Διαρθρωτικός.—That which organizes, constitutes organically, forms into a system. From ἄρθρον, a joint. The word “analyze,” by which Long translates διαρθροῦν, seems to me wanting in the formative sense expressed by the original.
Δόγμα.—An opinion, that which seems (δοκεῖν) true; generally in the special sense of a philosophic dogma.
Ἐυροεῖν.—To prosper; literally, to flow freely, εὔροια, prosperity. A common Stoic phrase for a happy life.
Εὐσέβεια.—Religion, piety. σέβομαι—“to feel awe or fear before God and man, especially when about to do something disgraceful” (Liddell and Scott); to worship, respect, reverence.
Ἡγεμονικόν (τό).—The Ruling Faculty—that in a man which chooses, determines, takes cognizance of good and evil, and sways the inferior faculties (δυνάμεις, powers) to its will. Lotze notes this hegemonic quality in the human soul as that which distinguishes it from the bundle of sensations into which the Association Philosophy would resolve it.
θαυμάζειν.—To admire, be dazzled with admiration by, to worship, to be taken up with a thing so as to lose the power of cool judgment. A frequent word in Epictetus, the sense of which is precisely rendered in Hor. Sat. I, 4, 28, “Hunc capit argenti splendor, stupet Albius ære.”
Ἰδιώτης.—One of the vulgar, an unlettered person; in Epictetus, one uninstructed in philosophy. Originally the word meant one who remained in private life, not filling any public office, or taking part in State affairs. A man might be an ἰδιώτης, or “layman,” with respect to any branch of science or art.
Καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός.—The good and wise man—literally, beautiful and good. A standing phrase to denote the perfection of human character. καλὸς is a word sometimes difficult to render. Curtius connects it etymologically with Sanscrit, kalyas; Gothic, hails=healthy.
Οἴησις.—“Conceit”—defined by Cicero as “Opinatio”—intellectual self-sufficiency, the supposing one’s self to know something when one does not. “The first business of a philosopher,” says Epictetus, “is to cast away oἴησις, for it is impossible that one can begin to learn the things that he thinks he knows” (Diss. II. xvii. 1.) He is not, in short, to be “wise in his own conceit.”