A truce, then, to the rhetoric about Cavalry being essentially an arm of offence. Ça va sans dire. Every combatant arm is an arm of offence. Infantry would regard such an exhortation as a poor compliment. Of course we know and make full allowance for the reason of the exhortation—namely, that the arme blanche is by its very nature only a weapon of offence, and that in Cavalry theory the arme blanche is the supreme source of dash. Get rid of this theory, and you get rid of all excuse for the exhortation.
The arme blanche gone, the path of progress in every department opens out broad and clear. We want light, lithe, wiry men, and horses to match—horses at any rate in which nothing of any moment is sacrificed to size, and of which hardihood is the predominant characteristic. Small horses were far the hardiest in South Africa and Manchuria. High speed is altogether secondary; looks are nothing.
The vexed question of the weight of general equipment (apart from the extra weight of steel weapons) I regard as outside the scope of this volume. The margin gained by abolishing steel weapons should be used for extra ammunition. In South Africa our men carried 130 rounds, the Japanese in Manchuria 150 rounds.
Should the troopers carry a bayonet? That is an interesting question, because it forces us to contrast the relative powers and duties of the foot-rifleman and the horse-rifleman. It is an open question, not vital, because the weight of a bayonet is small, and it does not impose a separate system of tactics. It may be said on the one hand that mobility and surprise are the grand advantages possessed by mounted riflemen over foot-riflemen, and should compensate for the bayonet, which, in point of fact, scarcely justified itself in South Africa. The Boers lost little by the lack of it, even in storming entrenchments at night, while their charges in the open were based directly on the idea, first of a swift stunning ride in, then on destructive magazine fire. That is the true idea, and we should not forget it. The bayonet suggests the slow, if less vulnerable, approach of men on foot. Even in the case of Infantry, critics of both the great modern wars associate over-close formations and unskilful skirmishing with an exaggerated idea of the importance of the cold steel. I except Port Arthur conditions, where horsemen were not wanted.
On the other hand, all British riflemen find confidence in the bayonet, and, as Lord Roberts truly says, it may be exceedingly useful in a dismounted night attack. War since 1865 proves that Cavalry must have the power to press home an assault against entrenched Infantry. As Mishchenko discovered, they cannot make the simplest raid without it. In strict logic, therefore, the trooper needs the bayonet if the Infantryman needs it. Only let us be sure that the utility of the bayonet is fully great enough to warrant the possible risk of making the trooper forget that normally his horse gives him a great tactical advantage over Infantry, and a range of opportunities unknown to them. Whatever we decide, let us not act in mimicry of “potential foes.” If the new German carbine has a bayonet, as I believe it has, let us not make the bayonet a fourth weapon in imitation, but a second weapon to fortify the rifle.
On manœuvre not strictly connected with any special weapon I only wish to repeat the clear lesson of South Africa and the wise counsel of Bernhardi, that the less Cavalry, when in free and independent movement, are taught to rely on the support of Horse Artillery the better.
I need scarcely say that we should erase the last vestiges of the idea that Cavalry should count on the support of mounted riflemen. If we abolish the arme blanche that distorted and unwholesome idea dies a natural death.
The conditions of service constitute a most important point. For officers the force should be as cheap as any other part of the army, the career ouverte à tous les talents. Every stimulus should be given for the accession of the best men, both mentally and physically, and selection should be rigid. Cavalry is a very important arm, demands the most varied powers, and should command the highest talent. It is a relatively small force, it has highly specialized functions, and of all arms it is the least easy to replace in the thick of a war. It must be a comparatively expensive force to maintain, but the expense should fall on the State which it serves. That perhaps is a counsel of perfection for the State in its relation to officers of all arms, but if it softens anywhere, it should soften in the case of the Cavalry.
And the source of the present excessive standard of expense? Analyze the whole matter carefully, and you will find at the back of it that enemy to progress, the arme blanche. Abolish that, and, with a little friendly help from the State, the evil will cure itself.