The Story of the "9th King's" in France

by Enos Herbert Glynne Roberts

billets. Fortunately, although many were dropped, not one of the bombs was effective enough to explode the ammunition. During the raid a large Gotha aeroplane was caught in the beam of one of the searchlights, and this was the first occasion the men saw this particular type of machine.

Despite the training the men had undergone before the battle, there was a good deal of time devoted to field work, as in view of the experience gained and the lessons learned in the recent attack new tactics had to be evolved. Until the Third Battle of Ypres, the chief obstacles to the advance of the British had been the German wire entanglements. The fuses on the British shells had always permitted the shells to bury themselves to some extent before exploding. This meant that a crater was formed, and though the enemy wire in the immediate vicinity of the crater would be destroyed, the obstacle effect of the whole entanglement remained almost in its entirety. A new fuse which was known as No. 106 was introduced in 1917, by means of which the shells would explode instantaneously on impact, and the splinters would destroy the wire over a much bigger area than had formerly been the case. The artillery could now ensure the proper cutting of the enemy wire entanglements, and it had been anticipated that in the attack of the 31st July the troops would not encounter serious obstacles in the way of wire entanglements, particularly as they were to be supported by tanks. It is true the artillery had cut the wire, but several units had nevertheless been held up. The Germans had anticipated to some extent the British methods of attack and invented a system of defence to meet it.

The Commander of the Fourth German Army

which was defending the Ypres sector, Infantry General Sixt von Arnim, was a commander of high standing, inasmuch as the British Higher Command had thought fit to publish some observations of his on the Somme Battle. In the Ypres sector he had adopted the plan of holding the forward zone with few troops well disposed in depth, with strong reserves in rear which could be used for an immediate counter-attack before the British could consolidate any positions they had won. His advanced troops were carefully echeloned in fortified farms, each strongly concreted and armed with several machine guns. The advantage of this scheme was that it afforded few definite targets to the British artillery, and gave every opportunity to the Germans to ambush and enfilade advancing British infantry. Tanks were of little avail against these block-houses, which in reality formed a belt of small fortresses which could only be overpowered one by one. At any rate they could easily break up the force of an attack, and inflict a large number of casualties at a small loss. The reserves could then be used to counter-attack the British before they had properly put the positions won into a state of defence. Such a method of defence was indeed a difficult obstacle to the advance, and its efficacy had been learnt at great cost in the last fight. This system of defence meant that new tactics had to be evolved to combat such a scheme. The German method of defence was explained in printed sheets and the explanations were retailed to the men. In the numerous tactical schemes and attack practices that took place the men were taught to encircle enemy strong points rapidly and close in on them. These exercises were supervised by the Divisional Commander in person.

While in this area another Divisional horse show took place, the third to which the Battalion had sent entries. It was rather a good show, and there was some very fine jumping, in which Belgian cavalry officers took part. The Battalion secured two first prizes for a water cart and limbered wagon, two second prizes and two third prizes. It obtained the third place in the Division for the total number of marks gained.

All good times come to an end and the 14th September was the Battalion's last day at Blanc Pignon. The occasion was marked by great festivities, and most of the men apparently consumed large quantities of beer. For this they could not be blamed as they were going into action, and might never survive to indulge so freely again. The next day the Battalion moved by train to Vlamertinghe, where the men bivouacked in the open, having for shelter large bivouac sheets.

The orders were that surplus personnel had to be left here, and all the officers who had taken part in the Battle of the 31st July were, with one exception, left behind. On the 17th the Battalion moved up from Vlamertinghe to Ypres, turned left at the Water Tower, skirted the Plaine d'Amour and proceeded along No. 5 Track to the neighbourhood of Warwick Farm. The next day the Battalion headquarters and two companies moved up to Bank Farm and took over the front shell crater position. Though two big attacks had taken place since the Battalion was last in this area, the front line was approximately in the same place as when the Battalion had left it in the early days of August. A fortified farm called Somme had been captured, and that was about all. Hill 35 was still in possession of the enemy. The Battalion with its sister

regiments in the Brigade was to succeed where others had failed.

The Battalion held the shell crater position from the evening of the 18th, and it was obvious that the enemy expected an attack as he searched the whole area with heavy artillery fire at dawn on the 19th.