Annals of a Fortress

by Eugène-Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc

Captain Allaud employed the whole of the night in strengthening the batteries B, C, D. They were armed with six guns, which on the morning of the 25th swept the boyaux of communication and a whole branch of the second parallel.

The Germans scarcely replied, and seemed to be abandoning their works.

They were probably going to try another attack. The colonel was somewhat disquieted at Captain Allaud's novel strategy, which, in face of a bold assailant, presented grave perils. The calmness of the enemy made him fear some unexpected design; perhaps a strenuous attack on that salient which, if it were taken, would furnish the besiegers with an excellent position for rapidly establishing breach batteries against demi-lune No. I, and bastion II. This salient therefore must be defended at any cost, since they had been led to establish it in order to disconcert the systematic attack of the Germans. Moreover, if they lost it, they would probably lose at the same time most of the guns that armed it; and the defence had only a restricted number.

Thirteen guns armed the advanced work. The two howitzers were placed in battery, one at the extremity of the salient D, pointed at battery No. 1, the other in the right re-entering place d'armes of the demi-lune No. 1. Two guns were also placed on the right face of the demi-lune; two guns on the front, between the bastions I. and II., and two guns on the right and left faces of this bastion, to sweep the advanced works if they were taken. In all, nineteen guns and two howitzers. Besides, the ridge of the plateau was well defended by a good trench-shelter with traverses, that the work might not be able to be taken by assault in rear by the escarpment. One of the twenty-four pounders was placed in battery in the bastion V. of the main work, in the direction of its capital, to sweep this slope.

On the 25th of February only a few cannon-shots were exchanged. The mortar batteries of the besieger concentrated their fire on the western redan, without doing much damage; but during the night of the 25th the fire of the bombs was so incessant that it became difficult to labour at these works. It continued during the 26th, but the besieged dismounted three of these mortars with the guns left on the bastions II. and III. The besieged on his side placed the two mortars in battery on the front between these two bastions, and sent projectiles into the batteries 11 and 12.

During the 26th of the month (the weather being clear) the enemy was seen to be erecting three batteries on the north-west, evidently directed against the batteries A, B, C, D, to crush them. They could not reply to their fire; the colonel therefore decided that they should bring back into the town temporarily the six guns of the batteries B, C, D. The bombs continued to fall into the works during the whole night of the 26th; and on the morning of the 27th the fire of the three batteries of the enemy, erected six hundred and fifty yards behind the abandoned battery No. 1, was opened against the redans B, C, D; it lasted the whole night of the 27th, damaged the blindages very severely, and threw down the traverses. On the morning of the 28th the crémaillère ceased to be tenable, but the work A had not been seriously injured. The howitzer placed at D had been brought back behind the great traverse F surmounted with a banquette.

About nine o'clock the enemy resumed possession of the battery No. 1, installed four field-pieces there in spite of the fire of the bastions I. and II., and threw an assaulting column against the damaged works D, C, B. This was what the colonel anticipated. The column encountered the fire of the three guns left in the redans A, the howitzer, and a front of fusiliers posted on the great traverse F. Bending to the right and defiling below the crest of the plateau, this column was able to seize the work B, C, D, without excessive loss; and, sheltered behind the ruins of the earthworks, it was able to keep its ground there while the field-pieces of the battery No. 1 cleared off the defenders of the great traverse F. The colonel, however, had brought in again the guns left in work A, and gave orders to his men to fall back. But at this juncture, from the demi-lune No. 1, the bastions I. and II. and the curtain between these bastions, twenty-two guns and some stone mortars poured a tremendously heavy fire into the abandoned work, inflicting very serious loss on the besieger, who was endeavouring to hold his ground there. This cannonade lasted till noon. The colonel, supposing the enemy to be giving way, sallied forth at the head of eight hundred men and fell on the posts which the Germans had begun to fortify. He had his attack sustained by the two howitzers. The work was retaken, but not without the loss of about a hundred men. The great point was to keep it. About two o'clock two field-pieces conveyed behind the ruined epaulements of batteries 2 and 3, and the four of battery No. 1, once more overwhelmed the salient with small bombs, balls, and grape. The bastions I., II., and III. replied immediately, and dismounted some of the enemy's pieces, which were ill-protected by the battered-down epaulements. The colonel made his men lie down behind the traverses C, B, F, and awaited a second assault; which was in fact attempted about four o'clock, as the enemy believed the outwork was once more abandoned. The assaulting columns passed the first epaulement; but as soon as they found themselves in the last redan, D, they were received by a discharge of muskets almost at arm's length, from behind the traverse C ([Fig. 75]), followed by a bayonet charge; this time two hundred Germans remained on the field, and the remains of the assaulting column fell back in disorder to the batteries, which recommenced firing and went on till nightfall.

The besieged remained masters of the place, but under the converging fire of the enemy they could not maintain this wedge-shaped and badly flanked position. There was no advantage in keeping it, sufficient to compensate for the loss they would suffer in resisting fresh attacks. However, the colonel was unwilling to abandon the redans without cost to the enemy. The evening was employed in charging three powder-mines under the salients A and B, and raising earthworks to protect themselves as well as they could. All this night of the 28th of February the bombs fell thick on the outwork: the men were still tolerably protected on the débris of the blindages. On the morning of the 1st of March the German artillery recommenced firing on the redans more briskly than the day before, from the three batteries behind and from battery No. 6.

The colonel withdrew his men into the town, and left only one platoon, well sheltered, with orders to fire the mines only when the enemy thought himself covered by the epaulement of the redan A, and was endeavouring to take up his position there.