The above two provisions practically conferred on the Bakufu the power of not only appointing the regent and ministers of State but also of keeping them in office. For, as the law had been framed in Yedo, in Yedo also was vested competence to judge the ability or disability of a candidate. Hence, when the Emperor proposed to appoint a regent or a minister, the Bakufu had merely to intimate want of confidence in the nominee's ability; and similarly, if the sovereign desired to dismiss one of those high officials, the shogun could interfere effectually by reference to the letter of the law. Thus, the power of appointing and dismissing the great officials in Kyoto, which is one of the important prerogatives of the crown, was practically usurped by the shogun.
"(4) An adopted son shall always be chosen from the family of his adopter; and a female shall never be adopted to be the head of a family, no such custom having existed in Japan at any time."
This provision had two main objects. The first was to avert adoptions having the effect of combinations; the second, to prevent adoption of Imperial princes into other families. The Bakufu sought, as far as possible, to bring about the taking of the tonsure by all princes of the Blood who were not in the direct line of the succession, and to keep these princes from attaining to the posts of regents or ministers of State.
"(5) All reports shall be submitted to the Emperor by the regent, the denso, or an administrator (bugyo). Any other person who, in disregard of this rule, attempts to address the Throne direct, shall be sent into exile, whatever his rank."
The denso mentioned in this provision was an official appointed by the Bakufu for that special purpose. The whole arrangement as to communication with the Throne constituted a powerful buttress of Bakufu influence. Generally, the latter could contrive, as has been shown above, to control the appointment and continuance in office of a regent or a minister, while as for the administrators (bugyo), they were nominees of Yedo. It thus resulted that the Throne was approachable through the channel of the Bakufu only.
LAWS WITH REFERENCE TO BUDDHISM
The above laws remained unchanged throughout the Tokugawa era. A special law was also enacted with reference to Buddhist sects and the principal Buddhist temples. Ieyasu secured to these temples the possession of their manors by granting title-deeds bearing what was called the "go-shuinji," or "vermilion signature." The term was not really applicable in the case of Ieyasu. It is true that Hideyoshi, doubtless in imitation of Chinese custom, stamped a vermilion seal upon documents of this character; but the Tokugawa shoguns employed a black signature written with a pen. Nevertheless, the term "go-shuinji" continued to be used from the time of the Taiko downwards. It was an outcome of Ieyasu's astuteness that the great Hongwan temple was divided into two branches, eastern and western, by which process its influence was prevented from becoming excessive. During the administration of the third shogun, every daimyo was required to adhere to a definite sect of Buddhism, and to the Buddhist and Shinto temples was entrusted the duty of keeping an accurate census of their parishioners. The direct purpose of these latter laws was to facilitate the extermination of Christianity. Anyone whose name was not enrolled on one of the above lists fell under suspicion of embracing the foreign faith.
A JAPANESE HISTORIAN'S OPINION
Referring to the above laws the Tokugawa Jidaishi says:
"The above laws and regulations were the Constitution of the Tokugawa Bakufu. By the aid of their provisions the influence of Yedo was extended to every part of the nation from the Imperial Court to the world of religion. No such codes had ever previously existed in Japan. Any unit of the nation, whether a Court noble, a great feudatory, a priest, or a common samurai, had to yield implicit obedience or to suffer condign punishment. Thus, it fell out that everybody being anxious to conform with the rules, the universal tendency was to share in preserving the peace. From the point of view of this system, Ieyasu was eminently above all modern and ancient heroes. Hideyoshi won brilliant victories in war, but he saw no better method of maintaining peace at home than to send the country's armies to fight abroad. He seems to have conceived a hope that his generals would find goals for their ambition in Korea or China, and would exhaust their strength in endeavouring to realize their dreams. But his plan brought about the contrary result; for the generals formed fresh enmities among themselves, and thus the harvest that was subsequently reaped at Sekigahara found hands to sow it.