SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF THE TWELVEHUMAN SPECIES.

N.B.—Column A denotes the Average Number of the Population in millions.Column B shows the Degree of the Phyletic Development of the Species, thus Pr =Progressive Diffusion; Co = Comparative Stability; Re = Retrogression and Extinction.Column C denotes the Character of the Primæval Language; Mn (Monoglottonic)signifies that the Species had one Simple Primæval Language; Pl (Polyglottonic)a Compound Primæval Language.

Tribe.Human Species.A.B.C.Home.
Tuft-haired
Lophocomi
(about 2 millions)

1.Papuan2ReMn

New Guinea and Melanesia, Philippine Islands, Malacca
2.Hotentot120ReMn

The extreme south of Africa
(The Cape)
Fleecy-haired
Eriocomi
(about 150 millions)

3.Kaffre20PrMn

South Africa (between 30° Lat. and 5° N. Lat.)
4.Negro130PrPl

Central Africa (between the Equator and 30° N. Lat.)
Straight-haired
Euthycomi
(about 600 millions)

5.Australian1/12ReMn

Australia
6.Malay30CoMn

Malacca, Sundanesia, Polynesia, and Madagascar
7.Mongol550PrMn?

The greater part of Asia and northern Europe
8.Arctic Man1/25CoPl?

The extreme north-east of Asia and the extreme north of America
9.American12ReMn?

The whole of America with the exception of the extreme north
Curly-haired
Euplocomi
(about 600 millions)

10.Dravidas34CoMn

South Asia (Hindostan and Ceylon)
11.Nubian10CoMn?

Central Africa (Nubia and Fula-land)
12.Mediterranean550PrPl

In all parts of the world, having migrated from South Asia to North Africa and South Europe
13.Hybrids of the Species11PrPl

In all parts of the world, having migrated from South Asia to North Africa and South Europe
Total1350

CHAPTER XXIV.

OBJECTIONS AGAINST, AND PROOFS OF THE TRUTH OF, THE THEORY OF DESCENT.

Objections to the Doctrine of Filiation.—Objections of Faith and Reason.—Immeasurable Length of the Geological Periods.—Transition Forms between Kindred Species.—Dependence of Stability of Form on Inheritance, and of the Variability of Form on Adaptation.—Origin of very complicated Arrangement of Organisation.—Gradual Development of Instincts and Mental Activities.—Origin of a priori Knowledge from Knowledge a posteriori.—The Knowledge requisite for the Correct Understanding of the Doctrine of Filiation.—Necessary Interaction between Empiricism and Philosophy.—Proofs of the Theory of Descent.—Inner Causal Connection between all the Biological Series of Phenomena.—The Direct Proof of the Theory of Selection.—Relation of the Theory of Descent to Anthropology.—Proofs of the Animal Origin of Man.—The Pithecoid Theory as an Inseparable Part of the Theory of Descent.—Induction and Deduction.—Gradual Development of the Human Mind.—Body and Mind.—Human Soul and Animal Soul.—A Glance at the Future.

If in these chapters I may hope to have made the Theory of Descent seem more or less probable, and to have even convinced some of my readers of its unassailable truth, yet I am by no means unconscious that, to most of them, during the perusal of my explanations, a number of objections more or less well founded must have occurred. Hence it seems absolutely necessary at the conclusion of our examination to refute at least the most important of these, and at the same time, on the other hand, once more to set forth the convincing arguments which bear testimony to the truth of the theory of development.

The objections which are raised to the doctrine of descent may be divided into two large groups: objections of faith and objections of reason. The objections of the first group originate in the infinitely varied forms of faith held by human individuals, and need not here be taken into consideration at all. For, as I have already remarked at the beginning of this book, science, as an objective result of sensuous experience, and of the striving of human reason after knowledge, has nothing whatever to do with the subjective ideas of faith, which are preached by a single man as the direct inspirations or revelations of the Creator, and then believed in by the dependent multitude. This belief, very different in different nations, only begins, as is well known, where science ends. Natural Science believes, according to the maxim of Frederick the Great, “that every one may go to heaven in his own fashion,” and only necessarily enters into conflict with particular forms of faith where they appear to set a limit to free inquiry and a goal to human knowledge, beyond which we are not to venture. Now this is certainly the case here in the highest degree, for the Theory of Development applies itself to the solution of the greatest of scientific problems—that of the creation, the coming into existence of things; more especially the origin of organic forms, and of man at their head. It is here certainly the right as well as the sacred duty of free inquiry, to fear no human authority, and courageously to raise the veil from the image of the Creator, unconcerned as to what natural truth may lie concealed beneath. The only Divine revelation which we recognise as true, is written everywhere in nature, and to every one with healthy senses and a healthy reason it is given to participate in the unerring revelation of this holy temple of nature, by his own inquiry and independent discovery.

