There was among the Carnutes (country of Chartres) a man of high birth, named Tasgetius, whose ancestors had reigned over that nation. In consideration of his valour and of his important military services, Cæsar had replaced him, during three years, in the rank held by his forefather, when his enemies publicly massacred him. The men who had participated in this crime were so numerous, that there was reason for fearing that the revolt would spread over the whole country. To prevent it, Cæsar despatched in the greatest haste L. Plancus at the head of his legion, with orders to establish his quarters in the country of the Carnutes, and to send him the accomplices in the murder of Tasgetius.[427]
Defeat of Sabinus at Aduatuca.
XII. He received at the same period (the end of October), from the lieutenants and the questor, the news that the legions had arrived and retrenched in their quarters. They had indeed been established in them about a fortnight, when suddenly a revolt took place at the instigation of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. These chiefs had at first repaired to the limits of their territory to meet Sabinus and Cotta, and had even furnished them with provisions; but soon after, urged on by the Treviran Indutiomaras, they raise the country, fall unexpectedly on the soldiers occupied in seeking wood, and attack the camp of Sabinus with considerable forces. Immediately the Romans run to arms and mount on the vallum. The Spanish cavalry makes a successful sortie, and the enemies retire, deceived in their hope of carrying the retrenchments by storm. Having then recourse to stratagem, they utter, according to their custom, loud cries, and demand to enter into negotiations and deliberate on their common interests, C. Arpineius, a Roman knight and the friend of Sabinus, and the Spaniard Q. Junius, who had been employed on several missions to Ambiorix, were sent to them. Ambiorix declared that he had not forgotten the numerous benefits he had received from Cæsar, but that he was forced to follow the movement of Gaul, which had conspired in a common effort to recover its liberty. That very day, according to his statement, the various quarters were to be attacked at the same time, so as to hinder them from lending each other mutual succour; the Germans had passed the Rhine, and would arrive in two days; Sabinus had no other chance of safety but by abandoning his camp and rejoining Cicero or Labienus, who were at a distance of fifty miles. In the end, Ambiorix promised under an oath to give him a free passage. The envoys reported to Sabinus and Cotta what they had heard. Troubled at this news, and the more disposed to put faith in it because it was hardly credible that so small a people as the Eburones would have dared alone to brave the Roman power, the two lieutenants submitted the affair to a council of war: it became the subject of warm disputes. Cotta, and with him several of the tribunes and centurions of the first class, were of opinion that they should not act hastily, but wait for orders from Cæsar. Their camp was strong enough to resist all the forces of the Germans; they were not pressed by want of food; they might receive succours, and, under circumstances of so much gravity, it would be disgraceful to take their counsel from the enemy.
Sabinus replied with force that it would be too late to decide when the number of the assailants would be increased by the arrival of the Germans, and when the neighbouring quarters would have experienced some disaster. “The movement requires a prompt decision. Cæsar has, no doubt, started for Italy: otherwise, would the Carnutes have dared to slay Tasgetius, and the Eburones to attack the camp with so much boldness? We must consider the counsel itself, and not him who gives it: the Rhine is at a short distance; the Germans are irritated by the death of Ariovistus, and by their preceding defeats; Gaul is in flames; she supports with impatience the Roman yoke, and the loss of her ancient military glory. Would Ambiorix have engaged without powerful motives in such an enterprise? It is safest, therefore, to follow his counsel, and to gain as quickly as possible the nearest quarters.”
Cotta and the centurions of the first class earnestly maintained the contrary opinion. “Let it then be as you will!” said Sabinus; and then, raising his voice to be heard by the soldiers, he shouted: “Death does not terrify me; but behold, Cotta, those who will require of thee a reckoning for the misfortunes which thou art preparing for them. After to-morrow, if you would agree to it, they could have rejoined the nearest legion, and, united with it, incur together the chances of war; they will know that thou hast preferred leaving them, far from their companions, exposed to perish by the sword or by famine.”
When the council was ended, the lieutenants are surrounded and implored not to compromise the safety of the army by their misunderstanding; let them go or remain, provided they are agreed, everything will be easy. The debate is prolonged into the middle of the night; at last, Cotta, moved, yields to the opinion of Sabinus, and agrees to repair to Cicero, encamped in the country of the Nervii; the departure is fixed for daybreak. The rest of the night is passed in the midst of preparations; the soldier chooses what articles of his winter equipment he will carry with him. And, as if the danger were not sufficiently great, he seems as if he wished to increase it by fatigue and watching. At daybreak, the troops, in full security, begin their march in a long column, encumbered with a numerous baggage.
At the distance of three kilomètres (a millibus passuum circiter duobus) from the town of Tongres is the vale of Lowaige, closed in between two hills, and forming a great defile of about 2,500 mètres in length (magnam convallem). It is traversed by a stream, the Geer. The hills, now denuded, were, only a century ago, covered with wood;[428] it was there that the Eburones lay in wait for the Roman army.
Informed of the intended retreat by the noise and tumult, they had divided themselves into two bodies, on the right and left of the vale, and placed themselves in ambush in the middle of the woods. When they saw the greater part of the Roman troops engaged in the defile, they attacked them in rear and in front, profiting by all the advantages of the locality.
Then Sabinus, like a man who had shown no foresight, becomes troubled, hurries hither and thither, hesitates in all his measures—as happens to him who, taken by surprise, is obliged to act decisively in the middle of danger. Cotta, on the contrary, who had calculated the fatal chances of the departure which he had opposed, neglects nothing for the general safety. He encourages the troops, combats in the ranks—a general and a soldier at the same time. As the length of the column prevented the lieutenants from seeing all and ordering all themselves, they caused the soldiers to pass on from mouth to mouth the order to abandon the baggage and form the circle. This resolution, though justified by the circumstances, had, nevertheless, a disastrous effect; it diminished the confidence of the Romans, and increased the ardour of the Eburones, who ascribed so desperate a resolution to fear and discouragement. There resulted from it, too, an inevitable inconvenience: the soldiers quitted their ensigns in crowds to run to the baggage, and take their more valuable effects; and on all parts there was nothing but shouts and confusion.
The barbarians acted with intelligence. Their chiefs, fearing that they would disperse to pillage the baggage of the Romans, sent orders on all points that every one must keep his rank, declaring that the thing important was first to assure themselves of the victory, and that afterwards the booty would fall into their hands.