REMARKS ON THE THEORY OF SPATIAL VISION.[147]
According to Herbart, spatial vision rests on reproduction-series. In such an event, of course, and if the supposition is correct, the magnitudes of the residua with which the percepts or representations are coalesced (the helps to coalescence) are of cardinal influence. Furthermore, since the coalescences must first be fully perfected before they make their appearance, and since upon their appearance the inhibitory ratios are brought into play, ultimately, then, if we leave out of account the accidental order of time in which the percepts are given, everything in spatial vision depends on the oppositions and affinities, or, in brief, on the qualities of the percepts, which enter into series.
Let us see how the theory stands with respect to the special facts involved.
1. If intersecting series only, running anteriorly and posteriorly, are requisite for the production of spatial sensation, why are not analogues of them found in all the senses?
2. Why do we measure differently colored objects and variegated objects with one and the same spatial measure? How do we recognise differently colored objects as the same in size? Where do we get our measure of space from and what is it?
3. Why is it that differently colored figures of the same form reproduce one another and are recognised as the same?
Here are difficulties enough. Herbart is unable to solve them by his theory. The unprejudiced student sees at once that his "inhibition by reason of form" and "preference by reason of form" are absolutely impossible. Think of Herbart's example of the red and black letters.
The "help to coalescence" is a passport, so to speak, made out to the name and person of the percept. A percept which is coalesced with another cannot reproduce all others qualitatively different from it for the simple reason that the latter are in like manner coalesced with one another. Two qualitatively different series certainly do not reproduce themselves because they present the same order of degree of coalescence.
If it is certain that only things simultaneous and things which are alike are reproduced, a basic principle of Herbart's psychology which even the most absolute empiricists will not deny, nothing remains but to modify the theory of spatial perception or to invent in its place a new principle in the manner indicated, a step which hardly any one would seriously undertake. The new principle could not fail to throw all psychology into the most dreadful confusion.
As to the modification which is needed there can be hardly any doubt as to how in the face of the facts and conformably to Herbart's own principles it is to be carried out. If two differently colored figures of equal size reproduce each other and are recognised as equal, the result can be due to nothing but to the existence in both series of presentations of a presentation or percept which is qualitatively the same. The colors are different. Consequently, like or equal percepts must be connected with the colors which are yet independent of the colors. We have not to look long for them, for they are the like effects of the muscular feelings of the eye when confronted by the two figures. We might say we reach the vision of space by the registering of light-sensations in a schedule of graduated muscle-sensations.[148]