[62]. Between May, 1901, and April, 1902, nine principal charging actions cost us 2,500 casualties and prisoners and 18 guns. The war cost about 5½ millions a month.
[63]. Times History, vol. v., p. 173.
[64]. Times History, vol. v., p. 226, Wildfontein; p. 475, Roodekraal.
[65]. “With French in South Africa,” p. 423. Vide infra, p. 285.
[66]. I am quite aware that under present arrangements our Mounted Infantry are allotted the duties of Divisional Cavalry, but this circumstance does not affect the general principles laid down for their action, which remain the same, and postulate the inferiority of mounted troops without steel weapons. The contradiction in terms exhibited by the nomenclature only serves to emphasize the confusion of thought involved.
[67]. “With French in South Africa,” p. 422.
[68]. On the subject of horses see Times History, vol. vi., part ii., chapter vi. The total number provided for the British army was 518,794 (mules 150,781). The net wastage accounted for was in horses 347,007 (mules 53,339). The Boers took the field with 50,000 to 60,000 horses, which were renewed several times. Their net wastage is estimated conjecturally at 100,000.
[69]. I ought, perhaps, to allude to another argument which appears in Mr. Goldman’s Preface to Bernhardi, though it is expressed in very vague terms, and the meaning is beyond me: “The Cavalry, after the first few weeks of 1900, as an effective force had practically ceased to exist.” Figures of strength and disposition will be found in my previous chapters.
[70]. This, as I shall show in the next chapter, is precisely the conclusion reached unconsciously by Bernhardi, and consciously by Wrangel. Their only tactical rôle with the steel is in the “collision of Cavalry masses”—i.e., between masses of Cavalry who both believe in the steel and engage on that understanding.
[71]. See Bernhardi’s warning, “Cavalry in Future Wars,” pp. 169, 170.