Tschackert remarks of the Loci of 1535: "Melanchthon wants to make man responsible for his state of grace. Nor does the human will in consequence of original sin lose the ability to decide itself when incited; the will produces nothing new by its own power, but assumes an attitude toward what approaches it. When man hears the Word of God, and the Holy Spirit produces spiritual affections in his heart, the will can either assent or turn against it. In this way Melanchthon arrives at the formula, ever after stereotype with him, that there are three concurring causes in the process of conversion: 'the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will, which, indeed, is not idle, but strives against its infirmity.'" (520.)
However, during the life of Luther, Melanchthon made no further measurable progress towards synergism. Perhaps the unpleasant experiences following upon his innovations in the doctrine of good works acted as a check also on the public development of his synergistic tendencies. During Luther's life Melanchthon, as he himself admitted to Carlowitz (106), dissimulated, keeping his deviating views to himself and his intimate friends. After Luther's death, however, he came out unmistakably and publicly, also in favor of synergism, endorsing even the Erasmian definition of free will as "the power in man to apply himself to grace." He plainly taught that, when drawn by the Holy Spirit, the will is able to decide pro or con, to obey or to resist. Especially in his lectures, Melanchthon—not indeed directly, but mentioning the name of Flacius—continually lashed such phrases of Luther as "purely passive," "block," "resistance,"—a fact to which Schluesselburg, who had studied in Wittenberg, refers in support of his assertion that Melanchthon had departed from Luther's teaching on free will. (Catalogus 5, 32.) While Melanchthon formerly (in his Loci of 1543) had spoken of three causes of a good action (bonae actionis) he now publicly advocated the doctrine of three concurring causes of conversion. Now he boldly maintained that, since the grace of God is universal, one must assume, and also teach, that there are different actions in different men, which accounts for the fact that some are converted and saved while others are lost. According to the later Melanchthon, therefore, man's eternal salvation evidently does not depend on the gracious operations of God's Holy Spirit and Word alone, but also on his own correct conduct toward grace. In his heart, especially when approaching the mercy-seat in prayer, Melanchthon, no doubt, forgot and disavowed his own teaching, and believed and practised Luther's sola-gratia-doctrine. But it cannot be denied that, in his endeavors to harmonize universal grace with the fact that not all, but some only, are saved, Melanchthon repudiated the monergism of Luther, espoused and defended the powers of free will in spiritual matters, and thought, argued, spoke, and wrote in terms of synergism. Indeed, Melanchthon must be regarded as the father of both synergism and the rationalistic methods employed in its defense, and as the true father also of the modern rationalistico-synergistic theology represented by such distinguished men as Von Hofmann, Thomasius, Kahnis, Luthardt, etc. (Pieper 2, 582; Frank 1, 231.)
155. Unsound Statements of Melanchthon.
Following are some of the ambiguous and false deliverances of Melanchthon: In the Loci of 1535 the so-called human cause of conversion which must be added to the Word and Spirit is described as endeavoring, striving, and wishing to obey and believe. We read: "We do not say this to ensnare the consciences, or to deter men from the endeavor to obey and believe, or from making an effort. On the contrary, since we are to begin with the Word, we certainly must not resist the Word of God, but strive to obey it…. We see that these causes are united: the Word, the Holy Spirit, and the will, which is certainly not idle, but strives against its infirmity. In this manner ecclesiastical writers are accustomed to join these causes. Basil says: 'Only will, and God will precede,' God precedes, calls, moves, assists us, but let us beware lest we resist…. Chrysostom says: He who draws, draws him who is willing." (C. R. 21, 376.)
