Meanwhile, I pointed out, my own company, United Aircraft, had from the beginning voluntarily stabilized its earnings at a figure based on the use of its own facilities and resources prior to the commencement of the United States aircraft production program. All these figures were, however, quite academic; they were simply estimated results of current operations based on an assumption that the war contracts might be terminated in an orderly manner. In the last war, no such thing had taken place; contracts had been closed out so brutally that, according to another National City Bank Bulletin, many companies had gone through the wringer and even the strongest, in the number of some sixty-six representative suppliers, had been forced to write down their apparent net worth by approximately one billion dollars, or 50 per cent. Our present “profit” was therefore but a temporary bookkeeping entry; no company could even guess where it would come out unless Congress proceeded with all speed to write new legislation that would facilitate orderly reconversion.
While I developed this testimony, our staff circulated a summary of the figures among the men and women at the press table, some of whom had, no doubt, read the C.I.O. pamphlet charging us with having made 3,000 per cent. C.I.O. figures showed gross profit before taxes as a percentage of net worth and, while accurate enough, manifestly emphasized what wide variations can result from the mere definition of the naughty word “profit.”
In continuing my testimony, I went on to point out that the aircraft industry, now the biggest industry, was a vital factor in our domestic economy and that the public interest as well as the worker’s interest demanded that we not upset the whole national picture through disorderly or even punitive procedure. By this we did not mean for a moment that our industry should be subsidized in any way; we hated subsidy because it tended to throttle technological progress. We had made rapid strides only because we had had rough going; in our struggle to exist at all we had been forced to conceive and create devices that would otherwise have never seen the light of day. What we asked of the government was that it make up its mind as to what it needed and then let us go back to cutting each other’s throats in that exciting way which had kept United States technology in the forefront of world progress.
At this remark, I noted a stir among the newsmen and women; long accustomed to hearing special pleaders demand special privilege, they were taken aback by the aircraft industry’s expressed preference for competition. Such unheard-of conduct was news of the “man-bites-dog” variety.
From this beachhead I went on to urge the appointment of a presidential advisory commission on aviation, one like the Morrow Board of 1925. After reviewing some of the background, I pointed out the rapid advances in technology since the day of that report, especially in the key element of air transport. This alone would seem to warrant a reappraisal of air policy, one based on the new concept that air power was not a military striking force but a trinity composed of air commerce, aircraft industry, and the armed service as well as all the other factors that went to make a country powerful in the air. All these factors were mutually interdependent and must be closely integrated if we were to employ our air power to keep the peace. The need for thinking through a new policy based on these ideas was obvious; it concerned government, labor, management—all the elements of the community.
In summing up, I pointed out again that our problem had never been a matter of profits but one of survival and that survival was our immediate concern. However, we were confident that, given an orderly reconversion and the necessary constructive air policy, air power could become the new reagent for keeping the peace of the world and better still, through the medium of improved transport, lead to the era of prosperity so vital to keeping the peace.
Following me, Harry Woodhead gave specific answers to eight questions propounded by the Committee and concerned with the industrial and human aspects of demobilization. Speaking in his clear, strong voice he made a convincing impression. Following Harry Woodhead, Joseph T. Geuting, Jr., submitted a comprehensive summary of things necessary to the orderly development of personal airplanes during the postwar adjustment period. Both Joe Geuting and Carl Ward, who now followed with his presentation, had been selected because of their knowledge of their subjects but even more important because both were good extemporaneous speakers and both had strong convictions as to the soundness of the industry policy. Carl Ward especially handled a complex subject with a knack rare in professional men; he reduced technical jargon to popular language.
At the close of the day, Senator Murray thanked us warmly for our constructive approach to the problem. During the sessions of the following days, Artemus L. Gates, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Air, endorsed the industry stand. Robert P. Patterson, Undersecretary of War; Charles E. Wilson, executive vice-chairman of the War Production Board; and representatives of the U.A.W.-C.I.O. and I.A.M.-A.F. of L. made recommendations generally in accord with the suggestions of the industry representatives. The C.I.O. barrage on profits broke down against the record established by the industry, and Senator Murray himself later introduced a bill in Congress calling for the appointment of a new presidential advisory commission, like the Morrow Board. However, many critical months must pass before such a board would see the light of day.
Meanwhile, press comment on the hearing was favorable and David Lawrence dug the meat out of the cocoanut in an article in which he said that the aircraft industry had revealed its postwar plan to a startled Congressional committee. The industry, he said, had thought its problem through. And to the surprise of all, it had not asked for subsidy. It had asked only that the government make up its mind what it wanted and leave the rest to competition within the industry.
We drew encouragement from all these events. We knew that Senator Murray was close to the White House and that his introduction of the bill implied at least that the President was not unfavorably disposed to it. For prior to the hearing, Fred Rentschler and I had taken pains to cover this angle, by making a call on John W. Snyder. Mr. Snyder had recently come to Washington at President Truman’s request and was destined to do a statesmanlike job in many fields for the Truman administration. We found him well informed on the whole air-power problem and fully prepared to advise the President on the industry’s plans to bring the matter before the public. Early in the program we even hoped that the President might appoint the committee himself, even as President Coolidge had done, but now to our surprise we found active opposition in two quarters.