The excavations made in 1862 brought the two camps to light. The fosses of the little camp are clearly defined in the calcareous soil. They form an irregular outline, represented on Plate 22. The Roche-Blanche, which presents in its southern part an escarpment almost as perpendicular as a wall, has lost on the sides its abrupt form by successive landslips, the last of which took place within memory of the inhabitants. The communication between the great and little camps was composed of a parapet, formed by the earth thrown out of two contiguous fosses, each four feet in depth and six in breadth, so that the breadth of the two together is only twelve feet. If we wonder that the Romans should have dug two little ditches, each six feet broad and four feet deep, instead of making one eight feet wide by six feet deep, which would have given the same amount of soil to take out, it may be answered that the two little ditches were much more quickly made than one large ditch.
| HOURS. | ||
| Cæsar starts at four o’clock in the morning, and arrives at Randan at one o’clock in the afternoon | 9 | |
| Employs in negotiation from one o’clock to seven o’clock | 6 | |
| Repose from seven o’clock to ten o’clock in the evening | 3 | |
| Hurried return from Randan to Gergovia, from ten o’clock to four o’clock in the morning | 6 | |
| Duration of Cæsar’s absence | 24 | |
[492] Plate 22 shows the places which Cæsar’s eye could embrace from the summit of the Roche-Blanche. He could see neither the plateau, nor the country situated on the norther slopes of the mountains of Gergovia and Rissoles. It was for this reason that he had to learn from the deserters the form of the ground which lay on the other side. He thus learnt that the ridge of this latter mountain (dorsum ejus jugi) was not very uneven, and gave access to the western part of the town (ad alteram partem oppidi) by a narrow wooded passage (the defile of the Goules, which separates Rissoles from Gergovia). (See Plate 21 in C.) This defile leads to the gate P of the oppidum. The foundations, of masonry, and the approaches to this gate, were uncovered in the month of July, 1861. The wide road which led from this gate to the defile C is distinctly seen. The alarm of Vercingetorix may be imagined; he feared lest the Romans might shut up from the Gauls this issue from the oppidum. These latter would have been almost blockaded (pœne circumvallati), without any way out, and in the impossibility of producing forage from the valley of the Artières, since the northern part of the town was difficult to access. Consequently, the words si alterum collem amisissent can only apply to the mountain mass of Rissoles, and not, as several authors have pretended, to Montrognon or to Puy-Giroux; for the possession of those two peaks, detached and rather far from the mountain mass of Gergovia, offered no interest either for the attack or for the defence.
The spot which it was important for the Gauls to fortify was the part D E of the heights of Rissoles which are opposite the village of Opme, because troops could only scale the mass by the western slope. How can any one suppose that, fearing for the defile of the Goules, the Gauls would have abandoned their camp before the place to go and entrench themselves on Montrognon, three kilomètres from Gergovia? How admit that Cæsar, to threaten the defile, would have sent troops to make the circuit of the mountain of Gergovia by the north? How could the legion, which supported this movement, without advancing far, and which concealed itself in the woods, have assisted in the stratagem, if the false attack had been made to the east and to the north of Gergovia, at two leagues from the camp? In passing by the south, that is, by the defile of Opme, the legion was always in communication with the camps, on which it could fall back, and the broken and wooded ground prevented the Gauls from knowing accurately the importance of the attack. Besides, two facts which result from the “Commentaries” prove that the Gauls were not very far from the oppidum. Cæsar sees the southern front abandoned, and he establishes his legions at a distance of 1,200 paces from the place. The soldiers scale the heights at a rapid pace; but scarcely have they reached the principal enclosure, when the Gauls, who hear the cries of the women and of the small number of defenders left in the place (primo exaudito clamore), have time to hurry to them, and drive back the Romans. Consequently, the Gauls were at a distance where the cries could be heard; and this distance may be measured by the time which the attacking columns must have taken to climb the space of 1,200 paces, since they arrived almost simultaneously. We believe, therefore, that they were at a distance of less than two kilomètres from the gate O of the town, engaged in fortifying the plateau of the heights of Risolles.
[493] According to Polyænus (VIII. xxiii. 9), the soldiers marched with their heads bent down, in order not to be seen.
[494] It is, in fact, 1780 mètres from the foot of the mountain, where Cæsar must have assembled his troops, between the Roche-Blanche and the Puy-de-Marmant, to the gate O of the oppidum. This is the line which passes by the ravine in which the village of Merdogne is situated; to the left and to the right the ground is too rugged for the troops to climb it.
[495] General Gœler believes, with apparent reason, that we ought to read regressus instead of progressus. The 10th legion, which acted as reserve, must, in the presence of a combat, the issue of which was uncertain, have taken up a position behind rather than towards the front.
[496] The part of the southern slope of Gergovia which was the scene of the last battle is clearly indicated by the ground itself. This battle took place on the whole space which extends in front of the gate O of the oppidum, the principal object of the attack. The ravine which, according to the “Commentaries,” prevented the legions from hearing the signal to retreat, is that which descends to the west of the Merdogne. Hence it may be concluded that, at this moment, Cæsar and the 10th legion were to the right of this ravine. Lastly, we understand on the spot the movement of the Ædui. To the east of Merdogne there is a spur, H, attached to the mountain of Gergovia, forty mètres below the table-land, and presenting several successive terraces. So long as the Ædui, who came from the east, had not arrived on the crest of this spur, they could not be perceived by the Romans, who were fighting towards Merdogne; but it may be imagined that, when they appeared all at once on this crest, and at a distance of 600 mètres from the right flank of the legions, the sight of them must have singularly surprised the troops, who were expecting no re-enforcement from that side.
General de Gœler, without having seen the locality, has indicated nearly the site of the Roman camp; but he does not place it sufficiently to the west. He makes the Gaulish troops encamp on the four slopes of the mountain of Gergovia. It is, no doubt, the expression circum se (VII. 36) which led him into this error. It is, indeed, impossible to admit that the Gauls could have encamped on the abrupt slopes of the northern declivity. General de Gœler is also mistaken in directing the false attack upon Montrognon. Lastly, he places the scene of the battle too much towards the west.