On October 12th he tells the Directory that Mantua will not fall till February—the exact date of its capitulation. One is tempted to wonder if Napoleon was human enough to have inserted one little paragraph of his despatch of October 12th from Milan with one eye on its perusal by his wife, as it contains a veiled sneer at Hoche's exploits: "Send me rather generals of brigade than generals of division. All that comes to us from La Vendée is unaccustomed to war on a large scale; we have the same reproach against the troops, but they are well-hardened." On the same day he shows them that all the marvels of his six months' campaign have cost the French Government only £440,000 (eleven million francs). He pleads, however, for special auditors to have charge of the accounts. Napoleon had not only made war support war, but had sent twenty million francs requisitioned in Italy to the Republic. On October 12th he leaves Milan for Modena, where he remains from the 14th to the 18th, is at Bologna on the 19th, and Ferrara from the 19th to the 22nd, reaching Verona on the 24th.
Jomini has well pointed out that Napoleon's conception of making two or three large Italian republics in place of many small ones minimised the power of the Pope, and also that of Austria, by abolishing its feudal rigours.
By this time Bonaparte is heartily sick of the war. On October 2nd he writes direct to the Emperor of Germany: "Europe wants peace. This disastrous war has lasted too long;" and on the 16th to Marshal Wurmser: "The siege of Mantua, sir, is more disastrous than two campaigns." His weariness is tempered with policy, as Alvinzi was en route, and the French reinforcements had not arrived, not even the 10,000 promised in May.
No. 13.
"Corsica is ours."—At St. Helena he told his generals, "The King of England wore the Corsican crown only two years. This whim cost the British treasury five millions sterling. John Bull's riches could not have been worse employed." He writes to the Directory on the same day: "The expulsion of the English from the Mediterranean has considerable influence on the success of our military operations in Italy. We can exact more onerous conditions from Naples, which will have the greatest moral effect on the minds of the Italians, assures our communications, and makes Naples tremble as far as Sicily." On October 25th he writes: "Wurmser is at his last gasp; he is short of wine, meat, and forage; he is eating his horses, and has 15,000 sick. In fifty days Mantua will either be taken or delivered."
No. 14.
Verona.—Bonaparte had made a long stay at Verona, to November 4th, waiting reinforcements which never came. On November 5th he writes to the Directory: "All the troops of the Directory arrive post-haste at an alarming rate, and we—we are left to ourselves. Fine promises and a few driblets of men are all we have received;" and on November 13th he writes again: "Perchance we are on the eve of losing Italy. None of the expected reinforcements have arrived.... I am doing my duty, the officers and men are doing theirs; my heart is breaking, but my conscience is at rest. Help—send me help!... I despair of preventing the relief of Mantua, which in a week would have been ours. The wounded are the pick of the army; all our superior officers, all our picked generals are hors de combat; those who have come to me are so incompetent, and they have not the soldiers' confidence. The army of Italy, reduced to a handful of men, is exhausted. The heroes of Lodi, Millesimo, Castiglione, and Bassano have died for their country, or are in hospital;[48] to the corps remain only their reputation and their glory. Joubert, Lannes, Lanusse, Victor, Murat, Chabot, Dupuy, Rampon, Pijon, Menard, Chabran, and St. Hilaire are wounded.... In a few days we shall make a last effort. Had I received the 83rd, 3500 strong, and of good repute in the army, I would have answered for everything. Perhaps in a few days 40,000 will not suffice." The reason for this unwonted pessimism was the state of his troops. His brother Louis reported that Vaubois' men had no shoes and were almost naked, in the midst of snow and mountains; that desertions were taking place of soldiers with bare and bleeding feet, who told the enemy the plans and conditions of their army. Finally Vaubois bungles, through not knowing the ground, and is put under the orders of Massena, while two of his half-brigades are severely censured by Napoleon in person for their cowardice.
No. 15.
"Once more I breathe freely."—Thrice had Napoleon been foiled, as much by the weather and his shoeless soldiers as by numbers (40,000 Austrians to his 28,000), and his position was well-nigh hopeless on November 14th. He trusts Verona to 3000 men, and the blockade of Mantua to Kilmaine, and the defence of Rivoli to Vaubois—the weakest link in the chain—and determines to manœuvre by the Lower Adige upon the Austrian communications. He gets forty-eight hours' start, and wins Arcola; in 1814 he deserved equal success, but bad luck and treachery turned the scale. The battle of Arcola lasted seventy-two hours, and for forty-eight hours was in favour of the Austrians. Pending the arrival of the promised reinforcements, the battle was bought too dear, and weakened Bonaparte more than the Austrians, who received new troops almost daily. He replaced Vaubois by Joubert.
No. 18.