Because something exists, something must have existed always. The mind can not realize the fact that existence or change can take place without a cause. If nothing had originally existed, we can not possibly conceive that any thing could ever have existed. Causes absolutely the same must, in the same circumstances, produce absolutely the same effects. This, I think, is self-evident, and admitted as such. An absolute want of cause involves an absolute sameness of an opposite kind, and must, with nearly the same evidence, continue forever. The necessity of causes to all the changes of being is universally admitted. No absurdity can be greater than to argue with a man who denies the connection between cause and effect. He himself, in speaking, admits himself to be the cause of the words he utters, and of the opinions he communicates, and the act of arguing admits you to be a similar cause. If his body be not a cause, and your eyes another cause, you can not see him. If his voice and your ears be not causes, you can not hear him. If your mind and his be not causes, you can not understand him.
Mr. Locke presents the argument substantially as follows: Every man knows with absolute certainty that he himself exists. He knows, also, that he did not always exist, but began to be. It is clearly certain to him that his existence is caused, and not casual, and was produced by a cause adequate to the production. By an adequate cause is invariably intended a cause possessing and exerting an efficacy to bring any effect to pass. In the present case an adequate cause is one possessing and exerting all the understanding necessary to contrive and the power necessary to create such a being as the man in question. This cause is what we are accustomed to call God.
The understanding necessary to conceive and the power necessary to create a being compounded of the human soul and body admit of no limits. He who can contrive and create such a being can contrive and create any thing. He who actually contrived and created man certainly contrived and created all things. This argument is conclusive. It has not been nor will it ever be answered except with sophistry or sneers. I do not affirm that every step of it is attended with what logicians call intuitive evidence, nor that it amounts to what is, in the logical sense, an absolute demonstration. But it is in every step attended with such evidence as excludes all rational doubt, and approaches so near the character of a demonstration as to leave the mind completely satisfied. At the same time it is opposed to no counter evidence.
The state of existing things completely proves the being of a God. The argument derived from this source is presented by Bishop Berkley in a clear and forcible manner, and is substantially as follows:
We acknowledge the existence of each other to be unquestionable, and when called upon for evidence on which this acknowledgment is founded allege that of our senses; yet it can by no means be affirmed with truth that our senses discern immediately any man. We see, indeed, a form, and we hear a voice communicating to us the thoughts, emotions, and volitions of an intelligent being. Yet it is intuitively certain that neither the form, the motions, the actions, the voice, the thoughts, nor the volitions are that intelligent being, or the living, acting, thinking thing which we call man. On the contrary, they are merely effects of which that living, active, acting thing denominated by the word man is the cause. The existence of the cause, or, in other language, of the man, we conclude from the effects which he thus produces. In the same manner, and with the like certainty, we discover the existence of God.
In the universe without us, and in the little world within us, we perceive a great variety of effects produced by some cause adequate to their production. Thus the motions of the heart, arteries, veins, and other vessels; of the blood and other juices; of the tongue, the hands, and other members; the perceptions of the senses and the actions of the mind; the storm, the lightning, the volcano, and the earthquake; the reviviscence and growth of the vegetable world; the diffusion of light and the motions of the planetary system—are all effects, and effects of a cause adequate to their production. This cause is God, or a being possessed of intelligence and power sufficient to contrive and bring them to pass. He, with evidence from reason equally clear with the testimony of the Scriptures, thundereth marvelously with his voice, holdeth the winds in his fists, sendeth lightnings with rain, looketh on the earth and it trembleth, toucheth the hills and they smoke, melteth the mountains like wax at his presence, causeth the outgoings of the morning and the evening to rejoice, and maketh his sun to rise on the evil and the good. Him also we are bound to praise, because we are fearfully and wonderfully made by him. Our substance was not hid from him when we were made in secret. His eyes saw our substance, yet being imperfect, and in his book all our members were written, which in continuance were fashioned by him, when as yet there was none of them. He also breathed into our nostrils the breath of life, and the inspiration of the Almighty hath given us understanding. Should it be said that these are the natural and necessary results of certain inherent powers of matter and mind, and therefore demand no extrinsic agency, I answer that this objection affects the conclusion only by removing it one step further back in the course of reasoning. That matter should have possessed these powers eternally without exerting them is impossible, and that it should have exerted them from eternity is equally impossible. It then follows that the properties and exertions of matter are derived from an extrinsic cause, and that that cause is possessed of intelligence and power to which no bounds can be assigned. The same argument may be stated in a more general and popular manner. The agency of God is clearly and certainly seen in the preservation and government of all things. The existence of all the forms and states of being which we behold in the universe is plainly derived, because it is a change in the former state of things, communicating, continuing, and terminating, and, as it is impossible that any thing should commence its own existence, derived certainly from an extrinsic and adequate cause. This cause can be none other than God.
CHAPTER I.
1. Existence.
Every Scripture that speaks of God implies his existence. The common interpretation makes "Lord"—Heb., Yehovah—mean the Existing One; as,