Certain general observations have suggested this point of view. It is well recognized that the incidence of pneumonia in patients with influenza has been much higher where overcrowding has existed. It would seem probable that this has been in large part due to the greater opportunity for the dissemination of organisms capable of producing pneumonia and the consequently increased opportunity for secondary contact infection among patients treated under such conditions. The not infrequent occurrence of influenzal pneumonia due to combined infections of the different types of pneumococci, hemolytic streptococci, staphylococci, and other bacteria, instances of which have been cited, is in harmony with this view, especially since pneumonia under ordinary conditions is rarely found to be associated with mixed infections of this nature. It is true that healthy individuals occasionally carry more than one type of pneumococcus simultaneously in the mouth, though this is very infrequent, and autogenous infection occurring in such individuals might account in some instances for the mixed pneumococcus infections encountered. By way of analogy it has been clearly shown in other studies by the Commission on the relation of hemolytic streptococcus carriers to the complications of measles, that secondary infection of the respiratory tract with S. hemolyticus is in very large part due to contact infection, the chronic carrier rarely developing complications due to this organism.
To obtain further light on this question the type of pneumococcus present in the mouths of 46 consecutive cases of early uncomplicated influenza was determined by the mouse inoculation method at time of admission to the receiving ward of the hospital before the patients had been associated, with the purpose of determining if cases among this group which subsequently developed pneumonia might be shown to have acquired a pneumococcus which they did not carry at time of admission. This group of patients was treated in a special ward set apart for the purpose. The patients were assigned to beds in rotation and confined in bed until thoroughly convalescent. Beds were well separated and cubicles, masks and gowns were in use. Cultures were made from the ward personnel. By these procedures an accurate record was kept of all sources of pneumococcus infection. The types of pneumococcus found in the mouths of these patients at time of admission are shown in Table XXV.
| Table XXV | ||
|---|---|---|
| Types of Pneumococci in the Mouths of Influenza Patients | ||
| PNEUMOCOCCUS | NUMBER | PER CENT |
| Pneumococcus, Type I | 0 | 0 |
| Pneumococcus, Type II | 0 | 0 |
| Pneumococcus, II atypical | 1 | 2.2 |
| Pneumococcus, Type III | 0 | 0 |
| Pneumococcus, Group IV | 25 | 54.3 |
| No pneumococci found | 20 | 43.5 |
Only 1 patient in this group developed pneumonia. At time of admission he had no pneumococcus in his mouth as determined by inoculation of a white mouse with his sputum. Examination of the sputum by the same method at time of onset of pneumonia three days after admission showed Pneumococcus Type III. The only ascertainable source of infection in this case was one of the ward attendants who carried Pneumococcus Type III in his throat in sufficiently large numbers to be demonstrable by direct culture and who frequently came in contact with the patient. In this instance the development of pneumonia was probably due to contact infection. An extensive study of this nature would be necessary to determine in what proportion of cases pneumonia following influenza is caused by secondary contact infection and in what proportion to autogenous infection. It is at least evident that contact infection with a type of pneumococcus found in the mouth of normal individuals may occur in influenza and be responsible for the development of pneumonia. Therefore every precaution should be taken to prevent it.
Methods for the Prevention of Secondary Contact Infection in Influenza and Pneumonia
The methods at present in vogue for preventing the spread of contagion in wards devoted to the care of patients with influenza and pneumonia may be briefly enumerated: The separation of patients by means of sheet or screen cubicles, the wearing of masks and gowns by the ward personnel and to some extent by convalescent patients who are up and about the ward, and in some hospitals the separation of streptococcus carriers from noncarriers as determined by throat culture at time of admission. That these methods are of some value in preventing spread of infection cannot be denied, and it is probable that they are fairly effective under ordinary conditions when conscientiously carried out. That they inevitably break down in the presence of an overwhelming epidemic when hospital wards become overcrowded is only too evident. Under such conditions the sheets hung between the beds are constantly being displaced and are slight proof against a patient’s curiosity as to the identity and condition of the man in the adjoining bed; masks cannot be worn by patients seriously ill with pneumonia, during the very time when they are most dangerous and in greatest danger and those worn by the ward personnel are very rarely sufficiently well made to prevent spread of contagion by droplet infection as the studies of Haller and Colwell[[54]] and Doust and Lyon[[55]] have shown; the separation of streptococcus carriers from noncarriers as at present carried out cannot keep pace with the ever increasing influx of patients nor with the rapidity of the spread of the hemolytic streptococcus, in part because of the time required to make the bacteriologic diagnosis, in part because the amount of work involved cannot be accomplished by the laboratory personnel available. That this is so will be shown in data presented below. Not only do these methods break down in the face of an epidemic, but they often provide a false sense of security.
