[18]. Unless the last Boer rush was of this character. The “Official History” (vol. i., p. 169) says that fifty Boers “charged boldly uphill” to within twenty yards of the crest held by the Gordons and the Imperial Light Horse, and then used their rifles. Whether they charged mounted is not stated.
[19]. “With French in South Africa,” p. 421.
[20]. Mr. Goldman complains that, although open, the country contained ridges, which provided successive lines of resistance to a retreating enemy. He does not see what ridicule he throws on Cavalry by such a line of argument.
[21]. I have tried, as usual, to follow the figures of the “Official History,” although for this period they are inadequate. Sometimes the considered estimate of the historian is given, sometimes the Intelligence estimate on the spot, with or without a warning that it was exaggerated, while in the case of particular operations the estimate is occasionally altogether omitted. It is not stated how much allowance is made for men detached on non-combatant duties, and for that leakage from particular commandos of burghers “on leave” which was such a grave source of weakness for the enemy.
On January 10, when Roberts landed, the historian’s estimate of “total effective strength of Boers in the field” (vol. i., p. 409) is 46,500, thus disposed:
| Joubert in Natal | 21,000 |
| Schoemann at Colesberg | 5,000 |
| Grobelaar around Stormberg | 4,000 |
| Cronje at Scholtz Nek | 8,000 |
| Ferreira besieging Kimberley | 3,000 |
| Snyman besieging Mafeking | 2,500 |
| H. Botha on Rhodesian border | 1,000 |
| “Reinforcements” | 2,000 |
| —-—- | |
| 46,500 |
On February 16 (four days after Roberts began his move) an Intelligence estimate (“somewhat exaggerated”) is given to this effect:
| Cronje (including Kimberley force) | 12,000 | 20 guns |
| A. Cronje (detached by Cronje)[[22]] | 1,300 | 2 guns |
| Near Goemansberg | 300 | 1 gun |
| Reinforcements (i.e., to Cronje) (“uncertain”) | 5,000 | |
| Colesberg | 8,000 | 10 guns |
| Stormberg, etc | 2,000 | |
| —-—- | ||
| 28,600 |
The Natal estimate is omitted, but by reference to the chapters on Natal at the same period the total Boer strength there cannot have been more than 12,000. Add, therefore, 12,000 + the forces of Snyman and H. Botha on January 10, i.e., 3,500, and we get
| 15,500 | ||
| —-—- | ||
| Total | 44,100 |