Flacius wrote: "Salvation is forgiveness of sins, as Paul testifies, Rom. 4, and David, Ps. 32: 'Blessed are they whose sins are forgiven.' 'Thy faith hath made thee whole.' Matt. 9; Mark 5. 10, Luke 7. 8. 18. Jesus saves sinners and the lost. Matt. 1, 18; 1 Tim. 1. Since, now, salvation and forgiveness of sins are one and the same thing, consider, dear Christian, what kind of doctrine this is: No one has received forgiveness of sins without good works; it is impossible for any one to receive forgiveness of sins or to be saved without good works; good works are necessary to forgiveness of sins." (Preger 1, 375.) Again: "Young children and those who are converted in their last hour (who certainly constitute the greater part), must confess that they neither possess, nor will possess, any good works, for they die forthwith. Indeed, St. Bernard also wrote when on his deathbed: Perdite vixi—I have led a wicked life! And what is still more, all Christians, when in their dying moments, they are striving with sins, must say: 'All our good works are like filthy rags; in my life there is nothing good;' and, as David says, Ps.51: 'Before Thee I am nothing but sin,' as Dr. Luther explains it." (376.) Again: "We are concerned about this, that poor and afflicted consciences may have a firm and certain consolation against sin, death, devil, and hell, and thus be saved. For if a condition or appendix concerning our good works and worthiness is required as necessary to salvation, then, as Dr. Major frequently discusses this matter very excellently, it is impossible to have a firm and solid consolation." (376.)
Flacius showed that Major's proposition taken as it reads, can be interpreted only in a papistical sense, and that no amount of explanations is able to cure it of its ingrained falsity. Major, said he, must choose between his proposition or the interpretations which he places upon it; for the former does not admit of the latter. He added that a proposition which is in constant need of explanations in order not to be misunderstood is not adapted for religious instruction. From the fact, says Flacius, that the justified are obliged to obey the Law, it follows indeed that good works are necessary, but not that they are necessary to salvation (as Major and Menius inferred). "From the premises [that Christians are in duty bound to obey the Law and to render the new obedience] it merely follows that this obedience is necessary; but nothing is here said of salvation." (392.) Flacius showed that Major's proposition, even with the proviso that each and every merit of works was to be excluded, remained objectionable. The words "necessary to, necessaria ad," always, he insisted, designate something that precedes, moves, works, effects. The proposition: Justification, salvation, and faith are necessary to good works, cannot be reversed, because good works are not antecedents, but consequents of justification, salvation, and faith.
For the same reason Flacius objected to the phrase that good works are necessary as causa sine qua non. "Dear Dr. G." (Major), says he, "ask the highly learned Greek philosophers for a little information as to what they say de causa sine qua non, hon ouk aneu. Ask I say, the learned and the unlearned, ask philosophy, reason, and common languages, whether it is not true that it [causa sine qua non] must precede." (377.) No one, said he would understand the propositions of Major and Menius correctly. Illustrating this point Flacius wrote: "Can one become a carpenter without the house which he builds afterwards? Can one make a wagon or ship without driving or sailing? I say, yes! Or, dear Doctor, are we accustomed to say: Driving and sailing is necessary to the wagon and ship respectively, and it is impossible for a wagon or ship to be made without driving or sailing? I hear: No!" (375.) "Nobody says: Fruits and leaves are necessary to the tree; wine and grapes are necessary to the vineyard; or dwelling is necessary to a house; driving and sailing, to a wagon and ship; riding is necessary to a horse; but thus they speak: Wagons and horses are necessary to riding, a ship is necessary to sailing." (391.)
