"Adams has been here in a dreadful state about the letter you have written him about Butler.
I declined to give him any opinion and asked him to do nothing more till I had seen or written to you.
What you say of Butler is true enough, tho' he denies your interpretation of the order.
But it is not clear that the President approves of the order, and I think if you could add something to the effect that you respect the Government of President Lincoln, and do not wish to impute to them the fault of Butler it might soothe him.
If you could withdraw the letter altogether it would be the best. But this you may not like to do[641]."
It is apparent that Russell did not approve of Palmerston's move against Adams nor of any "vigorous" language in Parliament, and as to the last, he had his way, for the Government, while disapproving Butler's order, was decidedly mild in comment. As to the letter, Adams, the suspicion proving unfounded that an immediate change of policy was intended, returned to the attack as a matter of personal prestige. It was not until June 15 that Palmerston replied to Adams and then in far different language seeking to smooth the Minister's ruffled feathers, yet making no apology and not answering Adams' question. Adams promptly responded with vigour, June 16, again asking his question as to the letter being official or personal, and characterizing Palmerston's previous assertions as "offensive imputations." He also again approached Russell, who stated that he too had written to Palmerston about his letter, but had received no reply, and he acknowledged that Palmerston's proceeding was "altogether irregular[642]." In the end Palmerston was brought, June 19, to write a long and somewhat rambling reply to Adams, in effect still evading the question put him, though acknowledging that the "Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs is the regular official organ for communications...." In conclusion he expressed gratification that reports from Lord Lyons showed Butler's authority at New Orleans had been curtailed by Lincoln. The next day Adams answered interpreting Palmerston as withdrawing his "imputations" but stating plainly that he would not again submit "to entertain any similar correspondence[643]."
Adams had been cautious in pushing for an answer until he knew there was to be no change in British policy. Indeed Palmerston's whole move may even have been intended to ease the pressure for a change in that policy. On the very day of Adams' first talk with Russell, friends of the South thought the Times editorial indicated "that some movement is to be made at last, and I doubt not we are to thank the Emperor for it[644]." But on this day also Russell was advising Palmerston to state in Parliament that "We have not received at present any proposal from France to offer mediation and no intention at present exists to offer it on our part[645]." This was the exact language used by Palmerston in reply to Hopwood[646]. Mason again saw his hopes dwindling, but was assured by Lindsay that all was not yet lost, and that he would "still hold his motion under consideration[647]." Lindsay, according to his own account, had talked very large in a letter to Russell, but knew privately, and so informed Mason, that the Commons would not vote for his motion if opposed by the Government, and so intended to postpone it[648]. The proposed motion was now one for recognition instead of mediation, a temporary change of plan due to Palmerston's answer to Hopwood on June 13. But whatever the terms of the motion favourable to the South, it was evident the Government did not wish discussion at the moment, and hesitancy came over pro-Southern friends. Slidell, in despair, declared that for his part he intended, no matter with what prospect of success, to demand recognition from France[649]. This alarmed Mason's English advisers, and he wrote at once strongly urging against such a step, for if the demand were presented and refused there would be no recourse but to depart for home[650]. He thought Lindsay's motion dying away for on consultation with "different parties, including Disraeli, Seymour Fitzgerald and Roebuck," it "has been so far reduced and diluted ... as to make it only expressive of the opinion of the House that the present posture of affairs in America made the question of the recognition of the Confederate States worth the serious consideration of the Government. It was so modified to prevent the Ministry making an issue upon it...." There was "no assurance that it would be sustained ... even in that form." Lindsay had determined to postpone his motion "for a fortnight, so that all expectation from this quarter for the present is dished, and we must wait for 'King Cotton' to turn the screw still further[651]." On June, 20 Lindsay gave this notice of postponement, and no parliamentary comment was made[652]. It was a moment of extreme depression for the Confederate agents in Europe. Slidell, yielding to Mason's pleas, gave up his idea of demanding recognition and wrote:
"The position of our representatives in Europe is painful and almost humiliating; it might be tolerated if they could be consoled by the reflection that their presence was in any way advantageous to their cause but I am disposed to believe that we would have done better to withdraw after our first interview with Russell and Thouvenel[653]."
FOOTNOTES:
[580] U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63, Pt. I, p. 41.
[581] F.O., Am., Vol. 826. Nos. 154 and 155. March 3, 1862.
[582] F.O., France, Vol. 1435. No. 362. Cowley to Russell, March 18, 1862.
[583] U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-63, Pt. I, p. 54. Adams to Seward, March 27, 1862.