[32]. See p. 201, line 22, where the Cavalry narrative, broken off at p. 197, is resumed (8 or 8.30 a.m.) “On the left” (i.e., on the south of the Modder) “disaster was only warded off by the gallantry of small groups of the bolder burghers,” etc., down to p. 203.
[33]. “Cavalry in the Russo-Japanese War,” Eng. Translation, p. 32.
[34]. “Official History,” vol. ii., p. 235; Times History, vol. iii, p. 588. There was no question of using the arme blanche.
[35]. South African Light Horse, Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry, Bethune’s Mounted Infantry, Imperial Light Horse (1 squadron), Natal Carbineers (1 squadron), a few Natal Mounted Police.
[36]. “Official History,” vol. ii., chaps. xx-xxii.; Times History, vol. iii, chaps. ix. and x.
[37]. It is just possible, no doubt, to take a different view of the affair. The German critic, who is always indifferent to mounted questions, thinks the whole turning movement was a mistake, and that, therefore, the question of supporting Dundonald was not of much consequence. The facts of the wretched friction between Warren and Dundonald are set forth exhaustively in our own “Official History” (pp. 362, 363, and Appendix 9 [c]), and a reader can form his own opinion. The comment affords an example of that criticism by innuendo which so often mars the careful and conscientious narrative of facts, and which generally defeats its own object—that of avoiding direct censure on individuals. The result frequently is to censure the wrong individual. In this case, reading between the lines, one is led to infer that Dundonald was wholly to blame in not sending sufficiently explicit messages to Warren. This interpretation of what happened leaves out of account all the larger aspects of the case, and the chapters are so written as to obscure these larger aspects. Buller’s original orders to Warren (p. 347) “embodied,” we are told, a “broad and bold conception.” So they undoubtedly did. Here is outspoken praise, well deserved. Whence came the failure, then? No one could guess from comments in the text, although, by exercising common sense on a study of the facts, two explanations stand out plainly: (1) That Buller, having framed his plan in outline, divested himself of responsibility for its execution, and remained a passive, though not an uncritical, spectator of events. (2) That speed in the turning movement was the essence of the plan, but that Warren never realized this, and was too slow, his mind perpetually fixed on his heavy transport and oblivious to the offensive possibilities of his advance. Ignoring these broad considerations, which have an obvious and direct bearing on the Dundonald-Warren friction, the Official Historian takes care to investigate and print every message bearing on that topic, and to justify, at any rate by implication, Warren’s caution. Could there be a worse moral, above all, for mounted troops? Overcurt as Dundonald’s messages were, they struck a note which would have elicited the right response from a mind tuned to the right key. One must make some allowance, too, for human nature. Imagine the feelings of a leader of horse who, at such a time and with such an opening before him, had been compelled at the outset to send back a regiment of regular Cavalry “to prevent the grazing oxen being swept away” from the main body! (Appendix 9 [c]).
[38]. This, nevertheless, is precisely what Mr. Goldman does in a passage of his book, “With French in South Africa,” p. 422. His proposition, sufficiently bold in itself, is that the regular Cavalry were not given sufficient chances in South Africa, and he instances particularly Buller’s failure to use his Cavalry in pursuit at this period. By the use of the vague word “Cavalry” to cover all Buller’s mounted troops, the majority of whom were irregular mounted riflemen, Mr. Goldman introduces into a correct statement of fact the unwarrantable suggestion that the steel weapon, the distinguishing feature of Cavalry, was deprived of a chance of inflicting a “crushing defeat” on the enemy. It must be understood that Mr. Goldman, in the essay I am referring to, is engaged in an express effort to prove the superiority of Cavalry over mounted riflemen.
[39]. War Commission Evidence, vol. ii., pp. 182, 183.
[40]. “Official History,” vol. ii., chaps. xxvi. and xxvii.; Times History, chap. xvi.
[41]. Vol. ii., p. 270.