Rev. XXI, 4. John to the seven churches which are in Asia: Grace be unto you, and peace, from him which is, and which was, and which is to come; and from the seven Spirits which are before his throne.
Rev. XXII, 3. And there shall be no more curse: but the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it; and his servants shall serve him.
Rev. VII, 15. Therefore are they before the throne of God, and serve him day and night in his temple: and he that sitteth on the throne shall dwell among them.
16. They shall hunger no more neither thirst any more: neither shall the sun light on them, nor any heat.
17. For the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall feed them, and shall lead them unto living fountains of waters: and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes.
9. Hell a Place of Endless Misery.
The chief objections that have been urged against the doctrine of the eternal punishment of the finally impenitent, are the following:
1. The disproportion between the actions done in time and endless punishment. While it is not denied that punishment is merited, it is contended that there should be some proportion between the crime and the duration of the penalty. To this objection we deem the following arguments a sufficient answer:
What is the moral proportion between one day and a month, or one day and a year? Does nothing depend on the nature of the crime? Suppose a man commits a petty larceny, would the objector say a month's imprisonment is enough? Another man commits murder, would the objector say that a year's punishment would suffice? But should the latter criminal be punished a month and the other a year? It is urged that the nature of the crime determines that. If this is granted it is apparent that the proportion is one of turpitude, and not of time. Society, and all civil governments, proceed upon the principle that the time occupied in the perpetration of a criminal act is not to be taken into account in considering the punishment that is to be awarded. This is manifestly correct; for less time is usually occupied in committing murder than in perpetrating a burglary; and, on the principle of strict proportion, the burglar should undergo a longer punishment than the murderer. But the moral instincts of society overrule its sentimentalities, and demand that the gravity of the crime shall determine the gravity of the punishment.
Take another illustration: suppose that twenty years ago a criminal forged your name to a check for ten thousand dollars. It was the work of a moment. A stroke or two of the pen and the work was done. The criminal never confessed the act, nor ever uttered a penitential word. You had him prosecuted, and he was imprisoned for ten years. He has now been at large ten years. Have you forgiven him? Have you invited him to your family circle? Have you restored him to your confidence? You answer, "No!" What then becomes of the argument of proportion? He was imprisoned ten years for a crime that consumed less than ten minutes in its perpetration. Ten years of punishment for ten minutes of crime! But you say the criminal is impenitent; he has never acknowledged his sin, and never asked for forgiveness. Time has no mitigating influence upon guilt. If a criminal continues impenitent respecting any crime, he is as guilty of that crime on the last day of his life as he was in the very hour of its committal, although he may have survived that hour fifty years. The question between the criminal and society is not one of time, but of penitence.