The rear-guard of Labienus had no sooner begun its march, than the barbarians urge each other not to let a prey so long coveted escape them. They imagine that the Romans are struck with terror, and, thinking it disgraceful to wait any longer the succour of the Germans, they cross the river and advance unhesitatingly upon unfavourable ground. Labienus, seeing the success of his stratagem, continued slowly his apparent retreat, in order to draw all the Gauls over the river. He had sent forward, to an eminence, the baggage, guarded by a detachment of cavalry. Suddenly he orders the ensigns to be turned towards the enemy, forms his troops in order of battle, the cavalry on the wings, and exhorts them to display the same valour as if Cæsar were present. Then an immense cry rises in the ranks, and the pila are thrown from all sides. The Gauls, surprised at seeing an enemy they believed they were pursuing turn against them, did not sustain even the first shock, but fled precipitately into the neighbouring forests. Pressed by the cavalry, they were slain or captured in great numbers.
Labienus employed those wise tactics to which the Romans owed their greatest successes. Invincible in their fortified camps, they could, as the Emperor Napoleon I. has so well remarked, either combat or wait for the opportune moment. The Gauls, on the contrary, warlike peoples, carried away by a fiery courage, not understanding the patience and wiliness of their adversaries, fell always into the snare which was laid for them. It was enough to feign terror, and inspire them with contempt for the enemy’s forces, to make them engage instantly in disorderly attacks, which the Romans, by sudden sorties, easily defeated. This was the system followed by Sabinus when attacked by the Unelli, by Cæsar on his way to the relief of Cicero, and by Labienus himself in the previous year.
A few days afterwards the country submitted; for, on the news of the defeat of the Treviri, the Germans returned home, followed by the relatives of Indutiomarus, the author of the revolt. Cingetorix, constant in his fidelity to the Romans, was replaced at the head of the nation. The double object proposed by Cæsar was thus attained; for, on one hand, since the submission of the Menapii, Ambiorix could no longer dream of finding a refuge among them; and, on the other, the victory of Labienus, followed by the retreat of the Germans, placed it out of his power to league with these latter. Nevertheless, to assure this double result, punish the Germans for their readiness to succour the Treviri, and cut off Ambiorix from all retreat, Cæsar, after having effected his junction with Labienus, resolved to pass the Rhine a second time.[451]
Second Passage of the Rhine.
V. He had passed from the country of the Menapii into that of the Treviri, and had arrived near the locality where now stands the town of Bonn. He there caused a bridge to be built a little above the spot where his army had crossed two years before. In consequence of the experience gained by the processes employed on the former occasion, and of the extreme zeal of the soldiers, the work was finished in a few days. Having left for the protection of the bridge a strong detachment on the bank belonging to the Treviri, for fear of some movement on their part, Cæsar crossed the river with the legions and the cavalry. The Ubii, who had long before made their submission, assured him that they had neither sent assistance to the Treviri or violated their oath; that the Suevi alone had furnished auxiliaries; and that thus he ought not to confound them with the latter in his anger against the Germans. He accepted their excuses, and obtained information on the roads and passes which led to the country of the Suevi.
A few days afterwards, he learnt that the latter were concentrating on a single point their troops and the contingents of the tribes under their dependence. He provided for the supply of provisions, chose a favourable position for his camp, and enjoined the Ubii to transport their cattle and goods into their oppida, hoping to compel the barbarians by famine to fight at disadvantage. The Ubii were similarly charged to watch the enemy by means of numerous scouts. A few days later, they informed Cæsar that the Suevi, at the approach of the Romans, had retired, with all their troops and those of their allies, to the extremity of their territory. There lay the forest Bacenis,[452] which advanced very far into the country, and which, placed like a natural barrier between the Suevi and the Cherusci, separated these two peoples and defended them against their mutual excursions. It was at the entrance to this forest, probably towards the mountains of Thuringia, that the Suevi had resolved to await the Romans.
In this expedition, as in the one preceding, Cæsar feared to engage himself too far in the middle of an uncultivated country, where provisions might have failed him. He therefore repassed the Rhine. But to keep the barbarians in fear of his return, and to prevent their re-enforcements from reaching the Gauls, he did not destroy the whole bridge, but only cut off 200 feet on the side of the Ubian bank; at the extremity of the truncated part he built a tower of four stories, and left on the left bank twelve cohorts in a retrenched post. Young C. Volcatius Tullus had the command of it. Cæsar’s two expeditions to the right bank of the Rhine led to no battle, and yet the moral effect was so great, that after this period the Germans no longer supported the insurrections in Gaul, and even became the auxiliaries of the Romans.[453]
War against Ambiorix.
VI. On the approach of harvest, Cæsar marched against Ambiorix, with his ten legions, except the guard left at the bridge of the Rhine. He started from Bonn, and advanced towards the country of the Eburones, by way of Zulpich and Eupen (see Plate 14), across the forest of the Ardennes, which extended, it will be remembered, from the banks of the Rhine to the country of the Nervii. In the hope of surprising the enemy, he sent forward M. Minucius Basilus, with all the cavalry, recommending to him not to light fires, which would reveal his approach, and informing him that he should follow him closely.
Basilus, faithful to his orders, fell by surprise on a great number of Eburones, proceeded straight towards the locality to which Ambiorix was said to have retired with a few cavalry, succeeded in penetrating to the abode of this chieftain, and seized upon all his effects; but the latter, protected by some of his followers, escaped on horseback through the woods; his partisans dispersed. It was thus that fortune, which plays so important a part in war, favoured at the same time the enterprise against Ambiorix and his escape. The Eburon chief sent secret messages in all directions, recommending the inhabitants to provide for their own safety. Some concealed themselves in the forest of the Ardennes, others in the midst of the marshes. Those who were nearest to the ocean sought refuge in the islands which are formed at high tide; others expatriated themselves, and settled in distant countries. Catuvolcus, king of one-half of the country of the Eburones, crushed with age and misfortunes, took poison, that he might not fall alive into the power of the Romans.