Perhaps I ought to say one word more in regard to one of the strangest of the many paradoxical arguments which the defence of the arme blanche has evoked. I mean the complaint which I commented on à propos of Boschman’s Kop—that the Cavalry were deprived of steel weapons just when the Boers were developing the charge, the assumption being, presumably, that but for this modification of armament the Cavalry would then for the first time have developed equally effective, if not more effective, arme blanche charging tactics of their own. I have never seen this view put forward in general terms by any high Cavalry authority, or, indeed, by any Cavalryman; but it figures among the nebulous popular arguments upon which the arme blanche thrives, and it sometimes finds accidental public expression. In July, 1909, an anonymous correspondent of the Times propounded it as a final and crushing answer to those who ventured to see something instructive and important in the Boer charges. Now, in the first place, the view is in conflict with the facts. The Boers began to charge long before the steel weapons were discarded. They charged at Sannah’s Post as early as March, 1900, and within view of the Cavalry engaged in that action. They charged mounted riflemen and attacked Cavalry with great pertinacity in the Eastern Transvaal during October, 1900; and although no body of Cavalry was, so far as I know, itself charged on horseback by Boers during the year 1901, the steel weapon outlived the period of Vlakfontein, and had not, I think, been more than partly abolished at the period of Bakenlaagte. But dates are not material. The discouraging feature of the argument is its total failure to grasp the real nature and origin of the rifle charge, the elementary physical and moral principles which distinguish it in tactical form, and, above all, in tactical spirit, from the shock charge. And behind it, I am afraid, we recognize an echo of Mr. Goldman’s complaint that the Boers, owing to fear of the steel, declined to “give battle” with Cavalry on “open ground.” I cannot pause now to discuss that.[[65]]

We need not exaggerate, as assuredly we must not minimize, the importance of the mounted charges in South Africa. We must allow for the fact that the Boers for the most part were veterans in the mounted rifleman’s art, and that the men against whom they were matched never reached the same degree of excellence. What we should do is to grasp the principle, and apply it to the training of our mounted troops, especially to our professional troops, who are competent to learn anything to which they apply their minds and wills. Shock, at any rate, is gone. South Africa gave it its death-blow, and Manchuria, as I shall show later, buried it for ever. The rifle charge, whether on foot, mounted, or in any intermediate stage up to direct riding into contact, remains as a proved, tangible fact. Since 1870 and up to the present day (1910) shock has been pure theory.

CHAPTER XII
A PECULIAR WAR?

Such are the facts of the South African War, our only great war since the Crimea, and the first serious test for the whole world of the smokeless magazine rifle. What results can we place to the credit of the arme blanche?

1. The pursuit at Elandslaagte (October 21, 1899), on the second day of hostilities: Boers killed, wounded, and prisoners, say fifty. (No figures are forthcoming, but I think fifty is on the safe side.)

2. Klip Drift (February 15, 1900): A “penetrating,” semi-aggressive charge, in widely extended order, by a very large force, with a big backing of Infantry and Artillery, through a gap in a small hostile skirmishing screen. Boer casualties about fifteen.

3. Diamond Hill (June 11, 1900): Two brave but insignificant little charges, which received as much punishment as they gave. Boer casualties about seventeen.

4. Welgevonden (February 12, 1901): A small charge in the open. Boer casualties and prisoners about twenty.

Not a single example of true shock.

This gives a record of about a hundred casualties and prisoners due directly to the arme blanche. There may, no doubt, have been a few others in unrecorded episodes. To be well on the safe side, let us put the total at 200. All the other damage inflicted by the Cavalry, whether in offence or defence, was inflicted through the agency of the carbine or rifle. The opportunities lost through over-training in the steel and inexperience in the firearm are beyond computation.