[740] Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 388.
[741] U.S. Messages and Documents, 1862-3. Pt. I, pp. 165-168.
[742] Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 389. First printed in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in 1899.
[743] Ibid., p. 390.
[744] See ante, p. 32.
[745] Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 21, 1862.
[746] Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 25, 1862.
[747] Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862. Stoeckl's own report hardly agrees with this. He wrote that the newspapers were full of rumours of European mediation but, on consultation with Seward, advised that any offer at present would only make matters worse. It would be best to wait and see what the next spring would bring forth (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Aug. 9-21, 1862. No. 1566). Three weeks later Stoeckl was more emphatic; an offer of mediation would accomplish nothing unless backed up by force to open the Southern ports; this had always been Lyons' opinion also; before leaving for England, Lyons had told him "we ought not to venture on mediation unless we are ready to go to war." Mercier, however, was eager for action and believed that if France came forward, supported by the other Powers, especially Russia, the United States would be compelled to yield. To this Stoeckl did not agree. He believed Lyons was right (Ibid., Sept. 16-28, 1862. No. 1776).
[748] Ibid., Aug. 22, 1862. Sumner was Stuart's informant.
[749] Ibid., Sept. 26, 1862. When issued on September 22, Stuart found no "humanity" in it. "It is cold, vindictive and entirely political."