[770] Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1, as, summarized, (1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with England in offering good services to the United States looking towards peace. (2) Much importance attached to the adhesion of Russia. (3) Excellent chance of success. (4) Nevertheless a possible refusal by the United States, in which case, (5) recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemed likely that this could be done without giving the United States a just ground of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" the action of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circumstances might delay it. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the political necessity of "doing something" before Parliament reassembled (Russian Archives, Brunow to F.O., London, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.). No. 1698.) Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to Stoeckl, together with a letter from Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.), in which Brunow expressed the opinion that one object of the British Government was to introduce at Washington a topic which would serve to accentuate the differences that were understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (This seems very far-fetched.) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this to Stoeckl was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy of extreme friendship to the United States (Ibid., F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct. 3, 1862 (O.S.).)
[771] Thouvenel, Le Secret de l'Empereur, II, pp. 438-9.
[772] Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 30, 1862.
[773] Ibid., Cowley to Russell, Oct. 3, 1862.
[774] Even the Edinburgh Review for October, 1862, discussed recognition of the South as possibly near, though on the whole against such action.
[775] Palmerston MS. Walpole makes Palmerston responsible for the original plan and Russell acquiescent and readily agreeing to postpone. This study reverses the roles.
[776] Russell Papers. Also see ante p. 41. Stuart to Lyons. The letter to Russell was of exactly the same tenor.
[777] Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 6, 1862. Lyons' departure had been altered from October n to October 25.
[778] Morley, Gladstone, II, p. 79. Morley calls this utterance a great error which was long to embarrass Gladstone, who himself later so characterized it.
[779] Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 402.