In his address to the conference, Ceausescu declared that in order to modernize Romania as a socialist state it was imperative to adopt new organizational and ideological forms. To achieve this end, he proposed a number of reforms in the structure and functioning of both the party and the government and defended the country's policy of independent development. Speaking of the relationship between party and government responsibilities, Ceausescu asserted the need to eliminate overlapping and duplication in party and government functions. As a remedy, he proposed that only one individual, whether in the party or in the government, should deal with a particular sector of activity. In addition, he called for a clearer delineation of the responsibilities of the government and the party. It was not necessary, he declared, for the Central Committee to decide all questions of economic affairs and continue to maintain a number of economic departments that duplicated the functions of the Council of Ministers and the economic ministries. He proposed that the Central Committee limit itself to basic decisions of economic policy and that the specific matters of implementation be left to the government ministries.

Political and ideological activity, Ceausescu proposed, would remain under the control of the Central Committee and would be given greater emphasis and direction through the creation of an ideological commission that would work to develop an intensified program of political education. A defense council, composed of the party's Standing Presidium and other members, would be established to deal with most military questions, but the basic questions of guidance for both the armed forces and the state security apparatus would continue to be the responsibility of the Central Committee. Major foreign policy questions would be decided by the Standing Presidium (see ch. 8).

Ceausescu also proposed reforms in the organization and responsibilities of governmental organs. In addition to proposing a reorganization of the state's territorial subdivisions, he asserted the need to broaden the activities of the Grand National Assembly and to increase the responsibilities of the assembly commissions in order to give that body a greater role in the government. Ministers and other high government officials were to be more aware of their responsibilities to keep the assembly informed of the activities of their departments. Ceausescu also declared the need to strengthen the role and organization of the Council of Ministers to enable it to provide for long-term economic planning. In addition, he suggested that the heads of three of the more important mass organizations—the General Union of Trade Unions, the Union of Communist Youth, and the National Union of Agricultural Production Cooperatives—be included in the government and be given ministerial ranking.

The party conference represented a major success for Ceausescu in his drive to gain undisputed political control. All of his proposals were unanimously adopted, and the party statutes were changed to enable him to become the head of state, as president of the Council of State, as well as head of the party, a reversal of the 1965 proscription against one individual simultaneously holding prominent posts in both the party and state. The nomination of Ceausescu was made by Stoica, the incumbent president of the Council of State, on the grounds that uniting the highest offices of the party and the state would eliminate the duplication of functions and increase efficiency. Stoica was given a position in the party Secretariat and later, in 1969, was named chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, a post he continued to hold in early 1972.

As a result of the approval of Ceausescu's recommendations, a number of changes were effected in local government and party organizations. Certain positions in the party and state organizations were fused, the county or city party first secretary also becoming chairman of the local people's council (see ch. 8). The secretaries of local party units and labor union representatives were included on the councils of the industrial enterprises.

Following the recommendations of the party conference, the day after the conference adjourned the Grand National Assembly convened to elect Ceausescu as president of the Council of State, and it approved legislation to implement most of the other conference decisions. At the same time, the assembly elected a new Council of State consisting of (in addition to Ceausescu) three vice presidents and fifteen other members. A new Council of Ministers was also elected, with Maurer again named as prime minister. Apostol was demoted from his position as a first deputy prime minister to his previously held post as chairman of the General Union of Trade Unions. Draghici was removed from the party Secretariat and given a position as a deputy prime minister under Maurer. With the successful demotion of his chief rivals, Ceausescu emerged at the close of 1967 as the undisputed leader of both the party and the state.

Rehabilitation and De-Stalinization

With his power base firmly established, Ceausescu acted to fully disassociate his regime from the Gheorghiu-Dej era. In April 1968, at a plenary session of the Central Committee, the report of the commission of inquiry, which had been secretly established in late 1965, was made public. The Gheorghiu-Dej regime was severely indicated for fraudulently conspiring to arrange the trial and execution of Patrascanu in 1954 and for violations of justice in the other political show trials of the 1950s. Patrascanu was exonerated of all charges, and several other of the trial victims were officially rehabilitated.

Because of this close association with Gheorghiu-Dej and his position as head of the internal affairs ministry during the period of the trials, the Central Committee dismissed Draghici from all his positions. Apostol and Stoica were censured but were allowed to remain in their posts, although their standing in the party was considerably weakened.

Throughout the 1968-70 period the Ceausescu regime continued a gradual and cautious policy of de-Stalinization in domestic affairs and continued, as well, to assert the country's independent stance in international relations. The domestic relaxation was limited, however, and, in an address to an association of artists in April 1968, Ceausescu cautioned both intellectuals and artists not to overstep the bounds established by the party.