Egypt of the Pharaohs and of the Khedivé

by F. Barham Zincke

Everything Jesus said in establishment of His main proposition, and by implication of its corollary, was in direct contradiction to the fundamental ideas of Mosaic Dispensation. In fact, the direct opposites of His proposition, and of its corollary, were the old Dispensation itself in its simplest expression: the whole of that Dispensation, just as it stood at work amongst God’s people, and just as it is presented to us in its authentic documents, being only the concrete enlargement, or organized embodiment of these opposites, with a view to the maintenance, under existing conditions, of the order of society.

The reason why Christ denied and disproved the proposition that God is the Executor, here, in this life, of His own law—the proposition of which the old Dispensation was an expansion—was that it hindered the perception of, and barred Him from teaching the doctrine of future rewards and punishments. Moses had seen precisely the same point, only reversely: for he had seen that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments would have barred him from teaching that God is the Executor here, in this life, of His own law. He, therefore, and the Prophets after him, had not taught it. Christ was restricted to the promulgation of a law which is not directly, but mediately, from God; the mediate stage being the moral consciousness of man; and, therefore, if we may so put it, He had no choice but to insist on the demonstration of the fact that God does not Himself directly execute the moral law here, for His not executing it here is the only logical basis of the doctrine of a future life. And He had no choice but to establish the doctrine of a future life, for the rewards and punishments of that life are the only sanctions of the law written in the heart. And, again, He had no choice but to promulgate that unwritten law, for it alone could be the law of His kingdom—of the kingdom of heaven as distinguished from the kingdoms of the world.

First, then, an examination of the position and aims of Moses, and of the means at his disposal, or, at all events, which he was led to adopt for effecting his work, tells us why he did not teach the doctrine of a future life. And then we see that Christ could not logically teach this doctrine, till He had undone that part of the work of Moses which had been a bar to his teaching it. The work of Moses, when analyzed and questioned, gives, itself and alone, the answer we are in search of. The work of Christ, when similarly analyzed and questioned, confirms the answer the work of Moses had already given. It makes clearer what was clear enough before.

In order that the intellectual, or scientific structure of morality and of religion might stand, instead of collapsing, and be enlarged, and rendered more commodious, and be made suitable to the new conditions and requirements of the world, Christ had to take out a part of the foundations of Moses, and to substitute other foundations for them. The foundations He took out were what had hindered Moses from teaching the great doctrine. Having taken these out He could, as He did, insert the great doctrine in their place as a foundation for the new religion. He abrogated the two ideas, that God does, in this world, give and execute the municipal law. Those two ideas being indispensable for the work Moses had to do, contain the reason why the Hebrew Scriptures ignored the future life.

The supersession of the old by the new Dispensation is, at all events, an historical fact; and if our explanation of that fact is satisfactory in the historical, it cannot be unsatisfactory in the religious, order; because all truth, which is only the ascertained order of the world, or sequence and relation of things and of events, is coherent and beneficent. The following are the particulars of the fact, and all of them appear to be sufficiently intelligible:—The law of the old Dispensation had been regarded as given and executed by God. Under the mental conditions of the times, it could not have been regarded otherwise; and that view of it was true in a general and absolute sense, because everything in the universe and on this earth is a link in the order of things, which is aboriginal and external to man. The existence of the material universe itself, of this world of ours, of all natural phenomena, of man, of the order of society, and, therefore, of law, and of the execution of law, are all, in this sense, from God. It was true also in a relative and particular sense, because the human mind was then, and especially was it so throughout the East, in that state in which no conception has as yet been formed either of the existence and action of general laws in nature and in human society, or of the spontaneity and freedom, within certain limits, of human action. Everything, therefore, is unavoidably and honestly referred to God, and in an especial degree the giving and execution of the law. And so did it continue in after times, so long as the Dispensation stood, with respect to everything that was said or done on its behalf, or that in any way bore upon it. Every word that every prophet uttered in exposition, enlargement, or support of it, was regarded by the congregation, and, too, by the prophet himself, as coming from God; and every event also that occurred in connexion with it was brought about by God. At that epoch—we have in our hands the evidence for the period of the Homeric poems—it was so in Greece. And, doubtless, it was so then in Italy and all over Europe. Such ideas belong to a certain stage in mental progress, the stage in which the world was then. This was the natural philosophy, this was the metaphysics of those times.

