Zoonomia; Or, the Laws of Organic Life, Vol. I

by Erasmus Darwin

SECT. [XXXIV].

DISEASES OF VOLITION.

[I]. [1]. Volition defined. Motions termed involuntary are caused by volition. Desires opposed to each other. Deliberation. Ass between two hay-cocks. Saliva swallowed against one's desire. Voluntary motions distinguished from those associated with sensitive motions. [2]. Pains from excess, and from defect of motion. No pain is felt during vehement voluntary exertion; as in cold fits of ague, labour-pains, strangury, tenesmus, vomiting, restlessness in fevers, convulsion of a wounded muscle. [3]. Of holding the breath and screaming in pain; why swine and dogs cry out in pain, and not sheep and horses. Of grinning and biting in pain; why mad animals bite others. [4]. Epileptic convulsions explained, why the fits begin with quivering of the under jaw, biting the tongue, and setting the teeth; why the convulsive motions are alternately relaxed. The phenomenon of laughter explained. Why children cannot tickle themselves. How some have died from immoderate laughter. [5]. Of cataleptic spasms, of the locked jaw, of painful cramps. [6]. Syncope explained. Why no external objects are perceived in syncope. [7]. Of palsy and apoplexy from violent exertions. Case of Mrs. Scot. From dancing, scating, swimming. Case of Mr. Nairn. Why palsies are not always immediately preceded by violent exertions. Palsy and epilepsy from diseased livers. Why the right arm more frequently paralytic than the left. How paralytic limbs regain their motions. [II]. Diseases of the sensual motions from excess or defect of voluntary exertion. [1]. Madness. [2]. Distinguished from delirium. [3]. Why mankind more liable to insanity than brutes. [4]. Suspicion. Want of shame, and of cleanliness. [5]. They bear cold, hunger, and fatigue. Charles XII. of Sweden. [6]. Pleasureable delirium, and insanity. Child riding on a stick. Pains of martyrdom not felt. [7]. Dropsy. [8]. Inflammation cured by insanity. [III]. [1]. Pain relieved by reverie. Reverie is an exertion of voluntary and sensitive motions. [2]. Case of reverie. [3]. Lady supposed to have two souls. [4]. Methods of relieving pain.

[I]. [1]. Before we commence this Section on Diseased Voluntary Motions, it may be necessary to premise, that the word volition is not used in this work exactly in its common acceptation. Volition is said in Section [V]. to bear the same analogy to desire and aversion, which sensation does to pleasure and pain. And hence that, when desire or aversion produces any action of the muscular fibres, or of the organs of sense, they are termed volition; and the actions produced in consequence are termed voluntary actions. Whence it appears, that motions of our muscles or ideas may be produced in consequence of desire or aversion without our having the power to prevent them, and yet these motions may be termed voluntary, according to our definition of the word; though in common language they would be called involuntary.

The objects of desire and aversion are generally at a distance, whereas those of pleasure and pain are immediately acting upon our organs. Hence, before desire or aversion are exerted, so as to cause any actions, there is generally time for deliberation; which consists in discovering the means to obtain the object of desire, or to avoid the object of aversion; or in examining the good or bad consequences, which may result from them. In this case it is evident, that we have a power to delay the proposed action, or to perform it; and this power of choosing, whether we shall act or not, is in common language expressed by the word volition, or will. Whereas in this work the word volition means simply the active state of the sensorial faculty in producing motion in consequence of desire or aversion: whether we have the power of restraining that action, or not; that is, whether we exert any actions in consequence of opposite desires or aversions, or not.

For if the objects of desire or aversion are present, there is no necessity to investigate or compare the means of obtaining them, nor do we always deliberate about their consequences; that is, no deliberation necessarily intervenes, and in consequence the power of choosing to act or not is not exerted. It is probable, that this twofold use of the word volition in all languages has confounded the metaphysicians, who have disputed about free will and necessity. Whereas from the above analysis it would appear, that during our sleep, we use no voluntary exertions at all; and in our waking hours, that they are the consequence of desire or aversion.

To will is to act in consequence of desire; but to desire means to desire something, even if that something be only to become free from the pain, which causes the desire; for to desire nothing is not to desire; the word desire, therefore, includes both the action and the object or motive; for the object and motive of desire are the same thing. Hence to desire without an object, that is, without a motive, is a solecism in language. As if one should ask, if you could eat without food, or breathe without air.

From this account of volition it appears, that convulsions of the muscles, as in epileptic fits, may in the common sense of that word be termed involuntary; because no deliberation is interposed between the desire or aversion and the consequent action; but in the sense of the word, as above defined, they belong to the class of voluntary motions, as delivered in Vol. II. Class III. If this use of the word be discordant to the ear of the reader, the term morbid voluntary motions, or motions in consequence of aversion, may be substituted in its stead.

If a person has a desire to be cured of the ague, and has at the same time an aversion (or contrary desire) to swallowing an ounce of Peruvian bark; he balances desire against desire, or aversion against aversion; and thus he acquires the power of choosing, which is the common acceptation of the word willing. But in the cold fit of ague, after having discovered that the act of shuddering, or exerting the subcutaneous muscles, relieves the pain of cold; he immediately exerts this act of volition, and shudders, as soon as the pain and consequent aversion return, without any deliberation intervening; yet is this act, as well as that of swallowing an ounce of the bark, caused by volition; and that even though he endeavours in vain to prevent it by a weaker contrary volition. This recalls to our minds the story of the hungry ass between two hay-stacks, where the two desires are supposed so exactly to counteract each other, that he goes to neither of the stacks, but perishes by want. Now as two equal and opposite desires are thus supposed to balance each other, and prevent all action, it follows, that if one of these hay-stacks was suddenly removed, that the ass would irresistibly be hurried to the other, which in the common use of the word might be called an involuntary act; but which, in our acceptation of it, would be classed amongst voluntary actions, as above explained.

Hence to deliberate is to compare opposing desires or aversions, and that which is the most interesting at length prevails, and produces action. Similar to this, where two pains oppose each other, the stronger or more interesting one produces action; as in pleurisy the pain from suffocation would produce expansion of the lungs, but the pain occasioned by extending the inflamed membrane, which lines the chest, opposes this expansion, and one or the other alternately prevails.