6. Then must I now be brought to trial, and now must another have a fever, and another sail the seas, another die, another be sentenced? Yea, for with such a body, in the bounds of such a universe, in such a throng of inhabitants, it cannot be but that different things of this nature should fall on different persons. This is thy task, then, having come into the world, to speak what thou shouldst, and to order these things as it is fitting.
7. Then some one saith, I charge you with wrong-doing. Much good may it do thee! I have done my part—look to it thyself if thou have done thine, for of this too there is some danger, lest it escape thee.
CHAPTER III.
against the epicureans and academics.
1. Beliefs which are sound and manifestly true are of necessity used even by those who deny them. And perhaps a man might adduce this as the greatest possible proof of the manifest truth of anything, that those who deny it are compelled to make use of it. Thus, if a man should deny that there is anything universally true, it is clear that he is obliged to affirm the contrary, the negation—that there is nothing universally true. Slave! not even this—for what is this but to say that if there is anything universal it is falsehood?
2. Again, if one should come and say, Know that nothing can be known, but all things are incapable of proof; or another, Believe me, and it shall profit thee, that no man ought to believe any man; or again, another, Learn from me, O man, that it is not possible to learn anything, and I tell thee this, and I will teach thee, if thou wilt—now wherein do such men differ from those—whom shall I say?—those who call themselves Academics? Assent, O men, that no man can assent to aught; believe us that no man can believe any one.
3. Thus Epicurus, when he would abolish the natural fellowship of men with one another, employeth the very thing that is being abolished. For what saith he? Be not deceived, O men, nor misguided nor mistaken—there is no natural fellowship among reasoning beings, believe me; and those who speak otherwise deceive us with sophisms. What is that to thee? let us be deceived! Will it be the worse for thee if all other men are persuaded that we have a natural fellowship with one another, and that we should in all ways maintain it? Nay—but much the better and safer. Man, why dost thou take thought for us, and watch at night for our sakes? Why dost thou kindle thy lamp and rise early? why dost thou write so many books, lest any of us should be deceived about the Gods, in supposing that they cared for men? or lest any one should take the essence of the Good to be anything else than Pleasure? For if these things are so, then lie down and sleep, and live the life of a worm, wherefor thou hast judged thyself fit; eat and drink and cohabit and ease thyself and snore. What is it to thee how other men think concerning these matters, whether soundly or unsoundly? What hast thou to do with us? With sheep hast thou some concern, for that they serve us when they are shorn, and when they are milked, and at last when they have their throats cut. Were it not, then, to be desired, if men could be lulled and charmed to slumber by the Stoics, and give themselves to thee and the like of thee, to be shorn and milked? These things shouldst thou say to thy brother Epicureans; but shouldst thou not keep them hidden from other men, and seek in every way to persuade them above all things that we are by nature social, and that temperance is good; in order that everything may be kept for thee? Or should we preserve this fellowship with some and not with others? With whom, then, should we preserve it? With those who also preserve it towards us, or with those who transgress it? And who transgress it more than ye, who set forth such doctrines?
4. What, then, was it that roused up Epicurus from his sleep, and compelled him to write the things he wrote? What else than Nature, the mightiest of all powers in humanity? Nature, that drags the man, reluctant and groaning, to her will. For, saith she, since it seems to thee that there is no fellowship among men, write this down, and deliver it to others, and watch and wake for this, and be thyself by thine own deed the accuser of thine own opinions. Shall we, then, say that Orestes was driven by the Furies and aroused from sleep, and did not crueller Furies and Avengers rouse this man as he slumbered, and suffered him not to rest, but compelled him, as madness and wine the priests of Cybele,[1] to proclaim his own evils? So mighty and invincible a thing is man’s nature.
5. For how can a vine be affected, and not in the manner of a vine, but of an olive? Or how, again, can an olive be affected not in the manner of an olive but of a vine? It is impossible, it cannot be conceived. Neither, then, is it possible for a man wholly to lose the affections of humanity, for even eunuchs cannot cut away for themselves the desires of men. And thus Epicurus has cut away all that belongs to a man as father of a family, and as citizen, and as friend; but the desires of humanity he hath not cut away, for he could not; no more than these pitiful Academics are able to cast away or to blind their own perceptions, although this is the thing that they have striven with all their zeal to do.
6. How shameful is this! that a man having received from Nature measures and canons for the recognition of truth, should study not to add to them and perfect them where they are wanting, but the very contrary of this; if there be anything that may lead us to the knowledge of the truth, they strive to abolish and destroy it.