In searching for a solution of the problem it is essential to have the following considerations clearly in mind. Every patient with influenza must be considered a potential source of pneumococcus or hemolytic streptococcus infection for his neighbor until he is proved otherwise by bacteriologic examination. Every person engaged in the care of patients with respiratory diseases must also be regarded as a potential source of danger. Pneumonia cannot be regarded as one disease but must be looked upon as a group of different diseases, with more or less similar physical signs and symptoms, it is true, but caused by a considerable variety of bacteria, infection with any one of which not only provides no protection against infection with another, but may even render the individual more susceptible to secondary infection. Therefore, every patient with pneumonia must be regarded as an actual source of danger to his neighbor, at least until it is established that he has the same type of infection. All these considerations are especially true in the presence of influenza, for it has become evident that many organisms readily gain access to the lung and produce pneumonia in patients with influenza which under ordinary circumstances fail to cause disease of the respiratory organs.
Since secondary infection in respiratory disease is undoubtedly spread in large part by droplet and contact infection, the prevention of secondary infection must depend upon the elimination of these methods of transmission. Three solutions present themselves: (1) Ward treatment with absolute elimination of overcrowding and much wider separation of patients than has hitherto been deemed necessary; (2) segregation of patients according to type of bacterial infection; (3) effective individual isolation of every patient.
It has been clearly shown that treatment of influenza and pneumonia in overcrowded wards even with the use of such precautions to prevent transfer of infection as cubicles, masking of attendants and patients, etc., is attended by serious danger of contact infection and that such infection will almost inevitably occur. This is not at all surprising when it is remembered that we are treating in the same ward, in the case of pneumonia, a group of what are in reality entirely different diseases, all of which may be transmitted from one patient to another, and in the case of influenza a group of individuals who carry a variety of potentially pathogenic bacteria. No one would expect to treat cases of scarlet fever, measles, and diphtheria together in a hospital ward without having contact infection result. Among patients ill with influenza and postinfluenzal pneumonia, certainly streptococcus pneumonia and to some extent pneumococcus pneumonia may be transmitted quite as readily as any of these diseases. In view of these considerations it must be apparent if ward treatment of these diseases is to be continued without respect to type of bacterial infection, not only that overcrowding is absolutely contraindicated but also that much wider separation of patients than has hitherto been regarded as necessary is imperative. Furthermore, beds should be separated by permanent cubicles that cannot readily be displaced. Patients should be confined to their cubicles until thoroughly convalescent and when up and about should not be allowed to enter cubicles occupied by patients still sick. Medical officers, nurses and attendants who come into contact with the patients should use the same rigid precautions that are used in the care of patients with typhoid or erysipelas or meningitis with the additional use of means to prevent droplet infection of the patients, always bearing in mind that the respiratory tract in patients with influenza or postinfluenzal pneumonia is as susceptible to secondary infection as the postpartum uterus or an open surgical wound. In other words, the most rigid aseptic technic should be maintained. The recognition of a case of streptococcus pneumonia in a ward should be an indication for immediate quarantine of the ward until it has been shown by bacteriologic examination that there is no longer danger of spread of streptococcus contagion. This is done in the case of meningitis or diphtheria, neither of which diseases is comparable with streptococcus pneumonia in rapidity of spread or in resulting fatality.
Segregation of patients in wards according to type of bacterial infection while theoretically an improvement over the indiscriminate mixing of patients with many different types of infection presents many practical difficulties which make it impossible to carry out in the presence of an overwhelming epidemic. It is quite obvious that grouping of influenzal patients on the basis of the types of pneumococci that they carry in their mouths is impossible since the great majority of mouth pneumococci belong to Group IV and comprise a heterologous immunologic group. The separation of influenza patients who carry S. hemolyticus from those who do not would appear to offer a more hopeful field. Since we cannot make an immediate distinction between streptococcus carriers and noncarriers by inspection of the patient, this procedure requires the taking of throat cultures at time of admission to the hospital, the holding of patients for eighteen to twenty-four hours in receiving wards until the bacteriologic diagnosis has been made, and their subsequent distribution to streptococcus and nonstreptococcus wards. This is feasible when the admission rate is low and the number of streptococcus carriers found at time of admission is small. In the presence of an influenza epidemic it immediately becomes impossible to carry out in base hospitals as now constituted, since the demand for beds under such conditions at once converts a large part of the hospital into a group of receiving wards with little room remaining for subsequent separation of patients. The amount of bacteriologic work involved at once becomes prohibitive and the time required to make the bacteriologic diagnosis defeats its purpose since it allows the spread of hemolytic streptococcus to occur in the receiving wards during the interval.