Throughout this period the weather was intensely cold and several falls of snow occurred. The billets were passably good, however, and the Battalion's bill of health remained clean.
The Battalion was unfortunate at this period in losing Sergeant-Major Dudley, who had done excellent work since mobilisation and now left for a commission in the Royal Fusiliers. He was killed a fortnight after joining his regiment. His duties were taken by Col.-Sergt. Instr. M. Harris, who filled this important position with success for nearly three years.
On the 22nd February the undermentioned officers, being the first reinforcement received by the Battalion, joined as follows:
Lieuts. F. A. Coffin, H. M. Lorden, D. J. Leonard, and A. D. Coates.
It is now necessary for a moment to look at the course which events were taking on the wide field of the Western Theatre.
At the period with which we are dealing, the Front held by the British troops extended from the Béthune-La Bassée Road, on the right to just north of the Ypres Salient on the left, and General Headquarters (Field-Marshal Sir John French in command) were at St Omer. The British troops were divided into two Armies, of which the First Army under Sir Douglas Haig, consisting of the I Corps (Gough), IV Corps (Rawlinson), and Indian Corps (Willcocks), held the right or southern end of the line; the left being entrusted to the Second Army (Sir H. Smith-Dorrien), which comprised the II Corps (Fergusson), the III Corps (Pulteney), and the V Corps (Plumer).
The moving warfare of the autumn of 1914, which had ended by the opposing armies gradually extending their flanks until the sea was reached and had culminated in the First Battle of Ypres in October—November 1914, had given way to a siege warfare in which the belligerents were confined in continuous lines of trenches which were gradually being more heavily fortified. After the force of the German drive toward Ypres had exhausted itself, a lull in active operations ensued, hostilities flaring up here and there along the line in the shape of minor operations of terrible intensity, in which the possession of a few yards of ground was contested with ferocity by both sides. In the intervals between these small struggles, however, the battle line had been comparatively quiet during the winter months, and not materially changed, the nett result being perhaps a slight gain of ground to the British at the southern end of the line, which was balanced by a tendency to lose ground in the north.
Since the bitter struggle at Ypres in November 1914, the enemy had, in the opinion of Sir John French, shown certain signs of weakening on the Western Front, and this was attributed by him to the success which was attending the Russian offensive in East Prussia, and to the consequent withdrawal of German troops from the West. In order to assist our Russian Allies as far as possible it was necessary to have resort to active operations with the main object of holding as many of the German reserves as possible in the West, and efforts to this end were already being made by the French at Arras and in Champagne.
The ravages caused during the winter trench warfare by sickness and "trench-foot," which had had especially disastrous effects on those regular divisions composed of troops withdrawn from tropical garrisons, rendered necessary the early cultivation of a vigorous offensive spirit, and these combined considerations led Sir John French to the decision to take the offensive as soon as the condition of the ground in Flanders should afford such an undertaking a reasonable prospect of success. By the beginning of March the conditions were considered sufficiently favourable, and the terrain selected for the proposed offensive was the German positions opposed to the First Army and defending the lower slopes of the Aubers Ridge.