CROCE AL MERITO DI GUERRA—ITALIAN
- James L. Bahl, First Lieutenant.
- Raymond P. Baldwin, First Lieutenant.
- Arthur M. Beach, First Lieutenant.
- Allen W. Bevin, First Lieutenant.
- Gilbert P. Bogart, First Lieutenant.
- Arthur F. Clement, First Lieutenant.
- William G. Cochran, First Lieutenant.
- De Witt Coleman, Jr., First Lieutenant.
- Kenneth G. Collins, First Lieutenant.
- Alexander M. Craig, First Lieutenant.
- Herbert C. Dobbs, Jr., First Lieutenant.
- Edmund A. Donnan, First Lieutenant.
- Norton Downs, Jr., First Lieutenant.
- Arthur D. Farquhar, First Lieutenant.
- Harry S. Kinkenstaedt, First Lieutenant.
- Willis S. Fitch, First Lieutenant.
- Donald G. Frost, First Lieutenant.
- William O. Frost, First Lieutenant.
- James P. Hanley, Jr., First Lieutenant.
- Spencer L. Hart, Second Lieutenant.
- George C. Hering, First Lieutenant.
- Wallace Hoggson, First Lieutenant.
- Gosta A. Johnson, First Lieutenant.
- James Kennedy, Second Lieutenant.
- LeRoy D. Kiley, First Lieutenant.
- Herman F. Kreuger, First Lieutenant.
- Fiorello H. LaGuardia, Major.
- Paton MacGilvary, First Lieutenant.
- Oble Mitchell, First Lieutenant.
- William H. Potthoff, First Lieutenant.
- Aubrey G. Russel, First Lieutenant.
- William B. Shelton, First Lieutenant.
- Norman Sweetser, First Lieutenant.
- Norman Terry, Second Lieutenant.
- Emory E. Watchorn, First Lieutenant.
- Frederick K. Weyerhaeuser, First Lieutenant.
- Warren Wheeler, First Lieutenant.
- Alfred S. R. Wilson, First Lieutenant.
- Warren S. Wilson, First Lieutenant.
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF MILITARY
AERONAUTICS
War Department,
Office of the Director of Military Aeronautics,
November 3, 1918.
Sir: I have the honor to submit herewith the annual report of the Division of Military Aeronautics for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1918. Though the Division of Military Aeronautics was created only on April 24, 1917, it was agreed that the duties intrusted to it and previously carried out by the Signal Corps should be covered in this report in order to present a continuous story of the development of the personnel, training, and organizing phases of the present Air Service. Also it should be pointed out that operations on the front in France have been left largely to whatever report the American Expeditionary Force may deem wise.
The fiscal year 1917-18 saw aviation develop from a wholly subsidiary branch of the Army as the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps to a position of extreme and decisive importance as the Air Service, directly under the Chief of Staff. From the most insignificant beginnings it came within the year to be one of America’s major efforts in the war.
This is all the more surprising when America’s previous backwardness in aviation is considered. This country has stood practically still in aerial progress, while the war in Europe brought about an extraordinary advance. From all this the United States was entirely shut off up to the time it abandoned neutrality. So little exact knowledge was available that the first American planes to go with the expedition into Mexico in March, 1916, were all rendered useless in accidents within a short time of arrival. There was practically no aviation technique here comparable to Europe’s, almost negligible manufacturing facilities, not a hundred trained flyers, and only the most rudimentary facilities for training. Moreover, no one had any adequate appreciation of the intricacy and skill required in the making of either an aeroplane or the training of a pilot.
As against this stagnation Europe’s progress in two and one-half years of war had been tremendous. The first planes to go to the front in 1914 had been few in number, unequipped with radio, machine guns, bombs, or photographic apparatus, and entirely unproved in military value. Their extraordinary success, however, in disclosing the size of the German concentration in Belgium at once brought them into a position of great importance. Very shortly radio was installed to replace signaling by dropping tinsel or making curious evolutions; the pistols of the pilots gave way to machine guns; the easy-going system of dropping bombs over the side was replaced by regular bombing planes, and the occasional taking of photographs by an intricate system of picturing every mile of the front. Engine power increased to 200, 300, 400, 500 horse power; huge planes with large carrying capacity were being developed for night-bombing; and operations were taking place by whole squadrons in various air strata—light, single-seater scouts around 15,000 to 20,000 feet, two-seater day bombers around 9,000 feet, and photographic and observation planes around 6,000 feet.