The charge that Major's proposition robbed Christians of their assurance of salvation was urged also by Nicholas Gallus. He says: It is giving with one hand and taking again with the other when Major adds [to his proposition concerning the necessity of good works to salvation] that our conscience is not to look upon our works, but on Christ alone. (Frank 2, 224.) The same point was stressed in the Opinion of the ministers of Luebeck, Hamburg, Lueneburg, and Magdeburg, published by Flacius and Gallus in 1553. (220.) The Hamburg theologians declared: "This appendix [necessary to salvation, ad salutem] indicates a cause and a merit." They added that in this sense also the phrase was generally understood by the Papists. (Planck, Geschichte des prot. Lehrbegriffes 5, 505. 497.) Gallus also explained that it was papistical to infer: By sins we lose salvation, hence it is retained by good works; or, Sins condemn, hence good works save. (Frank 2, 171.) Hesshusius wrote to Wigand: "I regard Eber's assertion that good works are necessary to justification because they must be present, as false and detrimental. For Paul expressly excludes good works from the justification of a sinner before God, not only when considered a merit cause, glory, dignity, price, object or trust, and medium of application, etc., but also as to the necessity of their presence (verum etiam quoad necessitatem praesentiae). If it is necessary that good works be present with him who is to be justified, then Paul errs when he declares that a man is justified without the works of the Law." (172.)
Regarding this point, that good works are necessary to justification in so far as they must be present, the Majorists appealed to Luther, who, however, had merely stated that faith is never alone, though it alone justifies. His axiom was: "Faith alone justifies, but it is not alone— Fides sola iustificat, sed non est sola." According to Luther good works, wherever they are found, are present in virtue of faith; where they are not present, they are absent because faith is lacking; nor can they preserve the faith by which alone they are produced. At the Altenburg Colloquy (1568 to 1569) the theologians of Electoral Saxony insisted that, since true faith does not and cannot exist in those who persevere in sins against their conscience, good works must not be altogether and absolutely excluded from justification, at least their necessity and presence must not be regarded as unnecessary. (189.) The theologians of Ducal Saxony, however, denied "that in the article and act of justification our good works are necessary by necessity of presence. Sed impugnamus istam propositionem, in articulo et actu iustificationis bona nostra opera necessaria esse necessitate praesentiae." "On the other hand, however, they, too, were solicitous to affirm the impossibility of faith's coexisting with an evil purpose to sin against God in one and the same mind at the same time." (237; Gieseler 3, 2, 251.) In the Apology of the Book of Concord the Lutheran theologians declared: "The proposition (Justification of faith requires the presence of good works) was rejected [in the Formula of Concord] because it cannot be understood otherwise than of the cause of justification. For whatever is present in justification as necessary in such a manner that without its presence justification can neither be nor occur, that must indeed be understood as being a cause of justification itself." (238)
148. Major's Concessions Not Satisfactory.
In order to put an end to the controversy, Major offered a concession in his "Confession concerning the Article of Justification, that is, concerning the doctrine that by faith alone, without any merit, for the sake of Christ, a man has forgiveness of sins, and is just before God and an heir of eternal salvation," 1558. Here he states that he had not used the controverted formula for several years and, in order not to give further cause for public contention, he promised "not to employ the words, 'Good works are necessary to salvation,' any more, on account of the false interpretations placed upon it." (Preger 1, 396.) In making this concession, however, Major did not at all intend to retract his teaching or to condemn his proposition as false. He promised to abstain from its use, not because he was now convinced of his error and viewed his propositions as false and incorrect as such, but merely because it was ambiguous and liable to abuse, and because he wished to end the conflict. (Frank 2, 166f. 223.)
Nor did Major later on ever admit that he had erred in the matter. In an oration delivered 1567 he boasted of his intimate relation and doctrinal agreement with Luther and Melanchthon, adding: "Neither did I ever deviate, nor, God assisting me, shall I ever deviate, from the truth once acknowledged. Nec discessi umquam nec Deo iuvante discedam ab agnita semel veritate." He had never thought or taught, said he, that good works are a cause of justification. And concerning the proposition, "Good works are necessary to salvation," he had expressly declared that he intended to abstain from its use "because it had offended some on account of its ambiguity, cum propter ambiguitatem offenderit aliquos." He continued: "The facts show that we [the professors of Wittenberg University] are and have remained guardians of that doctrine which Luther and Melanchthon … delivered to us, in whose writings from the time of the [Augsburg] Confession there is neither a dissonance nor a discrepancy, either among themselves or from the foundation, nor anything obscure or perplexing." (Frank 2, 224. 167.)
