History of Julius Cæsar, Vol. 1 of 2

by Emperor of the French Napoleon III

VOL. I.
NEW YORK:
HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS,
FRANKLIN SQUARE.
1866.

CONTENTS.

[BOOK I.] ROMAN HISTORY BEFORE CÆSAR
[CHAPTER I.] ROME UNDER THE KINGS.
PAGE
I.	The Kings Found the Roman Institutions	[1]
II.	Social Organisation	[3]
III.	Political Organisation	[6]
IV.	Religion	[15]
V.	Results obtained by Royalty	[20]
[CHAPTER II.] ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSULAR REPUBLIC (244-416).
I.	Advantage of the Republic	[25]
II.	Institutions of the Republic	[31]
III.	Transformation of the Aristocracy	[36]
IV.	Elements of Dissolution	[42]
V.	Résumé	[53]
[CHAPTER III.] CONQUEST OF ITALY (416-488).
I.	Description of Italy	[62]
II.	Dispositions of the People of Italy in regard to Rome	[65]
III.	Treatment of the Vanquished Peoples	[68]
IV.	Submission of Latium after the First Samnite War	[75]
V.	Second Samnite War	[78]
VI.	Third Samnite War—Coalition of Samnites, Etruscans, Umbrians,and Hernici (443-449)	[82]
VII.	Fourth Samnite War—Second Coalition of the Samnites,Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls (456-464)	[85]
VIII.	Third Coalition of the Etruscans, Gauls, Lucanians, andTarentum (469-474)	[88]
IX.	Pyrrhus in Italy—Submission of Tarentum (474-488)	[89]
X.	Preponderance of Rome	[92]
XI.	Strength of the Institutions	[97]
[CHAPTER IV.] PROSPERITY OF THE BASIN OF THE MEDITERRANEAN BEFORE THE PUNIC WARS.
I.	Commerce of the Mediterranean	[104]
II.	Northern Africa	[105]
III.	Spain	[110]
IV.	Southern Gaul	[114]
V.	Liguria, Cisalpine Gaul, Venetia, and Illyria	[115]
VI.	Epirus	[118]
VII.	Greece	[119]
VIII.	Macedonia	[124]
IX.	Asia Minor	[126]
X.	Kingdom of Pontus	[127]
XI.	Bithynia	[130]
XII.	Cappadocia	[131]
XIII.	Kingdom of Pergamus	[132]
XIV.	Caria, Lycia, and Cilicia	[135]
XV.	Syria	[137]
XVI.	Egypt	[143]
XVII.	Cyrenaica	[146]
XVIII.	Cyprus	[147]
XIX.	Crete	[148]
XX.	Rhodes	[148]
XXI.	Sardinia	[151]
XXII.	Corsica	[152]
XXIII.	Sicily	[152]
[CHAPTER V.] PUNIC WARS AND WARS OF MACEDONIA AND ASIA (488-621).
I.	Comparison Between Rome and Carthage	[155]
II.	First Punic War (490-513)	[158]
III.	War of Illyria (525)	[165]
IV.	Invasion of the Cisalpines (528)	[167]
V.	Second Punic War (536-552)	[169]
VI.	Results of the Second Punic War	[182]
VII.	The Macedonian War (554)	[189]
VIII.	War against Antiochus (563)	[194]
IX.	The War in the Cisalpine (558-579)	[196]
X.	War against Persia (583)	[199]
XI.	Modification of Roman Policy	[204]
XII.	Third Punic War (605-608)	[212]
XIII.	Greece, Macedonia, Numantia, and Pergamus reduced to Provinces	[215]
XIV.	Summary	[219]
[CHAPTER VI.] THE GRACCHI, MARIUS, AND SYLLA (621-676).
I.	State of the Republic	[224]
II.	Tiberius Gracchus (621)	[232]
III.	Caius Gracchus (631)	[238]
IV.	War of Jugurtha (637)	[246]
V.	Marius (647)	[249]
VI.	Wars of the Allies	[256]
VII.	Sylla (666)	[262]
VIII.	Effects of Sylla’s Dictatorship	[278]
[BOOK II.] HISTORY OF JULIUS CÆSAR.
[CHAPTER I.] (654-684.)
I.	First Years of Cæsar	[281]
II.	Cæsar Persecuted by Sylla (672)	[290]
III.	Cæsar in Asia (673, 674)	[293]
IV.	Cæsar on His Return to Rome (676)	[296]
V.	Cæsar Goes to Rhodes (678-680)	[299]
VI.	Cæsar Pontiff and Military Tribune (680-684)	[302]
[CHAPTER II.] (684-691.)
I.	State of the Republic (684)	[307]
II.	Consulship of Pompey and Crassus	[316]
III.	Cæsar Questor (686)	[323]
IV.	The Gabinian Law (687)	[327]
V.	The Manilian Law (688)	[330]
VI.	Cæsar Curule Ædile (689)	[334]
VII.	Cæsar Judex Quæstionis (660)	[339]
VIII.	Conspiracies against the Senate (690)	[340]
IX.	The Difficulty of Constituting a New Party	[342]
[CHAPTER III.] (691-695.)
I.	Cicero and Antonius Consuls (691)	[345]
II.	Agrarian Law of Rullus	[347]
III.	Trial of Rabirius (691)	[352]
IV.	Cæsar Grand Pontiff (691)	[354]
V.	Catiline’s Conspiracy	[357]
VI.	Error of Cicero	[379]
VII.	Cæsar Prætor (692)	[381]
VIII.	Attempt of Clodius (692)	[386]
IX.	Pompey’s Triumphal Return (692)	[388]
X.	Destiny Regulates Events	[397]
[CHAPTER IV.] (693-695.)
I.	Cæsar Proprætor in Spain (693)	[402]
II.	Cæsar Demands a Triumph and the Consulship (694)	[409]
III.	Alliance of Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus	[413]
IV.	Cæsar’s Election	[418]
[CHAPTER V.] CONSULSHIP OF CÆSAR AND BIBULUS (695).
I.	Attempts at Conciliation	[421]
II.	Agrarian Laws	[424]
III.	Cæsar’s Various Laws	[432]
IV.	Cæsar Receives the Government of the Gauls	[445]
V.	Opposition of the Patricians	[448]
VI.	Law of Clodius—Exile of Cicero	[456]
VII.	The Explanation of Cæsar’s Conduct	[460]