But to go on, in chronological order, with the particulars of the general fact: at last advancing knowledge and the progress of events began to give form to the ideas of order in nature, and of spontaneity and freedom, within certain limits, in man. The collapse of their own Theocracy, and their long subjection to Greeks and Romans, had obliged the Hebrews to understand the latter of these ideas. For those, therefore, among them who could understand facts it was an impossibility any longer to suppose that God was the sole, immediate, originator and executor of the law. In the minds of all such, the intellectual supports upon which that idea had rested had been completely cut away from beneath it. Still there was, but now removed back a step, an Originator and Governor of the universe, and of all that it contains, and of the moral sense among its other phenomena. This moral sense, therefore, must henceforth be the ground of religion; for that could not be found any longer in municipal law, which had become to their enlarged experience only a human manifestation of the divinely-ordained working of society. There was a Divine purpose and element in it; but in the results were blended so many elements of human error and wrong, especially when men were legislating, not for, or through inspiration from, the idea of God, but for themselves, and through the inspiration of their own supposed interests, as was the case with the heathen, that those results could not be accepted as the frame of religion. The moral sense must, therefore, be recognized, called forth, instructed, enlightened, purified, strengthened, and appealed to; and all this with a constantly understood reference to the knowledge of the day and to the existing conditions of society. But there could be no sanction for this moral sense excepting that of future rewards and punishments. They, therefore, must be recognized. They must be brought to the front. Belief in them must be laid in men’s minds as a foundation—the only foundation, with the mass of mankind—for the desired structure.

This implied that the idea that God gives and executes here the law must be abandoned. And with it must go the idea of His maintaining by any means of this kind a kingdom of this world, such as the old Jewish polity had been. Thenceforth God’s kingdom would be within. Its law would be found, in the moral sense, in the conscience, in the moral consciousness of the God-respecting, and so of the God-taught, individual. The old kingdom had been external; the new would be internal. It would come without observation. Its citizenship would not be of this world. This is the interpretation of those chapters in the history of religion which are contained in the whole range of the old, and in the inception of the new, Dispensation.

God has ordained progress in human affairs. We are sure of this, for history demonstrates it. Those affairs mean ultimately, in their highest form, morality and religion, towards the perfecting of which further approximations are ever from time to time being made; and these successive approximations are the steps of true progress. The most conspicuous instance of this progress, in the historical period, is Christianity itself. Progress means, when we look backward, a lower precedent condition of things just as much as it does, when we look forward from any point, a higher subsequent condition. Of any particular time, it means what was, in the progressive order of things, possible under the circumstances of that time. That was what was ordained for that time. The Mosaic Dispensation, therefore, was just as much ordained of God as the Christian, and the Christian as much as the Mosaic. Each, looking at the contemporary condition of the world, was from God in the same sense, and on analogous grounds. Moses was not wrong in allowing facilities for divorce. Under the circumstances, polygamy was one of them, he was right. Just so with his abstention from using the sanction of the rewards and punishments of the future life. The promulgator of the old Dispensation, we may suppose, felt and understood that mankind would attain, in some coming time, to a higher law than that which he was himself delivering, when he spoke of a Prophet like himself, that is, a moral legislator, who would some day arise, and to whom it would be the duty of God’s people to hearken. Christianity did not contemplate the abolition of slavery. Yet its abolition was a logically and morally right deduction from, and evolution of, Christianity. It was done rightly on Christian principles. If (for argument’s sake) the world should ever grow to a higher moral condition than that apparently contemplated by the first promulgators of Christianity, that would be no proof that Christianity had not been ordained of God as a step in the foreseen and appointed progress of humanity. Just the contrary. It was necessary for that condition, which would not have been possible without it. So was it with the old Dispensation.

It may, in passing, be noticed that the foregoing argument appears to throw some light on the much-vexed question of the historical relation of the New Testament to the Old. It, also, almost brings one to suspect that there must be some error in that teaching which supposes that in respect of the doctrine of a future life, and of the closely connected doctrine of Divine Interposition, particularly of a retributive character, in the ordinary course of human affairs the two are in perfect accord. Of course, they are in accord, though, it would seem, not in the way popularly taught. Their accord consists in the fact that each treats these doctrines in the way that was logically necessary for its own objects. Its own requirements, which were very much those of the knowledge and circumstances of the times, is the point of view from which each regards them.

Here I would ask leave to remark that doctrines, or different ways of stating some particular doctrine, which, from some points of view, or to some minds, appear discordant and contradictory, may, from other points of view and to other minds, appear quite the reverse: that is to say, in a higher and profounder sense they may be eminently accordant. It is so, for instance, I believe, with the doctrines, or doctrine, for it may be only the same idea stated reversely, of a Particular Providence and of General Laws. Our popular theologians on one side, and our men of science on the other, speak of the two as irreconcilably hostile, and exclusive of each other. But is there not an eminence, higher than that occupied by either of these two classes of expositors, from which the two doctrines are seen to be identical? Does not, in fact, the doctrine of general laws imply, and necessitate prevision of, and provision for, every particular case that has ever arisen, that is now arising, and that ever will arise? If so, then, it contains implicitly the doctrine of a Particular Providence. And does the doctrine of a Particular Providence at all imply that God ever acts otherwise than in conformity to the dictates of complete knowledge, perfect wisdom, unvarying justice, and unfailing goodness? If so, then, it contains implicitly the doctrine of General Laws. The two doctrines, therefore, must be mutually inclusive. Each presupposes the other. In fact, the two are one and the same thing.