MAXIM XIV.
Among mountains, a great number of positions are always to be found very strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous to attack. The character of this mode of warfare consists in occupying camps on the flanks or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him only the alternative of abandoning his position without fighting, to take up another in the rear, or to descend from it in order to attack you. In mountain warfare, the assailant has always the disadvantage; even in offensive warfare in the open field, the great secret consists in defensive combats, and in obliging the enemy to attack.
NOTE.
During the campaign of 1793, in the Maritime Alps, the French army, under the orders of General Brunet, did all in its power to get possession of the camps at Raus and at Fourches, by an attack in front. But these useless efforts served only to increase the courage of the Piedmontese, and to destroy the élite of the grenadiers of the republican army. The manœuvres by which Napoleon, without fighting, compelled the enemy to evacuate these positions in 1796, suffice to establish the truth of these principles, and to prove how much success in war depends upon the genius of the general as well as on the courage of the soldier.
MAXIM XV.
The first consideration with a general who offers battle, should be the glory and honor of his arms; the safety and preservation of his men is only the second; but it is in the enterprise and courage resulting from the former, that the latter will most assuredly be found. In a retreat, besides the honor of the army, the loss of life is often greater than in two battles. For this reason, we should never despair while brave men are to be found with their colors. It is by this means that we obtain victory, and deserve to obtain it.
NOTE.
In 1645, the French army, under the orders of the Prince of Condé, was on the march to lay siege to Nordlingen, when it was discovered that Count Merci, who commanded the Bavarians, had foreseen this intention, and had entrenched himself in a strong position which defended Nordlingen at the same time that it covered Donawerth.
Notwithstanding the favorable position of the enemy, Condé ordered the attack. The combat was terrible. All the infantry in the centre and on the right, after being successively engaged, was routed and dispersed, in spite of the efforts of the cavalry and the reserve, which were likewise carried away with the fugitives. The battle was lost. Condé, in despair, having no longer either centre or right to depend upon, collected the remnants of his battalions, and directed his march to the left, where Turenne was still engaged. This perseverance reanimated the ardor of the troops. They broke the right wing of the enemy, and Turenne, by a change of front, returned to the attack upon his centre. Night, too, favored the boldness of Condé. An entire corps of Bavarians, fancying themselves cut off, laid down their arms; and the obstinacy of the French general in this struggle for victory was repaid by possession of the field of battle, together with a great number of prisoners, and almost all the enemy’s artillery. The Bavarian army beat a retreat, and the next day Nordlingen capitulated.