[262] Ibid.
[263] Ibid.
[264] U.S. Messages and Documents, 1861-2, p. 1431 Seward to Adams, Sept. 7, 1861.
[265] Bancroft, Seward, II, p. 196. This speculation is not supported by any reference to documents revealing such a purpose. While it may seem a reasonable speculation it does not appear to be borne out by the new British materials cited later in this chapter.
[266] C.F. Adams, "Seward and The Declaration of Paris" Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, XLVI, pp. 23-81.
[267] Ibid., p. 57. The quotation is from a despatch by Lyons of Dec. 6, 1861; but this is inexact language. It is true that Seward had refused to receive officially this despatch, but he had read and considered it in private. Hence he knew privately the facts of Russell's proposal and that Lyons had no instructions to negotiate. The incident of this despatch has been treated by me in Chapter IV, where I regard Seward's refusal to receive officially the despatch as primarily a refusal to be notified of Great Britain's proclamation of neutrality. Bancroft treats this incident as primarily a clever refusal by Seward to be approached officially by Lyons and Mercier in a joint representation, thus blocking a plan of joint action. (Bancroft, Seward, II, p. 181.) I agree with C.F. Adams that the only effect of this, so far as the negotiation is concerned was that "Seward, by what has always, for some reason not at once apparent, passed for a very astute proceeding, caused a transfer of the whole negotiation from Washington to London and Paris." ("Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p. 50.)
[268] Ibid., p. 51.
[269] Ibid., p. 64.
[270] Ibid., p. 60.
[271] Ibid., p. 58.