenchman been spilt, he would have erected a column on the ruins of Pavia, on which should have been inscribed, "Here was the town of Pavia."

On May 21st, Carnot replies to the letter from Lodi: "You appear desirous, citizen general, of continuing to conduct the whole series of military operations in Italy, at the actual seat of war. The Directory has carefully considered your proposition, and the confidence that they place in your talents and republican zeal has decided this question in the affirmative.... The rest of the military operations towards the Austrian frontier and round Mantua are absolutely dependent on your success against Beaulieu. The Directory feels how difficult it would be to direct them from Paris. It leaves to you in this respect the greatest latitude, while recommending the most extreme prudence. Its intention is, however, that the army shall cross into the Tyrol only after the expedition to the south of Italy."

This was a complete victory for Bonaparte (Bingham calls it the Directory's "abject apology"), and, as Scott points out, he now "obtained an ascendency which he took admirable care not to relinquish; and it became the sole task of the Directory, so far as Italy was concerned, to study phrases for intimating their approbation of the young general's measures."