The real business of commanding a modern army is done by the chief of the general staff. It is of good augury that the present holder of that position is again a Moltke. On him falls the planning and the responsibility for carrying out of the plans, though he has under him a huge staff of subordinates—more than two hundred in all—whose duty is to collect information, make reports and even tender advice. The older Moltke once wrote: “The make-up of the headquarters of an army is of an importance not always sufficiently realized. Some commanders need no advice, but weigh and decide things for themselves. Their subordinates have merely to carry out instructions. But such stars of first radiance are only to be found about once in a century. Only a Frederick the Great takes counsel with no one and determines everything himself. As a rule the leader of an army can not do without advice.” The old plan was to hold a council of war and abide by its decisions; the new one is for the commanding general to use every aid from others but to take the whole responsibility himself.
Easily Upset
Headquarters travels with the army and with it goes the imperial chancellor, ready to take advantage of every happening in the field to influence the course of negotiations. The minister of war remains at home to see to the prompt forwarding of troops and supplies. In 1870 and 1871 Bismarck had much to suffer from female influences—royal ladies who objected to the bombardment of beautiful cities and the like. There are at present no royal ladies in Germany who are likely to interfere. Blücher used to insist that the most merciful way of making war was to be absolutely relentless in pursuit—to the last man and to the last horse. The worst thing that can happen is to have the campaign drag on slowly with necessity of renewing battles. This phase of the matter royal ladies do not always understand.
If the example of the Franco-Prussian War is followed the Germans will put as many as six different armies into the field, each with some four army-corps. There are twenty-five army-corps, and the fighting part of a single army-corps, which numbers some 41,000 men, strings out on an ordinary road to a distance of twenty-six kilometers or more than sixteen miles. As the food supplies, medical and surgical apparatus and ammunition wagons have to follow at a considerable distance we may estimate the length of the whole column at more than double this amount. Were the whole standing army (not to speak of the reserves) to travel along the same road it would take twenty-five days to pass a fixed point. It may be said here that the number of direct roads passing from Germany into France is small and that for purposes of invasion the possession of Belgium was a strategic necessity. Its occupation meant victory or defeat in the great struggle and the devil take the consequences. Belgium and France are so at one that the French have so trusted to the forts of Liege and Namur, which they believed to be impregnable, that they have done little to fortify their own borders in that direction.
Who the commanding generals of the German army are to be has not yet been made public in America. Judging by the holders of high positions in peace-time they will be Grand Duke Frederick II of Baden, Duke Albert of Württemberg, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria and the generals Bülow, Eichhorn, Heeringen and Prittwitz. Whether or not the German crown-prince will be given a command is doubtful. He is brave and dashing but impetuous and unbalanced, and his relations with his father have been somewhat strained. I am told that at maneuvers he expects far too much from his men and horses, though his pleasant manners and his joking way make him very popular. He may, of course, prove the Frederick the Great of the campaign should it last sufficiently long for him to gain the proper experience.
[*] It may be worth giving the exact strength of the German army on October 1, 1913: Total 790,788 and 157,816 horses. Of these: officers, 30,253; sanitary officers, 2,483; veterinaries, 865; non-commissioned officers, 104,377; common soldiers, 647,811. (Infantry, 515,216; cavalry, 85,593; field artillery, 126,042; sappers and miners, 24,010; communication troops, 18,949; army service, 11,592.)
PART III
THE NAVY