Also in his Testament (Testamentum Doctoris Georgii Majoris), published 1570, Major emphatically denied that he had ever harbored or taught any false views concerning justification, salvation, and good works. Of his own accord he had also abandoned the phrases: "Good works are necessary to salvation; it is impossible to be saved without good works; no one has ever been saved without good works—Bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem; impossibile est, sine bonis operibus salvum fieri; nemo umquam sine bonis operibus salvatus est." He had done this in order to obviate the misapprehension as though he taught that good works are a cause of salvation which contribute to merit and effect salvation. According to this Testament, he desired his doctrines and writings to be judged. In future he would not dispute with anybody about these phrases. (168.) Thus in his Testament, too, Major withdrew his statements not because they were simply false, but only because they had been interpreted to mean that good works are the efficient cause of justification and salvation. And while Major in later writings did eliminate the appendix "ad salutem, to salvation," or "ad vitam aeternam, to eternal life," he retained, and continued to teach, essentially the same error in another garb, namely, that good works are necessary in order to retain faith. Enumerating, in his Explanation of the Letter to the Galatians, of 1560, the purposes on account of which good works ought to be rendered, he mentions as the "first, in order to retain faith, the Holy Spirit, the grace bestowed, and a good conscience." (218.)
Thus Major was willing to abandon as dangerous and ambiguous, and to abstain from the use of the formula, "Good works are necessary to salvation," but refused to reject it as false and to make a public admission and confession of his error. This, however, was precisely what his opponents demanded; for they were convinced that they could be satisfied with nothing less. As a result the controversy continued till Major's death, in 1574. The Jena professors, notably Flacius, have been charged with prolonging the controversy from motives of personal revenge. (Schaff, 276.) No doubt, the Wittenbergers had gone to the very limit of rousing the animosity and resentment of Flacius (who himself, indeed, was not blameless in the language used against his opponents). Major had depicted Flacius as a most base and wicked man, as a cunning and sly adventurer; as a tyrant, who, after having suppressed the Wittenbergers, would, as a pope, lord it over all Germany; as an Antinomian and a despiser of all good works, etc. (Preger 1, 397.) In the address of October 18, 1567 already referred to, Major said: "There was in this school [Wittenberg] a vagabond of uncertain origin, fatherland, religion, and faith who called himself Flacius Illyricus…. He was the first one to spew out against this school, against its principal Doctors, against the churches of these regions, against the princes themselves, the poison which he had brewed and imbibed some time ago, and, having gnawed and consumed with the bite of a serpent the womb of his mother, to destroy the harmony of these churches, at first by spreading his dreams, fables, and gossip but now also by calumnies and manifest lies." (Frank 2, 217.) Melanchthon, too, had repeatedly written in a similar vein. In an Opinion of his, dated March 4, 1558, we read: "Even if they [Flacius and his adherents] condemn and banish me, I am well satisfied; for I do not desire to associate with them, because I well know that the said Illyricus with his adherents does not seek the honor of God, but publicly opposes the truth, and as yet has never declared himself concerning the entire sum of Christian doctrine." (C. R. 9, 463. 476. 311.) In an Opinion of March 9, 1559, Melanchthon even insinuated that Flacius denied the Trinity. (763.) Before this, August, 1549, he had written to Fabricius: "The Slavic runagate (Slavus drapetes) received many benefits from our Academy and from me. But we have nursed a serpent in our bosom. He deserves to be branded on his forehead as the Macedonian king did with a soldier: 'Ungrateful stranger, xevnos acharistos.' Nor do I believe that the source of his hatred is any other than that the place of Cruciger was not given to him. But I omit these disagreeable narrations." (7, 449. 478 ff.) This personal abuse, however, was not the reason why Flacius persisted in his opposition despite the concessions made by Major and Menius,— concessions with which even such moderate men as Martin Chemnitz were not satisfied.