Annals of a Fortress

by Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc

Wishing to keep all his artillery to batter the place and to effect a breach quickly, he did not provide any of these posts with guns, but contented himself with ordering them to erect a strong palisading, and to raise epaulements for shelter. The instructions he gave were wanting in precision, but he often cited Cæsar and Vegetius and Frontinus, and some of the great captains who had shed a lustre on Italy in the preceding century. While urging vigilance on his captains he merely went with them to reconnoitre the ground, and to determine their posts; but did not trouble himself further to know whether his orders were understood and strictly carried out. The investment was only a concession made to the general-in-chief, and his attention was entirely given to the attack on the north. He could not even avoid observing in presence of his officers that up to that time the works had been feebly conceived and executed; a remark which soon reached the ears of Galas.

Rincourt took advantage of the respite allowed him by the besieger to organize his little garrison more effectually. We have seen that he had six hundred militiamen capable of acting outside the ramparts. He set about equipping these men, who were but imperfectly armed. The castle contained a hundred muskets, which he distributed to those who knew best how to use this weapon, but had not been provided with it. The rest he armed with strong pikes, breach-knives, and partisans. Not counting artillerymen, he had remaining sixteen hundred soldiers—three hundred being horsemen—whom he formed into four bodies of four companies of infantry of eighty men each, commanded by a captain, and three companies of horsemen, one hundred strong.

The town contained thirty-two pieces of ordnance of various calibre. There were sixteen mounted in the north work; two on the cavalier behind the bridge; one in the bastion of the donjon; two in the bastion F[See [Fig. 59].] and one in each of the seven other bastions; in all twenty-eight. Two were placed in the tenaille of the castle, and two were kept in reserve. The enemy's arrangements were soon made known to the governor, either through spies or the reconnaissances made by his best officers, or himself personally; he took care not to disturb the carrying out of those arrangements, and contented himself with doubling the guard at the bridge, which was raised to two hundred men.

Fig. 64.

During the night of the 11th of November, Forcia had a second breach opened, and marked out the approach-works, as shown in [Fig. 64]. Besides the two places d'armes A and B, already marked out, he planned a third, C, to be reached by a new trench D, next two batteries at G and F, for two pieces each, and a battery for two mortars H. He had the first trench lengthened at I, with a piece at its extremity sweeping the curtain K. Two pieces mounted in the place d'armes B commanded the battery F, and the surroundings; a piece mounted at E commanded the battery G; and a piece mounted in the place d`armes C swept the outside of the western battery. He thought he should thus provide for every contingency. If the besieged determined to attempt some bold stroke, they could not advance far, and if they succeeded in taking either of the batteries G, F, he could crush them. The two batteries G, F were intended to silence the fire of the north-west salient and of the left half of the tenaille. That done, he could—secure against the right-hand fire—advance as far as the counterscarp, set up a breach battery, and take the place by the north-west salient. Meanwhile, the mortar battery would render the right of the work untenable, crush the defenders of the ancient terraced walls, damage the gates, and prevent the besieged from attempting anything at this point. The plan was not badly conceived; nothing remained but to execute it.

The phlegmatic governor had the gabionades of the work strengthened, and traverses and paréclats raised, especially on the platforms of the two great towers. He had shelter places arranged on the platforms of the earthworks. Moreover he kept up a continual fire on the workmen, so that they could scarcely make any advance except during the night. Sometimes at ten o'clock at night, sometimes at midnight, at two o'clock in the morning, or shortly before daybreak, Rincourt would alarm the enemy's camp by sorties of no importance considered with reference to the final result, but which greatly exhausted the besiegers.

These sorties were effected by one or two companies while the others rested. In this way he exercised the militia, and accustomed them to fighting.

By the 15th of November the besieger's works had scarcely made any progress. However the place d'armes C was made, as also the parallel which connected it with the place d'armes B; and the trenches were commenced which were to lead to the two batteries. The bomb-mortars were mounted, and began to fire towards evening. But they produced more noise than damage to the besieged. Their fire was badly directed, and most of the bombs burst too soon or too late. The besieged became accustomed to them, and kept out of their way when they saw them coming. For a dozen bombs fired the first evening, two men were wounded, and one gun-carriage damaged.