If we, therefore, here disregard all objections to the Doctrine of Descent which may be raised by the priests of the different religious faiths, we must nevertheless endeavour to refute the most important of those objections which seem more or less founded on science, and which we grant might, at first sight, to a certain extent captivate us and deter us from adopting the Doctrine of Descent. Many persons seem to think the length of the periods of time required the most important of these objections. We are not accustomed to deal with such immense periods as are necessary for the history of the creation. It has already been mentioned that the periods, during which species originated by gradual transmutation, must not be calculated by single centuries, but by hundreds and by millions of centuries. Even the thickness of the stratified crust of the earth, the consideration of the immense space of time which was requisite for its deposition from water, taken together with the periods of elevation between the periods of depression, indicate a duration of time of the organic history of the earth which the human intellect cannot realize. We are here in much the same position as an astronomer in regard to infinite space. In the same way as the distances between the different planetary systems are not calculated by miles but by Sirius-distances, each of which comprises millions of miles, so the organic history of the earth must not be calculated by thousands of years, but by palæontological or geological periods, each of which comprises many thousands of years, and perhaps millions, or even, milliards, of thousands of years. It is of little importance how high the immeasurable length of these periods may be approximately estimated, because we are in fact unable with our limited power of imagination to form a true conception of these periods, and because we do not as in astronomy possess a secure mathematical basis for fixing the approximate length of duration in numbers. But we most positively deny that we see any objection to the theory of development in the extreme length of these periods which are so completely beyond the power of our imagination. It is, on the contrary, as I have already explained in one of the preceding chapters, most advisable, from a strictly philosophical point of view, to conceive these periods of creation to be as long as possible, and we are by so much the less in danger of losing ourselves in improbable hypotheses, the longer we conceive the periods for organic processes of development to have been. The longer, for example, we conceive the Permian period to have been, the easier it will be for us to understand how the important transmutations took place within it which so essentially distinguish the fauna and flora of the Coal period from that of the Trias. The great disinclination which most persons have to assume such immeasurable periods, arises mainly from the fact of our having in early youth been brought up in the notion that the whole earth is only some thousands of years old. Moreover, human life, which at most attains the length of a century, is an extremely short space of time, and is not suitable as a standard for the measurement of geological periods. Our life is a single drop in the ocean of eternity. The reader may call to mind the duration of life of many trees which is more than fifty times as long; for example, the dragon-trees (Dracæna) and monkey bread-fruit trees (Adansonia), whose individual life exceeds a period of five thousand years; and, on the other hand, the shortness of the individual life of many of the lower animals, for example, the infusoria, where the individual, as such, lives but a few days, or even but a few hours, contrasts no less strongly with human longevity. This comparison brings the relative nature of all measurement of time very clearly before us. If the theory of development be true at all, there must certainly have elapsed immense periods, utterly inconceivable to us, during which the gradual historical development of the animal and vegetable kingdom proceeded by the slow transformation of species. There is, however, not a single reason for accepting a definite limit for the length of these periods of development.

A second main objection which many, and more especially systematic zoologists and botanists, raise against the theory of descent, is that no transition forms between the different species can be found, although according to the theory of descent they ought to be found in great numbers. This objection is partly well founded and partly not so, for there does exist an extraordinarily large number of transition forms between living, as well as between extinct species, especially where we have an opportunity of seeing and comparing very numerous individuals of kindred species. Those careful investigators of individual species who so frequently raise this objection are the very persons whom we constantly find checked in their special series of investigations by the really insuperable difficulty of sharply distinguishing individual species. In all systematic works, which are in any degree thorough, one meets with endless complaints, that here and there species cannot be distinguished because of the excessive number of transition forms. Hence every naturalist defines the limit and the number of individual species differently. Some zoologists and botanists, as I mentioned (vol. i. p. [276]), assume in one and the same group of organisms ten species, others twenty, others a hundred or more, while other systematic naturalists again look upon these different forms only as varieties of a single “good” species. In most groups of forms there is, in fact, a superabundance of transition forms and intermediate stages between the individual species.