PREFACE.

HISTORIC truth ought to be no less sacred than religion. If the precepts of faith raise our soul above the interests of this world, the lessons of history, in their turn, inspire us with the love of the beautiful and the just, and the hatred of whatever presents an obstacle to the progress of humanity. These lessons, to be profitable, require certain conditions. It is necessary that the facts be produced with a rigorous exactness, that the changes political or social be analysed philosophically, that the exciting interest of the details of the lives of public men should not divert attention from the political part they played, or cause us to forget their providential mission.

Too often the writer represents the different phases of history as spontaneous events, without seeking in preceding facts their true origin and their natural deduction; like the painter who, in re-producing the characteristics of Nature, only seizes their picturesque effect, without being able, in his picture, to give their scientific demonstration. The historian ought to be more than a painter; he ought, like the geologist, who explains the phenomena of the globe, to unfold the secret of the transformation of societies.

But, in writing history, by what means are we to arrive at truth? By following the rules of logic. Let us first take for granted that a great effect is always due to a great cause, never to a small one; in other words, an accident, insignificant in appearance, never leads to important results without a pre-existing cause, which has permitted this slight accident to produce a great effect. The spark only lights up a vast conflagration when it falls upon combustible matters previously collected. Montesquieu thus confirms this idea: “It is not fortune,” he says, “which rules the world.... There are general causes, whether moral or physical, which act in every monarchy, raising, maintaining, or overthrowing it; all accidents are subject to these causes, and if the fortune of a battle—that is to say, a particular cause—has ruined a state, there was a general cause which made it necessary that that state should perish through a single battle: in a word, the principal cause drags with it all the particular accidents.”[1]

If during nearly a thousand years the Romans always came triumphant out of the severest trials and greatest perils, it is because there existed a general cause which made them always superior to their enemies, and which did not permit partial defeats and misfortunes to entail the fall of the empire. If the Romans, after giving an example to the world of a people constituting itself and growing great by liberty, seemed, after Cæsar, to throw themselves blindly into slavery, it is because there existed a general reason which by fatality prevented the Republic from returning to the purity of its ancient institutions; it is because the new wants and interests of a society in labour required other means to satisfy them. Just as logic demonstrates that the reason of important events is imperious, in like manner we must recognise in the long duration of an institution the proof of its goodness, and in the incontestable influence of a man upon his age the proof of his genius.

The task, then, consists in seeking the vital element which constituted the strength of the institution, as the predominant idea which caused man to act. In following this rule, we shall avoid the errors of those historians who gather facts transmitted by preceding ages, without properly arranging them according to their philosophical importance; thus glorifying that which merits blame, and leaving in the shade that which calls for the light. It is not a minute analysis of the Roman organisation which will enable us to understand the duration of so great an empire, but the profound examination of the spirit of its institutions; no more is it the detailed recital of the most trivial actions of a superior man which will reveal the secret of his ascendency, but the attentive investigation of the elevated motives of his conduct.