[840] Bigelow, Retrospections, I, 579, Dec. 2, 1862. Bigelow was Consul-General at Paris, and was the most active of the Northern confidential agents abroad. A journalist himself, he had close contacts with the foreign press. It is interesting that he reported the Continental press as largely dependent for its American news and judgments upon the British press which specialized in that field, so that Continental tone was but a reflection of the British tone. Ibid., p. 443. Bigelow to Seward, Jan. 7, 1862.
[841] Lyons placed a high estimate on Adams' abilities. He wrote: "Mr. Adams shows more calmness and good sense than any of the American Ministers abroad." (Russell Papers. To Russell, Dec. 12, 1862.)
[842] Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Dec. 22. 1862.
[843] Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Jan. 3, 1863.
[844] December 1, Brunow related an interview in which Russell expressed his "satisfaction" that England and Russia were in agreement that the moment was not opportune for a joint offer to the United States. Russell also stated that it was unfortunate France had pressed her proposal without a preliminary confidential sounding and understanding between the Powers; the British Government saw no reason for changing its attitude. (Russian Archives. Brunow to F.O., Dec. 1, 1862 (N.S.), No. 1998.) There is no evidence in the despatch that Brunow knew of Russell's preliminary "soundings" of France.
[845] Various writers have treated Roebuck's motion in 1863 as the "crisis" of intervention. In Chapter XIV the error of this will be shown.