The Board especially turned thumbs down on the British plan of an air ministry charged with responsibility for both military and civil aviation. It took a strong position for the principle that historic American tradition called for armed forces for defense only, and it insisted they should be kept subordinate to the civil government. However, it urged the orderly expansion of air transport, preferably under private management and, to promote the orderly development of civil aviation, it recommended the establishment of a bureau of air commerce in the Department of Commerce, then under Secretary Herbert Hoover. It further recommended the appointment of an additional assistant secretary of commerce for air, to supervise the new bureau.
The Board recommended a policy of continuity of orders for the aircraft industry and proposed a standard rate of replacement of operating aircraft in order to retain a healthy industry. This, it pointed out, must become the nucleus of rapid wartime expansion and should be administered as a continuing source of technological leadership.
If the report proved lacking in sensationalism, it was none the less constructive. If now it could be implemented it might become the Magna Charta of American aviation. President Coolidge transmitted the report to Congress with his own approval and thus started it on its way to being translated into the Air Commerce Act and the Air Corps Act of 1926. These acts, in effect, placed the responsibility for promoting aviation directly upon the shoulders of the government. They made it the duty of those in authority to promote the orderly development of the air forces, our air commerce, and our aircraft industry; and thus, for the first time, enunciated a clear statement of United States air policy.
As for General Mitchell, whose charges had led to the formulation of this policy, he was tried by Army general court-martial and convicted of violation of the ninety-sixth Article of War. He was sentenced to be suspended from rank, command, and duty, with forfeiture of all pay and allowances for five years. President Coolidge modified the forfeiture of pay and accepted the general’s resignation, to take effect February 1, 1926. Just ten years later, Billy Mitchell died. But one day the United States Congress did create a separate air force, and by then, General Mitchell’s name had been firmly established in his countrymen’s minds as a man who had been martyred for his vision.
During the last decade of General Mitchell’s life, Admiral Moffett served continuously as Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, and there founded the technology of naval aviation. It has been said of the contributions of the two men that “Bill Mitchell’s fumble set up the play from which Billy Moffett went on to score.” Just at the peak of his career, the admiral gave his own life to his country in the crash of the rigid airship Akron.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Dwight Morrow Advances the Throttle
The Morrow Board policy, for all its wisdom, might have lapsed easily into innocuous desuetude save for the dynamic character of William A. Moffett. Whereas the Army Air Service proclaimed it a whitewash and a denial of their aspirations, the admiral recognized it for what it was, a golden opportunity. And as usual, when it came to capitalizing it, his timing was precise.
I was sitting behind my desk in the Engine Section one morning engaged in shoveling the avalanche of papers from “Incoming” to “Outgoing” and feeling much like a fireman on the floor plates of a coal-burning destroyer under forced draft shoveling coal into the insatiable maws of a pair of boilers, when the phone rang.
“This is Moffett,” came the admiral’s voice. “I want you to get hold of Du Bose right away. Grab a taxi and come up here to The Hill. You’ll find me in Congressman Butler’s office, Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee. Bring that estimate on the cost of the Mustin plan. Got it?”
“Aye, aye, sir!”