A history of the Japanese people

by F. Brinkley; Dairoku Kikuchi

THE FIVE REGENT FAMILIES

It has already been related how, by Yoritomo's contrivance, the post of family—descended from Fujiwara Kanezane—and scions of the Konoe family—descended from Fujiwara Motomichi. This system was subsequently extended at the instance of the Hojo. The second and third sons of Michiiye, grandson of Kanezane, founded the houses of Nijo and Ichijo, respectively; while Kanehira, the second of two grandsons of Motomichi, established the house of Takatsukasa. These five families—Konoe, Kujo, Nijo, Ichijo, and Takatsukasa—were collectively called Go-sekke (the Five Regent Houses) in recognition of the fact that the regent in Kyoto was supposed to be taken from them in succession. The arrangement led to frequent strife with resulting weakness, thus excellently achieving the purpose of its contrivers, the Hojo.

THE FIRST MONGOL INVASION

The rule of the Hojo synchronized with two events of prime importance the invasion of Japan by a Mongolian army, first in 1274, and subsequently in 1281. Early in the twelfth century, the Emperor of China, which was then under the sway of the Sung dynasty, invited the Golden Tatars to deal with the Khitan Tatars, who held Manchuria, and who, in spite of heavy tribute paid annually by the Sung Court, continually raided northeastern China. The Golden Tatars responded to the invitation by not only expelling the Khitans but also taking their place in Manchuria and subsequently overrunning China, where they established a dynasty of their own from 1115 to 1234.

These struggles and dynastic changes did not sensibly affect Japan. Her intercourse with the Asiatic continent in those ages was confined mainly to an interchange of visits by Buddhist priests, to industrial enterprise, and to a fitful exchange of commodities. It does not appear that any branch of the Tatars concerned themselves practically about Japan or the Japanese. Ultimately, however, in the first part of the thirteenth century, the Mongols began to sweep down on the Middle Kingdom under the leadership of Jenghiz Khan. They crushed the Golden Tatars, transferred (1264) the Mongol capital from central Asia to Peking (Cambaluc), and, in 1279, under Kublai, completely conquered China. Nearly thirty years before the transfer of the capital to Peking, the Mongols invaded the Korean peninsula, and brought it completely under their sway in 1263, receiving the final submission of the kingdom of Koma, which alone had offered any stubborn resistance.

It is probable that Kublai's ambition, whetted by extensive conquests, would have turned in the direction of Japan sooner or later, but tradition indicates that the idea of obtaining the homage of the Island Empire was suggested to the great Khan by a Korean traveller in 1265. Kublai immediately acted on the suggestion. He sent an embassy by way of Korea, ordering the Koma sovereign to make arrangements for the transport of the envoys and to re-enforce them with a Korean colleague. A tempest interrupted this essay, and it was not repeated until 1268, when the Khan's messengers, accompanied by a Korean suite, crossed safely to Chikuzen and delivered to the Dazai-fu a letter from Kublai with a covering despatch from the Korean King. The Korean sovereign's despatch was plainly inspired by a desire to avert responsibility from himself. He explained that in transporting the embassy he acted unavoidably, but that, in sending it, the Khan was not actuated by any hostile feeling, his sole purpose being to include Japan in the circle of his friendly tributaries.

In short, the Koma prince—he no longer could properly be called a monarch—would have been only too pleased to see Japan pass under the Mongol yoke as his own kingdom had already done. Kublai's letter, however, though not deliberately arrogant, could not be construed in any sense except as a summons to send tribute-bearing envoys to Peking. He called himself "Emperor" and addressed the Japanese ruler as "King;" instanced, for fitting example, the relation between China and Korea, which he described at once as that of lord and vassal and that of parent and child, and predicated that refusal of intercourse would "lead to war."

The Japanese interpreted this to be an offer of suzerainty or subjugation. Two courses were advocated; one by Kyoto, the other by Kamakura. The former favoured a policy of conciliation and delay; the latter, an attitude of contemptuous silence. Kamakura, of course, triumphed. After six months' retention the envoys were sent away without so much as a written acknowledgment. The records contain nothing to show whether this bold course on the part of the Bakufu had its origin in ignorance of the Mongol's might or in a conviction of the bushi's fighting superiority. Probably both factors were operative; for Japan's knowledge of Jenghiz and his resources reached her chiefly through religious channels, and the fact that Koreans were associated with Mongols in the mission must have tended to lower the affair in her estimation. Further, the Japanese had been taught by experience the immense difficulties of conducting oversea campaigns, and if they understood anything about the Mongols, it should have been the essentially non-maritime character of the mid-Asian conquerors.

By Kublai himself that defect was well appreciated. He saw that to carry a body of troops to Japan, the seagoing resources of the Koreans must be requisitioned, and on the bootless return of his first embassy, he immediately issued orders to the Koma King to build one thousand ships and mobilize forty thousand troops. In vain the recipient of these orders pleaded inability to execute them. The Khan insisted, and supplemented his first command with instructions that agricultural operations should be undertaken on a large scale in the peninsula to supply food for the projected army of invasion. Meanwhile he despatched embassy after embassy to Japan, evidently being desirous of carrying his point by persuasion rather than by force. The envoys invariably returned re infecta. On one occasion (1269), a Korean vessel carried off two Japanese from Tsushima and sent them to Peking. There, Kublai treated them kindly, showed them his palace as well as a parade of his troops, and sent them home to tell what they had seen. But the Japanese remained obdurate, and finally the Khan sent an ultimatum, to which Tokimune, the Hojo regent, replied by dismissing the envoys forthwith.

War was now inevitable. Kublai massed 25,000 Mongol braves in Korea, supplemented them with 15,000 Korean troops, and embarking them in a flotilla of 900 vessels manned by 8000 Koreans, launched this paltry army against Japan in November, 1274. The armada began by attacking Tsushima and Iki, islands lying in the strait that separates the Korean peninsula from Japan. In Tsushima, the governor, So Sukekuni,* could not muster more than two hundred bushi. But these two hundred fought to the death, as did also the still smaller garrison of Iki. Before the passage of the narrow strait was achieved, the invaders must have lost something of their faith in the whole enterprise. On November 20th, they landed at Hako-zaki Gulf in the province of Chikuzen There they were immediately assailed by the troops of five Kyushu chieftains. What force the latter represented there is no record, but they were certainly less numerous than the enemy. Moreover, the Yuan army possessed a greatly superior tactical system. By a Japanese bushi the battle-field was regarded as an arena for the display of individual prowess, not of combined force. The Mongols, on the contrary, fought in solid co-operation, their movements directed by sound of drum from some eminence where the commander-in-chief watched the progress of the fight. If a Japanese approached to defy one of them to single combat, they enveloped and slew him. Further, at close quarters they used light arms dipped in poison, and for long-range purposes they had powerful crossbows, which quite outclassed the Japanese weapons. They were equipped also with explosives which they fired from metal tubes, inflicting heavy loss on the Japanese, who were demoralized by such an unwonted weapon. Finally, they were incomparable horsemen, and in the early encounters they put the Japanese cavalry out of action by raising with drums and gongs a din that terrified the latter's horses. But, in spite of all these disadvantages, the Japanese fought stubbornly. Whenever they got within striking distance of the foe, they struck desperately, and towards evening they were able to retire in good order into cover "behind the primitive fortifications of Mizuki raised for Tenchi Tenno by Korean engineers six centuries before."