IV. Next morning, he divided the infantry and cavalry into three bodies, and sent them separately in pursuit of the enemy. The troops had advanced a considerable distance, and already the hindmost of the fugitives were in view, when a party of cavalry, despatched by Q. Atrius, came to announce that, in the preceding night, a violent tempest had damaged and thrown on shore nearly all the vessels. Neither anchors nor cordage had been strong enough to resist; the efforts of pilots and sailors had been powerless, and the shocks of the vessels against one another had caused serious loss. At this news, Cæsar called in his troops, ordered them to limit their efforts to repulsing the enemy as they retired, and hurried on before them to his fleet. He verified the correctness of the losses which were announced: about forty ships were destroyed, and the repair of the others required a long labour. He took the workmen attached to the legions, and brought others from the continent; wrote to Labienus to build, with his troops, the greatest number of ships possible; and lastly, in order to place his fleet in safety from all danger, he resolved, in spite of the labour it must entail upon him, to haul all the vessels on land, and inclose them in the camp by a new retrenchment.[400] The soldiers employed ten entire days in this work, without interruption, even during the night.[401]
Cæsar resumes the offensive.
V. The vessels once placed on dry ground and surrounded with substantial defences, Cæsar left in the camp the same troops as before, and returned towards the localities where he had been obliged to abandon the pursuit of the Britons. He found them collected in great number. The general direction of the war had been entrusted to Cassivellaunus, whose states were separated from the maritime districts by the Thames, a river which was about eighty miles distant from the coast.[402] This chief had heretofore had to sustain continual wars against the other peoples of the island; but, in face of the danger, all, with unanimous accord, agreed in giving him the command.
The enemy’s cavalry, with the war-chariots, attacked vigorously the cavalry in its march; they were everywhere beaten and driven back into the woods or to the heights. A short time after, while the Romans were labouring without distrust at their retrenchments, the Britons suddenly issued from the woods and attacked their advanced posts. The struggle becoming obstinate, Cæsar sent forward two picked cohorts, the first of two legions. They had hardly taken their position, leaving a slight interval between them, when the barbarians, manœuvring with their chariots according to custom, so intimidated the Romans by this mode of fighting, that they passed and repassed with impunity across the interval between the cohorts. The enemy was only repulsed on the arrival of re-enforcements. Q. Laberius Durus, a military tribune, perished in this action.
The description of this battle, as given in the “Commentaries,” has been differently understood. According to Dio Cassius, the Britons had at first thrown the ranks of the Romans into disorder by means of their chariots; but Cæsar, to baffle this manœuvre, had opened for them a free passage by placing his cohorts at greater intervals. He would thus have repeated the dispositions taken by Scipio at the battle of Zama, to protect him against the Carthaginian elephants.
This engagement, which took place before the camp and under the eyes of the army, showed how little the Roman tactics were fitted for this kind of warfare. The legionary, heavily armed, and accustomed to combat in line, could neither pursue the enemy in his retreat, nor move too far from his ensigns. There existed a still greater disadvantage for the cavalry. The Britons, by a simulated flight, drew them away from the legionaries, and then, jumping down from their chariots, engaged on foot in an unequal struggle; for, always supported by their cavalry, they were as dangerous in the attack as in the defence.[403]
The following day, the enemies took a position far from the camp, on the heights; they only showed themselves in small parties, isolated, harassing the cavalry with less ardour than before. But, towards the middle of the day, Cæsar having sent three legions and the cavalry, under the orders of the lieutenant C. Trebonius, to forage, they rushed from all sides upon the foragers with such impetuosity, that they approached the eagles and legions which had remained under arms. The infantry repulsed them vigorously, and, though they usually left to the cavalry the care of the pursuit, this time they did not cease to drive them before them till the cavalry, feeling themselves supported, came themselves to complete the rout. These left them time neither to rally nor to halt, nor to descend from their chariots, but made a great carnage of them. After this defeat, the Britons resolved to combat no more with their forces united, but to confine themselves to harassing the Roman army, so as to drag on the war in length.[404]
March towards the Thames.
VI. Cæsar, penetrating their design, hesitated no longer, in order to terminate the campaign promptly, to advance to the very centre of their strength: he directed his march towards the territory of Cassivellaunus, passing, no doubt, by Maidstone and Westerham. (See Plate 16.) Arriving at the banks of the Thames, which was then fordable only at one place, perhaps at Sunbury, he perceived a multitude of enemies drawn up on the opposite bank.[405] It was defended by a palisade of sharp pointed stakes, before which other stakes driven into the bed of the river remained hidden under the water. Cæsar was informed of this by prisoners and deserters, and he sent the cavalry forward (probably a certain distance above or below), in order to turn the enemy’s position and occupy his attention, while the infantry destroyed the obstacles and crossed the ford. The soldiers entered the river resolutely, and, although they were in the water up to their shoulders, such was their ardour that the enemy could not sustain the shock, but abandoned the bank and fled. Polyænus relates that on this occasion Cæsar made use of an elephant to facilitate the passage; but, as the “Commentaries” do not mention such a fact, it is difficult to believe.[406]
Submission of a part of Britain.