In conversion and salvation God certainly must do and does His share, but man must beware lest he fail to do what is required of him. This is also the impression received from Melanchthon's statements in the third elaboration of his Loci, 1543. We read: "Here three causes of a good action concur (hic concurrunt tres causae bonae actionis): the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the human will assenting to and not resisting the Word of God (humana voluntas assentiens, nec repugnans Verbo Dei). For it could expel [the Spirit], as Saul expelled [Him] of his own free will. But when the mind hearing and sustaining itself does not resist, does not give way to diffidence, but, the Holy Spirit assisting, endeavors to assent,—in such a struggle the will is not inactive (in hoc certamine voluntas non est otiosa). The ancients have said that good works are done when grace precedes and the will follows. So also Basil says: 'Monon theleson, kai theos proapanta, Only will, and God anticipates. God precedes, calls, moves, assists us; but as for us, let us see to it that we do not resist. Deus antevertit nos, vocat, movet, adiuvat, SED NOS VIDERIMUS, ne repugnemus,' (21, 658.) And Phil. 1, 6: 'He which hath begun a good work in you will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ,' i.e., we are assisted by God (adiuvamur a Deo), but we must hear the Word of God and not resist the drawing God." (916.) "God draws our minds that they will, but we must assent, not resist. Deus trahit mentes, ut velint, sed assentiri nos, non repugnare oportet." (917.) Here we also meet the remark: "But the will, when assisted by the Holy Spirit, becomes more free. Fit autem voluntas adiuvata Spiritu Sancto magis libera." (663.) Frank comments pertinently that the magis presupposes a certain degree of liberty of the will before the assistance of the Holy Spirit. (1, 198.)
The boldest synergistic statements are found in the Loci of 1548. It was the year of the Leipzig Interim, in which the same error was embodied as follows: "The merciful God does not deal with man as with a block, but draws him in such a way that his will, too, cooperates." (C. R. 7, 51. 260.) As to the Loci of this year, Bindseil remarks in the Corpus Reformatorum: "This edition is famous on account of certain paragraphs inserted by the author in the article on Free Will. For these additions contain the Erasmian definition of free will (that it is the faculty of applying oneself to grace), on account of which Melanchthon was charged with synergism by the Flacians…. For this reason the edition is called by J. T. Mayer 'the worst of all (omnium pessima).'" At the Weimar colloquy, 1560, even Strigel was not willing to identify himself openly with the Erasmian definition of free will (facultas applicandi se ad gratiam) as found in one of these sections. When Flacius quoted the passage, Strigel retorted excitedly: "I do not defend that definition which you have quoted from the recent edition [1548]. When did you hear it from me? When have I undertaken to defend it?" (Frank 1, 199. 135.) At the Herzberg colloquy Andreae remarked: "The Loci Communes of Melanchthon are useful. But whoever reads the locus de libero arbitrio must confess, even if he judges most mildly, that the statements are dubious and ambiguous. And what of the four paragraphs which were inserted after Luther's death? For here we read: 'There must of necessity be a cause of difference in us why a Saul is rejected, a David received.'" (Pieper 2, 587.)
From these additions of 1548 we cite: "Nor does conversion occur in David in such a manner as when a stone is turned into a fig: but free will does something in David; for when he hears the rebuke and the promise, he willingly and freely confesses his fault. And his will does something when he sustains himself with this word: The Lord hath taken away your sin. And when he endeavors to sustain himself with this word, he is already assisted by the Holy Spirit." (C. R. 21, 659.) Again: "I therefore answer those who excuse their idleness because they think that free will does nothing, as follows: It certainly is the eternal and immovable will of God that you obey the voice of the Gospel, that you hear the Son of God, that you acknowledge the Mediator. How black is that sin which refuses to behold the Mediator, the Son of God, presented to the human race! You will answer: 'I cannot.' But in a manner you can (immo aliquo modo potes), and when you sustain yourself with the voice of the Gospel, then pray that God would assist you, and know that the Holy Spirit is efficacious in such consolation. Know that just in this manner God intends to convert us, when we, roused by the promise wrestle with ourselves, pray and resist our diffidence and other vicious affections. For this reason some of the ancient Fathers have said that free will in man is the faculty to apply himself to grace (liberum arbitrium in homine facultatem esse applicandi se ad gratiam); i.e., he hears the promise, endeavors to assent, and abandons sins against conscience. Such things do not occur in devils. The difference therefore between the devils and the human race ought to be considered. These matters however, become still clearer when the promise is considered. For since the promise is universal, and since there are no contradictory wills in God, there must of necessity be in us some cause of difference why Saul is rejected and David is received; i.e., there must of necessity be some dissimilar action in these two. Cum promissio sit universalis, nec sint in Deo contradictoriae voluntates, necesse est in nobis esse aliquam discriminis causam, cur Saul abiiciatur. David recipiatur, id est, necesse est aliquam esse actionem dissimilem in his duobus. Properly understood, this is true, and the use [usus] in the exercises of faith and in true consolation (when our minds acquiesce in the Son of God, shown in the promise) will illustrate this copulation of causes: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, and the will." (C. R. 21, 659f.)
