The more the situation became serious, the more wise men inclined towards the party of peace. Pompey had again absented himself from Rome for a few days; he showed great irritation at the arrogance of the tribune Mark Antony, who, in a speech before the people, had attacked him with violence. He seemed also much hurt at the want of regard of Hirtius, that friend of Cæsar, who had come to Rome without paying him a visit.[885] The absence of Pompey in such critical moments had been generally blamed,[886] but he soon returned; his resolution was taken.
“I have seen Pompey,” wrote Cicero to his friend, on the 6th of the Calends of December. “We went together to Formiæ, and we conversed alone from two o’clock till evening. You ask me if there is any hope of agreement. As far as I have been able to judge from what he told me in a lengthy conversation full of details, there is even no desire for it. He pretends that, if Cæsar obtains the consulship, even after having dismissed his army, there will be a revolution in the state. He is, moreover, convinced that, when Cæsar knows that they take measures against him, he will abandon the consulship for this year, and that he will prefer keeping his army and his province; he added that his anger would not frighten him, and that Rome and he would know how to defend themselves. What shall I say? Although the great phrase, Mars has equal chances for everybody, recurred often to my mind, I felt reassured, in hearing a valiant man, so able and so powerful, reasoning like a politician upon the dangers of a false peace. We read together the speech of Antony, of the 10th of the Calends of January, which is, from beginning to end, an accusation against Pompey, whom he takes up from his infantile toga. He reproaches him with condemnations by thousands; he threatens us with war. Upon which Pompey said to me, ‘What will Cæsar not do, once master of the Republic, if his quæstor, a man without wealth, without support, dare to speak in this manner?’ In short, far from desiring such a peace, he appeared to me to fear it, perhaps because then he would be obliged to go to Spain. What annoys me most is, that I shall be obliged to reimburse Cæsar, and to apply to that use all the money which I intended for my triumph, for it would be disgraceful to remain the debtor of a political adversary.”[887] By this declaration Cicero proves in the most positive manner that Pompey desired war, and rejected all reconciliation; he repeats it elsewhere with still more precision.
Pompey, led by the inevitable march of events to oppose Cæsar’s just demands, which he had favoured at first, was reduced to desire civil war.
He and his party had not arrived at this extremity without in most cases overruling the will of the Senate, without wounding the public feeling, and without overstepping the bonds of legality. In the beginning of 703, when Marcellus had proposed to recall Cæsar before the legal period, the Senate, assembled in great number, had passed to the order of the day,[888] and during the rest of the year they had shown a determination not to undertake anything against the proconsul of Gaul. They had rejected a second time the motion of Marcellus, renewed on the 1st of March, 704, and afterwards the Senate had shown dispositions favourable to Cæsar. However, the law which permitted him to keep his command until the consular comitia of 705 is soon treated with contempt; after many hesitations the Senate decides that Cæsar and Pompey shall disband their armies at the same time, but the decree is not executed; passions become inflamed, the most arbitrary measures are proposed, the tribunes intercede: their veto is considered as not existing. Then, without obtaining a senatus-consultus, without appealing to the people, the consuls charge Pompey to raise troops, and to watch over the welfare of the Republic. It is the aristocratic party which places itself above the law, and places right on the side of Cæsar.
CHAPTER X.
EVENTS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE YEAR 705.
C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, Consuls.
I. IN the course of the summer, it will be remembered, Cæsar had returned to Arras, to the middle of his army, which was encamped in the north of Gaul. He was informed of the plots going on at Rome; he knew that his enemies would agree to no arrangement, but he still hoped that the Senate would maintain the equal balance between him and his rival, for that assembly had already shown its pacific tendencies, and did not even seem inclined to interfere in the quarrel.[889] In the winter between 704 and 705 he returned to Cisalpine Gaul; presided there, according to his custom, over the provincial assemblies, and stopped at Ravenna, the last town in his command.[890] He had only the 13th legion at his disposal, which was 5,000 men strong, with 300 cavalry;[891] nearly his whole army, to the number of eight legions, had remained in winter quarters in Belgium and Burgundy.[892]
It was at Ravenna that Curio, the year of whose tribuneship expired in December, 704,[893] hastened to him. Cæsar received him with open arms, thanked him for his devotedness, and conferred with him upon the measures to be taken. Curio proposed that he should call the other legions which he had beyond the Alps, and march upon Rome; but Cæsar did not approve of this counsel, still persuaded that things would yet come to an understanding. He engaged his friends[894] at Rome to propose a plan of accommodation which had been approved, it was said, by Cicero, and which Plutarch expressly ascribes to him: Cæsar was to have given up Transalpine Gaul, and kept Cisalpine Gaul and Illyria with two legions, until he had obtained the consulship. It was even said that he would be satisfied with Illyria alone and one legion.[895] “He made the greatest efforts,” says Velleius Paterculus,[896] “to maintain peace: the friends of Pompey refused all conciliatory proposals.” “The appearance of justice,” says Plutarch, “was on the side of Cæsar.” When the negotiation had failed, he charged Curio to carry to the Senate a letter full of impudence, according to Pompey; full of threats, according to Cicero;[897] well adapted, on the contrary, according to Plutarch, to draw the multitude to Cæsar’s side.[898]
Curio, after travelling 1,300 stadia (210 kilomètres) in three days, re-appeared in that assembly on the very day of the installation of the new consuls, the Calends of January, 705. He did not deliver to them, according to custom, the letter of which he was the bearer, for fear that they should not communicate it; and, indeed, at first they opposed the reading of it; but two tribunes of the people devoted to Cæsar, Mark Antony, formerly his quæstor, and Q. Cassius, insisted with so much energy, that the new consuls were unable to refuse.[899]
Cæsar, after reminding them of what he had done for the Republic, justified himself against the imputations spread against him by his enemies. While he protested his respect for the Senate, he declared that he was ready to resign his proconsular functions, and to disband his army, or deliver it to his successor, provided Pompey did the same. It could not be required of him to deliver himself up unarmed to his enemies while they remained armed, and alone to set the example of submission. He spoke not on this occasion of his pretensions to the consulship; the great question, to know whether he and Pompey should keep their armies, overruled all the others. The conclusion of the letter displayed a strong feeling of resentment. Cæsar declared in it that, if justice were not rendered to him, he should know how, by revenging himself, to revenge his country also. This last expression, which strongly resembled a threat, excited the loudest reclamations in the Senate. “It is war he declares,” they exclaimed, and the irritation rose to the greatest height.[900] No deliberation could be obtained on any of his propositions.