Dimitrov died in 1949 but, before he died, his programs were well under way, the Moscow-oriented BKP was in complete control, and the country was firmly in the Soviet orbit. Several years later, even though the term satellite was no longer used to describe the Eastern European countries aligned with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria was considered to be the most rigidly loyal of all former Soviet satellites. Shortly after the death of Dimitrov, the top position of leadership was secured by Vulko Chervenkov who, over the next few years, earned a reputation as Bulgaria's version of Stalin. After Stalin died, Chervenkov's power base eroded to the point that he was forced to give up the top party post in favor of Zhivkov; Chervenkov retained the top position in the government, however, and remained on the scene as an opposing locus of political power. The intraparty factional strife that ensued lasted into the 1960s, but Zhivkov, who had established a close relationship with Soviet party leader Nikita Khrushchev, eventually overcame the opposition and stabilized his regime. Zhivkov also managed to establish close relations with the Soviet leaders who ousted Khrushchev and has apparently maintained good rapport with Leonid Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Soviet party.
The BKP in 1973 was structured very much like the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The structure is pyramidal in form, the general membership making up the base and the office of first secretary occupying the apex. Between the two extremes the most important bodies from bottom to top are the Party Congress, the Central Committee, the Secretariat, and the Politburo. The Party Congress is a large gathering of delegates, representing the rank and file, that meets every five years, theoretically, to make party policy, amend party statutes if necessary, and determine the party program for the ensuing five-year period. Actually the congress is a large, unwieldy body (over 1,500 delegates at the 1971 congress), which meets to demonstrate solidarity rather than to make policy. The congress, by party statute, elects the Central Committee, which is a permanently sitting body that acts in the name of the congress during the long intervals when the larger body is not in session. The so-called election of the Central Committee is, in fact, a ratification of preselected members. The same holds true for the election of the Politburo and the Secretariat by the Central Committee—in effect, the Politburo has already determined its own membership and that of the Secretariat, and the election process by the Central Committee is unanimous confirmation rather than election, making the Politburo a self-perpetuating body.
The Politburo for policymaking and the Secretariat for policy implementation are the true centers of power in the overall party-government system. The Central Committee is an operating body and is made up of important members of the party, although they rank below the small group that has reached the top echelons of the structure. It is the interlocking of various party and government positions that really concentrates power in the hands of a few individuals and permits the ultimate leader, Zhivkov, to control the entire apparatus. Zhivkov himself is an example of the interlocking in that, since 1971, he has been the first secretary of the party and a member of the Politburo at the same time that he was the president of the governmental State Council. Only one other individual in 1973 combined membership in the party's most prestigious bodies—Politburo and Secretariat—with membership in the government's leading body—the State Council. Two other party secretaries were candidate (nonvoting) members of the Politburo, but they did not concurrently hold any high government office.
The government established under the Dimitrov Constitution, as changed by the Constitution of 1971, is the instrument through which the party administers the country. The central government consists, essentially, of the National Assembly, the State Council, and the Council of Ministers. The unicameral National Assembly is described in the constitution as "a supreme body of state power," whereas the State Council is described as "a supreme constantly functioning body of state power." In practice, if one or the other were to be described as the single supreme body of state power, it would be the State Council, the membership of which in 1973 included seven (out of twenty-four) members or candidate members of the party Politburo and the operations of which, during its first two years of existence, have stamped it with the mark of supreme authority.
The role of the National Assembly as a legislative body is circumscribed by the infrequency of its meetings. The assembly is popularly elected from a single list of nominees at five-year intervals, but it is required to meet only three times annually. The sessions of the assembly are usually so brief that it functions as an after-the-fact approving body rather than as a legislature. The development and initiation of new legislation, therefore, is handled outside of the actual legislature, primarily by the State Council and the Council of Ministers.
At its first session after general elections the National Assembly elects the State Council, but it would be highly unlikely if not impossible for the assembly to refuse to elect the complete slate of nominees that has been preselected by the party hierarchy. The election of the State Council, therefore, as is the case with various party elections, is a unanimous vote of approval rather than a true election. The State Council is the true center of the government. When it was created by the 1971 Constitution, Zhivkov chose to relinquish his governmental post as chairman of the Council of Ministers (the country's premier) and assume the position of president of the State Council, leaving no doubt about where real governmental power lay. The State Council, in effect, is a collective executive body that, because the National Assembly meets so infrequently, also becomes a major initiator of legislation.
The Council of Ministers, also elected by the National Assembly in the same manner as the State Council, functions as the administrative arm of the government. Here again, party influence is pervasive. In 1973 the chairman of the council (premier) and four deputy chairmen were concurrently members of the party Politburo, the minister of internal affairs was a candidate member of the Politburo, and most other ministers were members of the Central Committee.
Matters of state—such as defense, foreign affairs, education, and welfare—usually associated with the central government of any country are handled by individual ministries and are overseen by the Council of Ministers. In addition to such affairs of state, however, various ministries, as well as the council itself, are charged with administering the country's entire economy, as is the case in other communist-ruled states. In mid-1973 eleven ministries out of a total of twenty-two dealt exclusively with economic matters. In addition, the State Planning Committee, the chairman of which holds ministerial rank, is of great importance in the overall economic structure.
The economic ministries control virtually every aspect of the country's economy. The goals of nationalization of all industry and collectivization of agriculture were achieved early in the communist era, and the efforts of the party-government ever since have been toward increased efficiency. In Bulgaria the quest for greater production has led to ever greater centralization of control. In the early 1970s this quest has brought about the reorganization of industry wherein industrial enterprises have been grouped into huge trusts at the same time that collective and state farms have been similarly grouped into so-called agroindustrial complexes.
The consolidation of agriculture into extremely large complexes, begun in 1970, was intended to raise productivity through concentration of effort, specialization of production, and increased control by the central government. The reorganization is a long-range program that is expected to be completed by 1980, at which time authorities predict that farm incomes will have risen to equal industrial incomes and, because agricultural enterprises will be run just like factories, the social differences between peasants and workers will have been eliminated. By 1973 results of the reorganization that had already occurred were mixed, and it was still too early to assess the long-range value of the agroindustrial complexes.