At the colloquy of Worms, 1557, Melanchthon, interpellated by Brenz, is reported to have said that the passage in his Loci of 1548 defining free will as the faculty of applying oneself to grace referred to the regenerated will (voluntas renata), as, he said, appeared from the context. (Gieseler 3, 2, 225; Frank 1, 198.) As a matter of fact, however, the context clearly excludes this interpretation. In the passage quoted, Melanchthon, moreover, plainly teaches: 1. that in conversion man, too, can do, and really does, something by willingly confessing his fault, by sustaining himself with the Word, by praying that God would assist him, by wrestling with himself, by striving against diffidence, etc.; 2. that the nature of fallen man differs from that of the devils in this, that his free will is still able to apply itself to grace, endeavor to assent to it, etc.; 3. that the dissimilar actions resulting from the different use of this natural ability accounts for the fact that some are saved while others are lost. Such was the plain teaching of Melanchthon from which he never receded, but which he, apart from other publications, reaffirmed in every new edition of his Loci. For all, including the last one to appear during his life (1559), contain the additions of 1548. "The passage added by the author [Melanchthon, 1548] after Luther's death is repeated in all subsequent editions," says Bindseil. (C. R. 21, 570.)
The sections which were added to the Loci after 1548 also breathe the same synergistic spirit. In 1553 Melanchthon inserted a paragraph which says that, when approached by the Holy Spirit, the will can obey or resist. We read: "The liberty of the human will after the Fall, also in the non-regenerate, is the faculty by virtue of which man is able to govern his motions, i.e., he can enjoin upon his external members such actions as agree, or such as do not agree, with the Law of God. But he cannot banish doubts from his mind and evil inclinations from his heart without the light of the Gospel and without the Holy Spirit. But when the will is drawn by the holy Spirit, it can obey or resist. Cum autem trahitur a Spiritu Sancto, potest obsequi et repugnare." (21, 1078; 13, 162.)
Other publications contain the same doctrine. While in his Loci of 1543 he had spoken only of three causes of a good action (bonae actionis), Melanchthon, in his Enarratio Symboli Nicaeni of 1550, substituted "conversion" for "good action." We read: In conversion these causes concur: the Holy Spirit, the voice of the Gospel, "and the will of man, which does not resist the divine voice, but somehow, with trepidation, assents. Concurrunt in conversione hae causae: Spiritus Sanctus … vox Evangelii … et voluntas hominis, quae non repugnat voci divinae, sed inter trepidationem utcumque assentitur." Again: "And concerning this copulation of causes it is said: The Spirit comes to the assistance of our infirmity. And Chrysostom truly says: God draws, but he draws him who is willing." Again: God's promise is universal, and there are no contradictory wills in God; hence, though Paul is drawn in a different manner than Zacchaeus, "nevertheless there is some assent of the will (tamen aliqua est voluntatis assensio)." "God therefore begins and draws by the voice of the Gospel but He draws him who is willing, and assists him who assents." "Nor is anything detracted from the glory of God, but it is truly affirmed that the assistance of God always concurs in the beginning and afterwards (auxilium Dei semper initio et deinceps concurrere)." (23, 280 ff.) Accordingly, God merely concurs as one of three causes, among which the will of man is the third. In his Examen Ordinandorum of 1554, Melanchthon again replaced the term "good action" by "conversion." He says: "In conversion these causes concur: the Word of God, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father and Son send to kindle our hearts, and our will, assenting and not resisting the Word of God (et nostra voluntas assentiens et non repugnans Verbo Dei). And lest we yield to diffidence, we must consider that both preachings are universal, the preaching of repentance as well as the promise of grace…. Let us therefore not resist but assent to the promise, and constantly repeat this prayer: I believe, O Lord, but come to the help of my weakness." (23, 15.) Finally in his Opinion on the Weimar Book of Confutation, March 9, 1559, Melanchthon remarks: "Again, if the will is able to turn from the consolation, it must be inferred that it works something and follows the Holy Spirit when it accepts the consolation. Item, so sich der Wille vom Trost abwenden mag, so ist dagegen zu verstehen, dass er etwas wirket und folget dem Heiligen Geist, so er den Trost annimmt." (9, 768.)