Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam

by Ephraim Emerton

The impression of this letter is one of sad but confident sincerity. Luther is not afraid of Erasmus because he is unshakably convinced of the justice of his own cause, but he would gladly be spared the necessity of going into an encounter which would make even more evident to the world than it was already the difference between his own and Erasmus' views of reform. His tone is lofty, arrogant if we will, because he is speaking for what he believes to be divine truth and to a man who seemed to him as yet untouched by the real divine spark. He acknowledges his indebtedness to the great scholar, but cannot see why Erasmus may not continue to find full scope for his talents on the lines he has been following. He did not succeed in staying the publication of the essay on free will, but at all events the moderation of its tone shows a notable effort on the part of Erasmus to avoid irritating language.

The treatise, published in 1524, is a short one, covering sixteen folio pages. It consists chiefly of a careful historical examination of passages of Scripture, both of the Old and New Testaments, in which the subject seems to be alluded to. So far as the argument itself is concerned, the work is of little interest. Erasmus for the most part carefully avoids original discussion and holds himself closely to authority. Since the beginning, he says, there has never been anyone to deny free will entirely except "Manichæus" and Wiclif. Yet Luther gives no weight to all this and falls back upon Scripture. Very good, but this is only what all do. "Both sides accept and revere the same Scripture. The battle is only about the meaning of Scripture," and in getting at the meaning we ought to pay respect to talent and learning. Of course the only sound interpretation comes through the gift of the Spirit; but where is the Spirit? The chances are much greater that it is to be found among those to whom God has given ordination, just as we believe more easily that grace is given to a baptised man than to an unbaptised one.

"If Paul commands his time, in which the gift of the Spirit was flourishing, to prove the spirits, whether they be of God, what must we do in this fleshly age? How then shall we judge the spirits? by learning? On both sides there are men of learning. By the life? there are sinners on both sides. In the other life is the whole choir of the saints who approve the freedom of the will. 'But,' they say, 'those were mortals'; true, and I am comparing men with men, not men with gods. I am asked: 'What have majorities to do with the meaning of Scripture?' I answer: 'What have minorities to do with it?' I am asked: 'How does the mitre help in understanding Scripture?' I answer: 'How does the cloak help or the cowl?' I am asked: 'What has the understanding of philosophy to do with the understanding of Scripture?' I answer: 'What has ignorance to do with it?' I am asked: 'What can be done for a knowledge of Scripture by a Council, in which it may happen that no one has the Spirit?' I answer: 'What can be done by private gatherings of a few men, among whom it is far more probable that no one has the Spirit?' ...

"If you ask them by what proof they know the true sense of Scripture, they reply, 'By the witness of the Spirit.' If you ask how they come to have the Spirit, rather than those whose miracles have been known to all the world, they reply as if there had been no Gospel in the world for thirteen hundred years. If you ask of them a life worthy of the Spirit, they reply that they are justified by faith, not by works. If you ask for miracles they tell you that these have long since ceased and that there is no need of them in the present clear light of Scripture. If you deny that Scripture is clear on this point, upon which so many of the greatest men have been involved in darkness, the circle comes round again to its beginning."

Now all this is very clever—too clever, in fact; for it amounts to nothing but an elaborate defence of the principle of human authority in belief. By means of this introduction, Erasmus sets himself squarely against the principle of free interpretation of the original sources of Christianity by the light of reason and knowledge, for which the Reformation was really working and towards which he himself by his own New Testament work had been contributing.

Another principle of Erasmus, especially irritating to Luther, was that the truth should not always be spoken, a maxim as obviously true as the application of it was liable to gross abuse.

"Let us then suppose," he says, "that it be true in some sense, as Wiclif and Luther have said, that 'whatever is done by us, is done, not by free will but by pure necessity,' what more inexpedient than to publish this paradox to the world? Or, let us suppose that in a certain sense it is true, as Augustine somewhere says: 'God works both good and evil in us, and rewards his own good works in us and punishes his own evil works in us,' what a door to impiety this saying would open to countless mortals, if it were spread abroad in the world!... What weak man would keep up the perpetual and weary conflict against the flesh? What evil man would strive to correct his life? Who could persuade his soul to love with his whole heart a God who has prepared a hell glowing with eternal tortures that he may there avenge upon miserable men his own misdeeds as if he delighted in human tortures?"

Here was an objection to Augustinianism as old as Augustine himself, but the fact was that it had never yet been sustained and was not likely to be. Even if it had been, that could not affect the principle Erasmus was now concerned with; namely, that truth which seemed likely to make any confusion in the world ought not to be spoken.[153]

Having fortified himself on these preliminary points, Erasmus lays out the problem with great clearness and then proceeds with the examination of scripture passages on both sides. It would be idle to follow this process, by which, proverbially, anyone can prove anything. Of course Erasmus finds the weight of Scripture on his side, as his opponents found it on theirs. Far more important and interesting is his own personal declaration of faith. Put in a word, it was that one ought to allow to man some share in his own good actions; not a great share, only "non nihil." In fact, this is really the only thing he finds to criticise in the Lutheran doctrine, the overemphasis on the element of grace in human action.

"[154] Doubtless to them [the Lutherans] it seems perfectly in harmony with the simple obedience of the Christian soul that man should depend wholly upon the will of God, should place all his hope and trust in His promises, and, knowing how wretched he is of himself, should marvel and adore His boundless mercy which is poured out upon us freely in such large measure and should entrust himself wholly to His will, whether He wishes to save or to condemn; that man should take no credit to himself for His kindnesses, but should ascribe all the glory to His grace, bearing in mind that man is only the living organ of the divine spirit, purified and consecrated by His free goodness, ruled and governed by His inscrutable wisdom. There is nothing here which anyone can claim for his own strength and yet one may with confidence hope from Him the reward of eternal life—not because he has deserved it by good deeds, but because it has seemed best to His goodness to promise it to His faithful. It is the part of men earnestly to pray God that he may impart and increase His spirit in us, to give thanks if any good is done through us, to worship His power in all things, to marvel at His wisdom, and to love His goodness.