With decreased Actions of the Organs of Sense.
SPECIES.
[1]. Recollectionis jactura. Loss of recollection. This is the defect of memory in old people, who forget the actions of yesterday, being incapable of voluntary recollection, and yet remember those of their youth, which by frequent repetition are introduced by association or suggestion. This is properly the paralysis of the mind; the organs of sense do not obey the voluntary power; that is, our ideas cannot be recollected, or acted over again by the will.
After an apoplectic attack the patients, on beginning to recover, find themselves most at a loss in recollecting proper names of persons or places; as those words have not been so frequently associated with the ideas they stand for, as the common words of a language. Mr. ——, a man of strong mind, of a short necked family, many of whom had suffered by apoplexy, after an apoplectic fit on his recovering the use of speech, after repeated trials to remember the name of a person or place, applauded himself, when he succeeded, with such a childish smile on the partial return of his sagacity, as very much affected me.—Not long, alas! to return; for another attack in a few weeks destroyed the whole.
I saw a child after the small-pox, which was left in this situation; it was lively, active, and even vigorous; but shewed that kind of surprise, which novelty excites, at every object it viewed; and that as often as it viewed it. I never heard the termination of the case.
[2]. Stultitia voluntaria. Voluntary folly. The absence of voluntary power and consequent incapacity to compare the ideas of present and future good. Brute animals may be said to be in this situation, as they are in general excited into action only by their present painful or pleasurable sensations. Hence though they are liable to surprise, when their passing trains of ideas are dissevered by violent stimuli; yet are they not affected with wonder or astonishment at the novelty of objects; as they possess but in a very inferior degree, that voluntary power of comparing the present ideas with those previously acquired, which distinguishes mankind; and is termed analogical reasoning, when deliberatively exerted; and intuitive analogy, when used without our attention to it, and which always preserves our hourly trains of ideas consistent with truth and nature. See Sect. XVII. 3. 7.
[3]. Credulitas. Credulity. Life is short, opportunities of knowledge rare; our senses are fallacious, our reasonings uncertain, mankind therefore struggles with perpetual error from the cradle to the coffin. He is necessitated to correct experiment by analogy, and analogy by experiment; and not always to rest satisfied in the belief of facts even with this two-fold testimony, till future opportunities, or the observations of others, concur in their support.
Ignorance and credulity have ever been companions, and have misled and enslaved mankind; philosophy has in all ages endeavoured to oppose their progress, and to loosen the shackles they had imposed; philosophers have on this account been called unbelievers: unbelievers of what? of the fictions of fancy, of witchcraft, hobgobblins, apparitions, vampires, fairies; of the influence of stars on human actions, miracles wrought by the bones of saints, the flights of ominous birds, the predictions from the bowels of dying animals, expounders of dreams, fortune-tellers, conjurors, modern prophets, necromancy, cheiromancy, animal magnetism, with endless variety of folly? These they have disbelieved and despised, but have ever bowed their hoary heads to Truth and Nature.
Mankind may be divided in respect to the facility of their belief or conviction into two classes; those, who are ready to assent to single facts from the evidence of their senses, or from the serious assertions of others; and those, who require analogy to corroborate or authenticate them.
Our first knowledge is acquired by our senses; but these are liable to deceive us, and we learn to detect these deceptions by comparing the ideas presented to us by one sense with those presented by another. Thus when we first view a cylinder, it appears to the eye as a flat surface with different shades on it, till we correct this idea by the sense of touch, and find its surface to be circular; that is, having some parts gradually receding further from the eye than others. So when a child, or a cat, or a bird, first sees its own image in a looking-glass, it believes that another animal exists before it, and detects this fallacy by going behind the glass to examine, if another tangible animal really exists there.